Abstract:

On 10 August 2022, the central government of the mainland issued a white paper on “The Taiwan Question and the Cause of China’s Reunification in the New Era”. This is essentially the latest version of China’s decision on the future of Taiwan. This version of the white paper essentially deprives China of the political benefits of the “one country, two systems” policy that China had previously promised Taiwan. This was a major setback for the efforts of Ye’s Nine Points and Deng’s Six Points. It retreated from its earlier promise of “military power, diplomatic power and comprehensive government power, with the central government retaining a special status for Taiwan” to “no military power, no diplomatic power and senior officials subject to central control and supervision”. The “Taiwan Special Administrative Region” has become a choice rather than a necessity. Ye Jianying’s version of the “two-systems solution” gives Taiwan a political structure similar to that of a “confederated country”. Deng Xiaoping’s two-system plan recognised Taiwan’s “substantial full autonomy”. Hong Kong’s roadshow version of the two-systems plan shows that Taiwan can gain “partial diplomatic rights, full government rights, final decision-making rights” and additional military command rights. From 2019 to 2022, Taiwan still has the opportunity to gain more political benefits than the “Hong Kong Two Systems Lite”. With the release of the 2022 White Paper, the Chinese central government has imposed the most severe political restrictions on Taiwan. It essentially deprives Taiwan of the “two systems” benefits it had previously promised. This series of developments is actually the result of a long-term struggle between Taiwanese politicians and the mainland central government. If Taiwan loses its window of opportunity for peace negotiations before 2026, a more serious political failure may be inevitable.

Keywords:

One Country, Two Systems, 2022 Version of Two-system, Ye’s Nine Points, Deng’s Six Points, Forced Reunification, Taiwan, Future

I. The Evolution of “One Country, Two Systems

It has been 43 years since Ye Jianying first proposed the “one country, two systems” plan for Taiwan on 30 September 1981, and the Chinese central government proposed the latest “two systems” plan for Taiwan on 22 August 2022. During these 43 years, the mainland’s one country, two systems plan for Taiwan has actually gone through five versions.

These five versions are a confederation-like national structure based on Ye’s Nine Points; Taiwan’s substantial comprehensive autonomy system based on Deng’s Six Points; a comprehensive autonomy system based on Hong Kong’s demonstration version; and the scaled-down version of Hong Kong after 2020; and a 2022 version of the non-substantive Two-system.

Gap between Taiwan’s Pursuits and Mainland’s Promises				Legend	Y:  All	P: Partial	Noun
Full Independece	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Status Quo	P	P	Y	Y	Y	P	Y
Full Autonomy		P	P	Y	Y	P	Y
Condederation		P	P	Y	Y	P	Y
Federal Structure		P	P	Y	Y	P	P
	International Recognition	Foreign Authority	Military Autonomy	Politics Autonomy	Economy Autonomy	Legislative Power	Final Adjudication
Ye’s Nine Points		P	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Deng’s Six Points		P	P	Y	Y	Y	Y
H.K. Demo Version		P		Y	Y	Y	Y
H.K. Lite Version		P		P	Y	P	Y
2022 Official Version				P/?	Y	P	?
Tabulation ：（叶其泉  PPPNet  www.pppnet.net)

Table 1: Mailand’s Two-system Versions and Taiwan’s Aspirations

1.1 The best version for Taiwan – Ye’s Nine Points

Full Power on Military

Possess diplomatic power (the level is not specified)

Central government will not interfere in Taiwan affairs

The social system remains unchanged; the economic system remains unchanged; the way of life remains unchanged;

Reserve leadership seats specifically for Taiwan

Issued on 30 September 1981.

 

Figure 1: Ye’s Nine Points on Taiwan’s Two System is Closest to Taiwan’s Political Aspirations

1.2 Deng’s Six Points recognised full autonomy in substance

 

Figure 2: Deng’s Six Point version of Two-system recognises Taiwan’s substantial and full autonomy

 

Taiwan can have an army, but it cannot be a threat to the mainland.

Reciprocal negotiations, without mentioning negotiations between the central and local governments.

After reunification, Taiwan can have higher power level than other provinces and regions. For example, final jurisdiction will not go to the mainland.

The mainland does not send anyone to Taiwan. The party, government and military are all run by the Taiwanese themselves; the central government has reserved special seats for Taiwan.

Disagree with the concept of “full autonomy” for Taiwan.

The systems may be different, but in the international arena China can only be represented by the mainland.

Published on 25 June 1983. Restrictions on the military were proposed, but not specifically on diplomatic powers. Specifically stated that we do not support the concept of “full autonomy” for Taiwan.

1.3 Roadshow Version – Hong Kong’s First Version of One Country, Two Systems

Hong Kong does not have the right to command the military (this does not mean that Taiwan has the right to command the military).

Hong Kong has some diplomatic powers

Hong Kong has legislative, executive, judiciary and final judicial powers.

The socio-economic system remains the same.

Hong Kong pays no taxes to the central government. Instead, the central government can provide financial assistance to Hong Kong.

The central government does not send anyone to participate in Hong Kong affairs.

The Chief Executive of Hong Kong and the President of China sit side by side.

After leaving office, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong becomes the vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (national level).

This took effect on 1 July 1997.

1.4 A streamlined version of Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” principle

The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress interferes with Hong Kong’s legislative power through its legislative and interpretative powers.

The Liaison Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has been upgraded from a central liaison office to a representative office of the central government.

Hong Kong established a National Security Council to increase the power of the Chief Executive and reduce the power of the Legislative Council.

Hong Kong’s Chief Executive cannot sit alongside the President and must sit below the Head of State;

Introduced in June 2020.

1.5 Toughest version: latest version on 10 August 2022

Taiwan has no right to control any military.

All diplomatic powers are controlled by the central government.

Executive power is subject to oversight (senior officials are subject to restrictions and oversight) and the administrative structure may be retained.

The economic system will remain unchanged.

Taiwan does not necessarily have to pay taxes; the central government may support Taiwan financially. (emphasis: not necessarily)

Other details can be discussed, but if not, there may not be any.

After the forced unification began, there was basically no chance of peace talks. Political conditions will only get tougher, not looser.

 

Figure 3: The final official version of the two-system plan in 2022: depriving the two systems of their substantive advantages

II. Popular interpretation of the new version of the “one country, two systems” framework

The Chinese central government officially published a white paper on 10 August. It is called “The Taiwan Question and the Cause of China’s Reunification in the New Era” [1]. This is in fact a formal “Taiwan’s new one country, two systems plan”. It can also be called the mainland version of “Taiwan’s Future Decision”. In fact, it massively reduces the chances for peace negotiations between mainland China and Taiwan and further shrinks Taiwan’s political space. In terms of severity, it can be regarded as the greatest political challenge Taiwan has faced in the past 40 years. The White Paper’s restrictions on Taiwan’s political space go far beyond those of the 2005 Anti-Secession Law.

The main features of the new version of Taiwan’s “one country, two systems” framework in 2022 can be briefly described as follows:

1) All political commitments made by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping have become invalid.

2) Taiwan is not allowed to have any diplomatic power, and all diplomatic permissions are entirely in the hands of the central government.

3) Taiwan shall no longer have any military forces under its direct jurisdiction, and its military forces shall be wholly owned by the central government.

4) Taiwan’s administrative officials must support the mainland government. Administrative officials must accept the jurisdiction and supervision of the Central Government.

5) There may be no Taiwan Special Administrative Region.

The specific content of Taiwan’s “one country, two systems” is almost entirely contained in the Section IV and Section V of the white paper ” The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era” [1]. This part will now be transcribed and explained in the vernacular.

2.1 Window for peace talks is still on

[Content in First Paragraph of Section IV.]

National reunification by peaceful means is the first choice of the CPC and the Chinese government in resolving the Taiwan question, as it best serves the interests of the Chinese nation as a whole, including our compatriots in Taiwan, and it works best for the long-term stability and development of China. We have worked hard to overcome hardships and obstacles to peaceful reunification over the past decades, showing that we cherish and safeguard the greater good of the nation, the wellbeing of our compatriots in Taiwan, and peace on both sides.

Interpretation: The mainland will continue to hold peaceful talks and fulfil its responsibility to provide information, protection and justice to compatriots.)

vernacular: The ball is in Taiwan’s court. Don’t blame the mainland for not fulfilling its notification obligations.

2.2 Promises made by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping have become invalid.

[Second Paragraph of Section IV.]

The One Country, Two Systems principle is an important institutional instrument created by the CPC and the Chinese government to enable peaceful reunification. It represents a great achievement of Chinese socialism. Peaceful reunification and One Country, Two Systems are our basic principles for resolving the Taiwan question and the best approach to realizing national reunification. Embodying the Chinese wisdom – we thrive by embracing each other – they take full account of Taiwan’s realities and are conducive to long-term stability in Taiwan after reunification. We maintain that after peaceful reunification, Taiwan may continue its current social system and enjoy a high degree of autonomy in accordance with the law. The two social systems will develop side by side for a long time to come. One Country is the precondition and foundation of Two Systems; Two Systems is subordinate to and derives from One Country; and the two are integrated under the one-China principle. We will continue working with our compatriots in Taiwan to explore a Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question and increase our efforts towards peaceful reunification. In designing the specifics for implementing One Country, Two Systems, we will give full consideration to the realities in Taiwan and the views and proposals from all walks of life on both sides, and fully accommodate the interests and sentiments of our compatriots in Taiwan.

Interpretation: One country takes precedence over two systems. All the details need to be discussed again. Public opinion on both sides of the Taiwan Strait will be taken into account in the negotiations.

vernacular: The promises made by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping have expired. Negotiations focus on mainland public opinion.

2.3 Taiwan’s preference cannot exceed Hong Kong’s.

[Tird Paragraph of Section IV.]

Ever since the One Country, Two Systems principle was proposed, certain political forces have been misrepresenting and distorting its objectives. The DPP and the authorities under its leadership have done everything possible to target the principle with baseless criticisms, and this has led to misunderstandings about its aims in some quarters of Taiwan. It is a fact that since Hong Kong and Macao returned to the motherland and were reincorporated into national governance, they have embarked on a broad path of shared development together with the mainland, and each complements the others’ strengths. The practice of One Country, Two Systems has been a resounding success. For a time, Hong Kong faced a period of damaging social unrest caused by anti-China agitators both inside and outside the region. Based on a clear understanding of the situation there, the CPC and the Chinese government upheld the One Country, Two Systems principle, made some appropriate improvements, and took a series of measures that addressed both the symptoms and root causes of the unrest. Order was restored and prosperity returned to Hong Kong. This has laid a solid foundation for the law-based governance of Hong Kong and Macao and the long-term continuation of One Country, Two Systems.

Interpretation: The two systems are not static. Modification, improvement and perfection are the essential attributes of Two-system.

(Vernacular: Don’t forget what you did to make trouble in Hong Kong. The rebates given to Taiwan cannot exceed those given to Hong Kong)

2.4 There is no option to maintain the status quo.

[Fourth Paragraph of Section IV.]

To realize peaceful reunification, we must acknowledge that the mainland and Taiwan have their own distinct social systems and ideologies. The One Country, Two Systems principle is the most inclusive solution to this problem. It is an approach that is grounded in democratic principles, demonstrates good will, seeks peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question, and delivers mutual benefit. The differences in social system are neither an obstacle to reunification nor a justification for secessionism. We firmly believe that our compatriots in Taiwan will develop a better understanding of the principle, and that the Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question will play its full role while compatriots on both sides work together towards peaceful reunification.

 

(Interpretation: It is no longer possible to maintain the status quo. Now is the time for both sides of the Taiwan Strait to work together to promote reunification.)

(vernacular: Reunification proposal follows the mainland public opinion)

2.5 Unification will be completed during Xi’s term

[Fifth Paragraph of Section IV.]

Peaceful reunification can only be achieved through consultation and discussion as equals. The long-standing political differences between the two sides are the fundamental obstacles to the steady improvement of cross-Straits relations, but we should not allow this problem to be passed down from one generation to the next. We can phase in flexible forms of consultation and discussion. We are ready to engage with all parties, groups, or individuals in Taiwan in a broad exchange of views aimed at resolving the political differences between the two sides based on the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus. Representatives will be recommended by all political parties and all sectors of society on both sides, and they will engage in democratic consultations on peaceful development of cross-Straits relations, integrated development of the two sides, and the peaceful reunification of our country.

(Vernacular: The reunification issue must be completed during Xi’s term and will not be left to his successor.)

2.6 The USA cannot stop reunification

[Tenth Paragraph of Section IV.]

Separatism will plunge Taiwan into the abyss and bring nothing but disaster to the island. To protect the interests of the Chinese nation as a whole, including our compatriots in Taiwan, we must resolutely oppose it and work for peaceful reunification. We are ready to create vast space for peaceful reunification; but we will leave no room for separatist activities in any form. We Chinese will decide our own affairs. The Taiwan question is an internal affair that involves China’s core interests and the Chinese people’s national sentiments, and no external interference will be tolerated. Any attempt to use the Taiwan question as a pretext to interfere in China’s internal affairs or obstruct China’s reunification will meet with the resolute opposition of the Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan. No one should underestimate our resolve, will and ability to defend China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

(Vernacular: Mainland has the ability to handle this matter now)

[Twelfth Paragraph of Section IV.]

Some forces in the US are making every effort to incite groups inside Taiwan to stir up trouble and use Taiwan as a pawn against China. This has jeopardized peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits, obstructed the Chinese government’s efforts towards peaceful reunification, and undermined the healthy and steady development of China-US relations. Left unchecked, it will continue to escalate tension across the Straits, further disrupt China-US relations, and severely damage the interests of the US itself. The US should abide by the one-China principle, deal with Taiwan-related issues in a prudent and proper manner, stand by its previous commitments, and stop supporting Taiwan separatists.

(Vernacular: The United States can no longer play the Taiwan card. If they do, I will beat them to death)

2.7 No tax imposed on Taiwan

[Second Paragraph of Section V.]

Taiwan boasts a high level of economic growth, industries with distinctive local features, and robust foreign trade. Its economy is highly complementary with that of the mainland. After reunification, the systems and mechanisms for cross-Straits economic cooperation will be further improved. Backed up by the vast mainland market, Taiwan’s economy will enjoy broader prospects, become more competitive, develop steadier and smoother industrial and supply chains, and display greater vitality in innovation-driven growth. Many problems that have long afflicted Taiwan’s economy and its people can be resolved through integrated cross-Straits development with all possible connectivity between the two sides. Taiwan’s fiscal revenues can be better employed to improve living standards, bringing real benefits to the people and resolving their difficulties.

(Vernacular: No tax to Taiwan)

2.8 Taiwan SAR will be not necessary. Senior officials must be subject to supervision.

[Fourth Paragraph of Section V.]

Provided that China’s sovereignty, security and development interests are guaranteed, after reunification Taiwan will enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region. Taiwan’s social system and its way of life will be fully respected, and the private property, religious beliefs, and lawful rights and interests of the people in Taiwan will be fully protected. All Taiwan compatriots who support reunification of the country and rejuvenation of the nation will be the masters of the region, contributing to and benefitting from China’s development. With a powerful motherland in support, the people of Taiwan will enjoy greater security and dignity and stand upright and rock-solid in the international community.

(Interpretation: Taiwan Special Administrative Region is an option. Senior officials must support reunification)

(Vernacular: Taiwan’s government officials must support the central government and accept supervision by the central government.)

2.9 No power to command troops

[Sixth Paragraph of Section V.]

The people separated by the Taiwan Straits share the same blood and a common destiny. After reunification, China will have greater international influence and appeal, and a stronger ability to shape international public opinion, and the Chinese people will enjoy greater self-esteem, self-confidence and national pride. In Taiwan and on the mainland the people will share the dignity and triumph of a united China and be proud of being Chinese. We will work together to refine and implement the Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question, to improve the institutional arrangements for implementing the One Country, Two Systems policy, and to ensure lasting peace and stability in Taiwan.

(Interpretation: Now the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are jointly deciding on the two-system plan to ensure that Taiwan will not rebel again)

(Vernacular: Taiwan has no military control, and military power belongs to the central government. The central government must intervene in Taiwan’s government)

 

2.10 All diplomatic powers are vested in the central government.

[Eighth Paragraph of Section V.]

 

After reunification, foreign countries can continue to develop economic and cultural relations with Taiwan. With the approval of the central government of China, they may set up consulates or other official and quasi-official institutions in Taiwan, international organizations and agencies may establish offices, relevant international conventions can be applied, and relevant international conferences can be held there.

(Vernacular: Taiwan has no diplomatic powers. All foreign-related powers are vested in the central government.)

 

III. The reason for Taiwan’s lukewarm response to the new version of the two systems

The white paper “Taiwan Issue and China’s Unification Cause in the New Era”[1] published on 10 August 2022 is actually the official “Taiwan One Country, Two Systems New Plan”. It can also be called the mainland version of “Taiwan’s Future Decision”. It severely restricts Taiwan’s political space after its return to China. It also effectively hinders peace negotiations between mainland China and Taiwan.

In the past, whenever the mainland introduced major measures or major policy changes, whether or not they had anything to do with Taiwan, it triggered a series of official and unofficial reactions from Taiwan. Even pickled mustard, which is not for sale in mainland China, provokes a heated debate in Taiwan. When mainland China introduced the Anti-Secession Law in 2005, it also drew strong reactions from the United States, Europe, Japan and many other countries.

In terms of severity, the 2022 White Paper can be described as the biggest political challenge Taiwan has faced in the past 40 years. The White Paper’s restrictions on Taiwan’s political space far exceed those of the 2005 Anti-Secession Law. At the same time, the consequences of this version of the white paper will also have a serious impact on the existing international order led by the United States.

What is curious is the lukewarm response of the political science community as a whole to this major political event. The countries and regions affected by this political shift include China, Taiwan, the United States, the European Union, Japan and South Korea. There has been no political response from these key parties to the contents of this White Paper. This political insensitivity is highly unusual.

 

This White Paper is a policy document promulgated by mainland China on 10 August 2022, which will fundamentally affect Taiwan’s future political space, political path and political direction. It’s literally been sitting there for a year without being discussed. It is so ridiculous.

It is easy to understand why people in mainland China are not coming out to interpret it. Because everyone knows what they are talking about. Besides, mainland politicians often pretend not to talk about important issues. This is both their political strategy and their political style.

This White Paper is a policy document promulgated by mainland China on 10 August 2022, which will fundamentally affect Taiwan’s future political space, political path and political direction. It’s literally been sitting there for a year without being discussed. It is so ridiculous.

It is easy to understand why people in mainland China are not coming out to interpret it. Because every mainland person knows what they are talking about. Besides, mainland politicians often pretend not to talk about important issues. This is both their political strategy and their political style.

Maybe Taiwan people are deliberately pretending not to understand, or they really do not understand the political language of mainland China. There is none of any vernacular translation on this latest white paper so far. At least, there is no translation on the table so far.

It would be hard to understand if the Taiwanese people did not stand up to comment on this political incident. It is speculated that the main reasons for Taiwanese silence on this important document are as follows:

3.1 Mainland political language has a characteristic structure

Why did Taiwan react so coldly to such an important political document? One important reason is that ordinary people in Taiwan are not familiar with the political language of the mainland. Over the past 70 years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, a unique code language has emerged. This is the political language.

Table 2 Examples of political language on the Chinese mainland
Model language	Popular interpretation	Background
14 March 2012. The then Premier Wen Jiabao pointed out at a press conference that the Chongqing Municipal Party Committee and municipal government should learn profound lessons from the Wang Lijun incident.	Bo Xilai is responsible for the Wang Lijun case.	6 February 2012, Wang Lijun entered the US Consulate in Chengdu for 24 hours. Bo Xilai was Secretary of the Chongqing Municipal Party Committee at the time.
27 March 2012, the People’s Daily published an editorial: Don’t leave difficulties to next shift.	asked Hu Jintao not to leave Bo Xilai’s case to Xi’s tenure.	After 15 March 2012, Bo Xilai disappeared from public view.
2 May 2012, the “People’s Daily” published an editorial entitled “Don’t back down before leaving office”.	Publicly demanding that current General Secretary Hu Jintao deal with the “Bo Xilai case” before the end of his term.	Hu’s term is coming to an end. Xi is about to take over as president.
18 May 2012, the People’s Daily published an editorial entitled “Pave the way before leaving office”.	Hu Jintao was required to handle the Bo Xilai case before leaving office.	Hu’s term is coming to an end. Xi is about to take over as president.
June and July 2012, many provincial Party newspapers across the country printed an interview report on their front pages. The title is “Finish tasks in the current term. Never leave jobs to successor “.	“Don’t leave shit things to me. If you delay any longer, I will overturn the table.	Hu’s term is coming to an end. Xi is about to take over as president.Bo Xilai’s case has not yet been concluded.
Tabulation: Ye Qiquan (PPPNET www.pppnet.net)

 

As for the political language of mainland China, people who have been immersed in the mainland environment for a long time must also interpret it based on the specific political background. This is also the main reason why it is difficult for ordinary people in Taiwan to properly understand the political language and policy statements of the mainland.

3.2 Political scientists and politicians shirk responsibility

Taiwan has a large number of political scientists. There are also people who have had long-term close contacts with mainland politicians. There are also politicians who specialise in studying political trends in mainland China. It is neither professionally nor intuitively logical to assume that these people do not understand the political language of mainland China.

If none of the 23 million people in Taiwan understands the political language of the mainland, this assumption is not statistically logical.

Why don’t these professionals, whose livelihood depends on interpreting political trends on the mainland, come out to interpret this extremely important document? One of the possible reasons is probably to avoid responsibility and allow Taiwan to fall.

3.3 The political atmosphere blocks the view.

The consciousness of ordinary people in Taiwan has been manipulated and misled by some “intentional people”, resulting in the gradual development of the five versions of “one country, two systems” and the gradual narrowing of Taiwan’s political space and political rights.

The one-sided “anti-one country, two systems atmosphere” has made some sober people reluctant to raise the issue of one country, two systems, thus missing a good political opportunity.

• In 2019, some people have predicted that mainland China will abandon the one country, two systems policy, which was originally a political preference proactively provided by the mainland. This observer believes that one country, two systems is in line with the medium- and long-term political interests of the Taiwanese people. This person tried his best to convey his predictions to the Taiwanese people. He reminded the Taiwanese people to pursue one country, two systems. It is a pity that no matter how hard this voice tries, it cannot be effectively disseminated to the public in Taiwan. It shows that public opinion in Taiwan is not very open, and it hinders the dissemination of voices that are beneficial to Taiwan’s medium- and long-term interests.

3.4 Mainland conceals essence and key points

This time, the mainland has introduced a major policy that will seriously affect Taiwan’s political space and political ecology. Compared with the past, when the mainland often issued loud warnings to Taiwan, this time the mainland chose to handle this major incident coldly. The reasons why Mainland China, from the private sector to the official sector, has consistently handled this major incident coldly are as follows:

1) Public opinion in mainland China is against peaceful reunification and looks forward to armed reunification. Mainland officials are unwilling to encourage Taiwan’s readiness for peace talks.

2) Officials have made armed preparations and are convinced that there will be no surprises in this united armed action. They do not want Taiwan to bring up peace talks.

3) Compared to peaceful reunification, armed reunification is more in line with China’s overall national interests. [2]

4) Major media platforms in mainland China are forbidden to discuss this incident.

IV. The process of one country, two systems between Taiwan and mainland China

4.1 Ye’s Nine Points, Deng’s Six Points and Chiang‘s Three No Policy

According to a 1981 “Ye’s Nine Points”, Taiwan can achieve a substantially fully autonomous status similar to or even higher than that of the confederation with full military power.

Although Deng’s 1983 “Six Points” clearly limited the formulation of “full autonomy”, it did not deny the essence of full autonomy. Although Deng’s Six Points proposed to limit the size of Taiwan’s military, he did not abolish Taiwan’s military command. Deng made it clear that the central government would not send anyone to Taiwan to participate in administration. Accordingly, Taiwan can send people to join the central government. The central government reserves a set of seat specifically for Taiwan (implying the seats of the vice-president and some other senior officials).

Mr Chiang Ching-kuo, the then leader of Taiwan, first rejected the mainland’s proposal on the basis of the “Three People’s Principles”. He then rejected the mainland’s proposal with the “three no’s” policy (no contact, no negotiation and no compromise).

At that time, Taiwan’s GDP was US$53.5 billion and mainland China’s was US$231.2 billion. Taiwan’s GDP is about a quarter of China’s GDP. This is an important reason why Taiwan does not want to unify with the mainland.

Second, Taiwan’s economic prosperity in the 1970s was closely linked to the economic policies of the United States. Taiwan has no political power to oppose US foreign policy. Cross-strait separation is the political goal of the United States.

There may be another factor that is more important than the above. Mr Chiang Ching-kuo could not prevent the Taiwan independence forces from carrying out the political liquidation of the Chiang family. The political liquidation of the Chiang family by the Taiwan independence forces made Mr Chiang Ching-kuo lose his desire to continue to protect Taiwan. This may be an important reason why Chiang Ching-kuo lost his pursuit of historical achievements.

4.2 Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States broke the tacit political understanding

In 1995, while president of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui visited an American university, breaking the long-standing tacit political understanding between the Chiang family and the mainland. This led to the 1995 cross-strait missile crisis.

4.3 Before leaving office, Lee Teng-hui launched the theory of “special state-to-state relations” (1999).

In 1999, before leaving office, Lee Teng-hui launched the theory of “cross-strait special relations”, which further aggravated the conflicts between the mainland and the island. Lee Teng-hui has special thoughts about Japan. This is one of the main reasons why Lee Teng-hui prevented further reconciliation between Mainland and Taiwan.

Although Lee Teng-hui prevented the two sides from coming closer, public opinion in Taiwan at that time had not reached the level of supporting Taiwan independence. The international political situation did not give Taiwan a chance to become independent.

In 1999, Taiwan’s GDP was US$298.8 billion, while mainland China’s GDP was US$1,421.2 billion. Taiwan’s GDP is about one-fifth that of mainland China. Taiwan’s economic advantages are still very evident.

4.4 Chen Shui-bian’s “one country, one side” (2002)

In 2002, Chen Shui-bian proposed the “one country on each side” theory, which led to unprecedented tensions in cross-strait relations.

In fact, since the bin Laden 9/11 incident in 2001, Taiwan has completely lost its political opportunity for independence. However, the “Taiwan independence” atmosphere in Taiwan has been hyped to an unprecedented level by Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian and has gotten out of control. Chen Shui-bian’s “one country, one side” theory can only slightly ease the political pressure on him from the Taiwan independence forces. However, this move led to China and the United States jointly imposing sanctions on Taiwan.

The United States defined Chen Shui-bian as a troublemaker and imposed sanctions on Taiwan. The premise is that the United States needs China’s help to suppress the uprisings in the Arab world.

4.5 Mainland China promulgates Anti-Secession Law (2005)

During Chen Shui-bian’s rule in Taiwan, Taiwanese independence forces developed rapidly. Chen Shui-bian has repeatedly expressed his intention to hold a “referendum” on the island of Taiwan. The referendum plan is to decide whether Taiwan will choose the path of independence or reunification. In order to counter Taiwan’s referendum, mainland China enacted the Anti-Secession Law in 2005. This law directly identifies issues such as the Taiwan referendum as trigger points for the armed reunification of Taiwan. Because the United States needs China’s help in its war on terrorism, the United States is essentially powerless to prevent the introduction of this law.

Another effect of the introduction of this law is that China will accept the maintenance of the status quo in Taiwan. The mainland did not object to the conditions promised by Ye’s Nine Points and Deng’s Six Points. This stage is actually the best time for Taiwan to gain political space for “almost full autonomy”.

However, due to the rising atmosphere of Taiwan independence, Taiwan did not clearly realise that the political environment had changed, thus missing a good opportunity to negotiate.

4.6 Taiwan Red Shirt Army March(2006)

In 2006, large anti-Beijing and anti-corruption demonstrations took place in Taiwan. The main point of departure is Chen Shui-bian’s corruption of state secrets fee case.

However, the corruption in the “Lafayette Warship Case” involving Lee Teng-hui is far more serious than Chen Shui-bian’s secret state spending case, and the evidence is more obvious and easier to obtain. But no one spoke out against Lee Teng-hui’s corrupt behaviour.

In essence, this anti-corruption march is just an excuse for this Red Shirt movement. The essence is to oppose Chen Shui-bian’s hesitation in the process of Taiwan independence. Although Chen Shui-bian knew that Taiwan independence had no chance at all, public opinion in Taiwan at the time believed that Chen Shui-bian had missed the opportunity to pursue Taiwan independence. This is the main reason why Taiwan independence forces rose up to denounce him.

The anti-Bian demonstration by the Taiwan Red Shirt Army was superficially an anti-corruption demonstration, but in reality it was a concentrated display of Taiwan independence forces in Taiwan.

4.7 Ma Ying-jeou maintains the status quo (2008-2016)

The anti-Bian movement of the Taiwan Red Shirt Army in 2006 was essentially an act by Taiwan independence forces to accuse Chen Shui-bian of delaying the process of Taiwan independence. But this accusation was made under the guise of “anti-corruption”. This anti-corruption veil contributed to the victory of the “non-corrupt Ma Ying-jeou” in Taiwan’s 2008 elections.

Ma Ying-jeou won a landslide victory in the 2008 Legislative Yuan elections. But during his administration, the proportion of Taiwan’s population who consider themselves Chinese has fallen rapidly, while the proportion who consider themselves Taiwanese has risen sharply. Ma Ying-jeou did not even correct the Taiwan independence propaganda in history textbooks, which is relatively easy to do. His actions led many members who opposed Taiwan independence to unanimously condemn him.

On a deeper level, it was the anti-corruption campaign of the Red Shirt Army in 2006 that made Ma Ying-jeou afraid of the Taiwan independence forces and did not dare to take any measures to correct or limit Taiwan independence.

At the same time, mainland China’s newly introduced anti-secession law gives Ma Ying-jeou room to maintain the status quo. This allows him to manoeuvre between China’s opposition to Taiwanese independence and Taiwan’s desire for independence.

Limited by the strength of mainland China at the time, the mainland has not found more and better ways to control the development of Taiwan’s independence movement. There is no strong force opposing Taiwan independence on the island of Taiwan. As a result, relations between Taiwan and the mainland have become increasingly estranged.

4.8 Tsai Ing-wen manipulates Taiwan independence consciousness (2016-)

Tsai Ing-wen is a typical politician who relies on “Taiwan independence” sentiment to win elections in Taiwan. In fact, she has many shortcomings, and she relies on the cover of Taiwan independence to protect her government. Tsai Ing-wen’s Taiwan independence mantle may even protect her for some time after she leaves office.

However, the political environment has changed dramatically, and it is impossible for Tsai Ing-wen to achieve any results in the actual process of Taiwan independence.

During her time in office, China’s political and economic strength was fully comparable to that of the United States. Mainland China was also able to gain an advantage in the region in terms of military strength. These political realities make Tsai Ing-wen the most vulnerable politician in Taiwan.

Tsai has very good political skills. Through a series of fake “Taiwan independence” actions, she continues to win the support of the Taiwanese people. And protect her from a series of mistakes.

Another effect of Tsai Ing-wen’s series of games with the central government is that mainland public opinion has turned to calling for the military reunification of Taiwan. Mainland public opinion has gone from embracing and admiring the Taiwanese to hating and despising the Taiwanese, to despising and even scorning the Taiwanese people. Mainland Chinese view Taiwan from “the most beautiful scenery” to “one country, two wisdoms” to “frog” to “traitor”. This series of political-ecological changes that are not favourable to Taiwan essentially began with Tsai Ing-wen.

In the 2020 election in Taiwan, almost 97% of mainlanders supported Tsai Ing-wen. The starting point is that Tsai’s government can promote the military unification process in mainland China. This shows how much pressure the mainland central government is under regarding military unification.

4.9 Mainland public opinion against peace talks and for forced reunification (2019, 2020)

The year 2019 is actually a key juncture for “one country, two systems”. Since this year, the mainland public’s attitude towards “one country, two systems” has undergone a fundamental change.

Anti-extradition riots took place in Hong Kong in 2019. The US and Taiwan authorities are deeply involved. The mainland people’s contempt for the Taiwan authorities and the Taiwanese people has quickly turned from contempt to hatred. They regard the Taiwan authorities and people as “traitors”.

After the chaos in Hong Kong in 2019, any blog posts with anti-war content, or even articles related to anti-war, quickly lost their space. Whether it is an official WeChat account, Sina Weibo or ifeng.com blog, anti-war blogs or posts are quickly reported by readers and quickly disappear. At the same time, a large number of blog posts commemorating the war and its heroes appeared on the Chinese internet.

On 3 September 2019, President Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the Central Party School. The word “struggle” appeared 56 times in the speech[3].

On September 8, 2019, Ye Qiquan posted an article on Duowei Blog, stating that “one country, two systems” was moving away from Taiwan and reminding Taiwan to actively work for it to avoid serious damage to its political interests[4].

On 30 June 2020, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress used its legislative power to directly enact the National Security Law for Hong Kong.

In the 2020 Taiwan election, almost 97% of the mainland population supported Tsai Ing-wen. The starting point is that Tsai’s government can promote China’s military reunification process. This shows that the mainland central government is under enormous pressure to unify Taiwan by force.

4.10 Repeated conflicts have caused Taiwan to repeatedly lose political interests (2022)

In August 2022, Lopez, Speaker of the US House of Representatives, visits Taiwan. The mainland has begun military exercises in waters within 12 nautical miles of the island of Taiwan. This includes Japan’s exclusive economic zone.

In this wave of military exercises, mainland military aircraft are officially and frequently flying over the 70-year-old central demarcation line across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan has officially lost its military isolation role in the central line of the Taiwan Strait.

Unconfirmed reports indicate that a Chinese warship has appeared within sight of Kaohsiung port.

On 10 August 2022, the mainland central government issued a white paper on ‘The Taiwan Question and the Cause of Chinese Reunification in the New Era’. Taiwan has been deprived of the political benefits of “essentially one country, two systems”. This version of the white paper clearly emphasises that: the commitments made by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping are null and void; Taiwan doesn’t have the power to unify the military; Taiwan has no diplomatic power; Taiwan’s senior officials must accept direct supervision by the central government; the issue of Taiwan reunification must be resolved during Xi Jinping’s term of office. This is seen as the biggest setback for Taiwan’s political rights in 40 years.

Mainland China has taken the harshest and most substantial disciplinary measures against Taiwan. However, both Taiwan and mainland China kept a low profile and did not publicise this major event.

Ye Qiquan predicted that 2026 will be the final deadline for mainland China to initiate armed reunification [4].

V. The likelihood of the latest version of “one country, two systems” coming to Taiwan

Although the latest version of the two-systems plan in August 2022 clearly stripped Taiwan of its military and diplomatic rights, it made clear commitments in areas closely related to ordinary people. These include that the economic system will remain unchanged, that Taiwan will not be taxed, that the livelihood system will remain unchanged, and that the central government can provide financial support if necessary. It also means that the administrative system can be discussed and there can be a special administrative region structure, etc.

But in the new White Paper there is a strong hint. That is, any reserved political space must be obtained through peaceful negotiations. This may indicate another pessimistic side, which is that the above-mentioned commitments will not definitely be maintained under the path of military unification.

Will the Taiwan authorities opt for peaceful negotiations on “one country, two systems”? Is there any chance of peaceful reunification across the Taiwan Strait? The prediction of this article is no. The chances of cross-strait peace negotiations are extremely slim. The main way to reunification will eventually be through military action. The main reasons are

1) Such a “one country, two systems” policy has restricted Taiwan’s political space more than Ye’s Nine Points and Deng’s Six Points. Taiwan has no public opinion base to accept it.

2) There is no chance that powerful politicians will emerge in Taiwan to reverse the current political atmosphere;[2].

3) Mainland public opinion is against peace talks;[2].

4) Peace talks have a major negative impact on the overall interests of the country;[2].

5) Mainland China has political and military advantages over the United States in regional battlegrounds;[5,7].

6) It is extremely difficult for the United States and the U.S. alliance to face armed unified action from the mainland. [5]

Based on the above, the chances of cross-Strait peace negotiations are extremely slim. The main way for reunification will eventually be through military action. Then a period of military control will last for a long time until there is considerable mutual integration between the two sides. Ye Qiquan’s expected period of military control is about 30 years [6].

Summary

On 10 August 2022, the central government of the mainland issued a white paper on “The Taiwan Question and the Cause of China’s Reunification in the New Era”. This is essentially the latest version of China’s decision on the future of Taiwan. This version of the white paper essentially deprives China of the political benefits of the “one country, two systems” policy that China had previously promised Taiwan. This was a major setback for the efforts of Ye Jiutiao and Deng Liutiao. It retreated from its earlier promise of “military power, diplomatic power and comprehensive government power, with the central government retaining a special status for Taiwan” to “no military power, no diplomatic power and senior officials subject to central control and supervision”. The “Taiwan Special Administrative Region” has become a choice rather than a necessity. Ye Jianying’s version of the “two-systems solution” gives Taiwan a political structure similar to that of a “confederated country”. Deng Xiaoping’s two-system plan recognised Taiwan’s “substantial full autonomy”. Hong Kong’s roadshow version of the two-systems plan shows that Taiwan can gain “partial diplomatic rights, full government rights, final decision-making rights” and additional military command rights. From 2019 to 2022, Taiwan still has the opportunity to gain more political benefits than the “Hong Kong Two Systems Lite”. With the release of the 2022 White Paper, the Chinese central government has imposed the most severe political restrictions on Taiwan. It essentially deprives Taiwan of the “two systems” benefits it had previously promised. This series of developments is actually the result of a long-term struggle between Taiwanese politicians and the mainland central government. If Taiwan loses its window of opportunity for peace negotiations before 2026, a more serious political failure may be inevitable.

Reference

1. Policy Document. The Taiwan Question and China’s “Reunification”in the New Era. Interpret: China. CSIS. Aug. 10, 2022. https://interpret.csis.org/translations/the-taiwan-question-and-chinas-reunification-in-the-new-era/
2. 叶其泉。中国武统计划（9）：台湾之宿命（2：永失一国两制）. PPPNet. Sep.  12，https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan9-taiwans-destiny-02/
3. Xi Foucus: Xi emphasizes “struggles” to achieve national rejuvenation. XINHUANET. Sep. 3, 2019. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/03/c_138362482.htm
4. Ye QiQuan. China’s Unifying Plan:(1) Shaped by 2012, Works in 2026. PPPNet. Mar. 29, 2023. https://en.pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026/
5. Ye QiQuan. China’s Unifying Plan:(5) Risk Assessment of Total Sina-US War. PPPNet. Mar. 29, 2023. https://en.pppnet.net/risk-assessment-of-total-sino-us-war/
6. 叶其泉。中国武统计划（9）：台湾之宿命（3：统一的路径和特征）. PPPNet. Sep. 17, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan9-taiwans-destiny-03/
7. 叶其泉. 联盟战争强度评估系统：中美在东亚周边的全面战争结局推测. PPPNet. Dec. 9, 2023. https://pppnet.net/group-war-strength-system-predicting-china-usa-war-around-east-asia/