It is a necessary political process for China to begin effective governance immediately after Taiwan’s reunification. The efficiency of China’s central government in governing Taiwan will be closely related to the effectiveness of China’s use of Taiwan’s geopolitical power. It even affects the efficiency and effectiveness of China’s integration of geopolitical forces in East Asia. It may even affect China’s historical progress. At present, it is impossible to speculate on the Chinese central government’s logic and plan for governing Taiwan. But there are many cases of power integration in Chinese history. Reviewing these histories will undoubtedly improve our understanding of the Chinese central government’s logic in ruling Taiwan.
I. The importance of the island of Taiwan in the process of Chinese history
- To effectively heal China’s long-term chronic bleeding wounds;
- To effectively block China’s eastern strategic gap;
- Play the role of “land bridge” or “land sword” to bring land power into the sea power area;
- Suppress the sea power of Japan and South Korea and the political power parasitic on sea power;
- Lay the foundation for China to dominate and integrate the geopolitical forces in East Asia;
- Achieve, possess or maintain a cornerstone of power to displace the military and political presence of the United States in East Asia;
- Become the basis for weakening the power of the US empire, or become a forward base for confronting the power of the US empire;
- Become the basis of political and military power for an economic cooperation mechanism in East Asia or Pan-East Asia;
- The basis for dramatically improving China’s overall national strength;
- The prerequisite and foundation for China to effectively expand its national interests in other directions;
- Gives China the initiative to choose the G2, G3 or G4 international order. At the very least, it will give China the potential power to guide the development of the international order.
II. Stable and sustainable governance solutions will effectively reduce governance costs.
Formulating a moderate, stable and sustainable governance strategy has always been China’s basic principle for governing the country. “Governing a big country is like cooking small fish” has always been a wise saying in China.
China’s plan to rule Taiwan may start from the day the military operation is launched. And it may adapt the process of the military operation to the needs of the political plan to rule Taiwan. The political aim of the military operation may be to lay the best possible political foundation for the government after the landing.
III. Famous cases of power integration and their background in the past
| Famous Power Integration Cases and Their Backgrounds in History | |
| Success Cases | Failure Cases |
| Feudalism of the Zhou Dynasty (Early Era) | Feudalism of the Zhou Dynasty (Later Era) |
| v Quickly distribute ruling power to controllable areas of the empire. Form a powerful distributed power system. Maximize empire’s span of control and safety buffer
v Recruit surrender quickly and effectively and manage potential opposition forces of ex-dynasty. v Appease the peripheral areas of the empire with minimal cost, and thus expand the empire’s ruling area and security area. v Using the huge power gap at the founding of the dynasty, successfully established an internal power hierarchical management system. |
v Fail to maintain the power gap needed to maintain imperial order.
v Without metabolic mechanism to reverse the decline of royal power. v shirmped tax can not cover the dynasty’s administrative costs. v paying management costs by cutting off its own financial resources, labour and land. |
| Jin State weakened royal family（Early Era） | Jin State weakened royal family（Later Era） |
| v vThe The Jin state suppressed the power of members of the royal family. A single inheritance mechanism that prevents other family members who have the right to inherit the royal power from threatening the royal power.
v The power to administer the country is held by nobles who have no right to inherit the royal power. This ensures the long-term stability of the royal power. v Multiple Noble families jointly govern the country and maintain the long-term stability of the governance system. The king was always at the centre of power. v The ruling nobles who were prevented by philosophical authority from seizing royal power. |
v The royal family lost its metabolic ability and gradually lost its political ability and management ability.
v Administrative power was gradually concentrated in the hands of a few noble families. v As The authority of the philosophical centre declined, and the isolation mechanism between the ruling aristocracy and the royal power was damaged. Eventually, the ruling nobles took over the royal power. |
| Centralisation of Power (Qin State) | Centralisation of Power (Qin Dynasty) |
| v The Qin State pioneered the abolition of the feudal system in recorded history. The reward system was used to appease nobles and commoners who had contributed to the country. Commoners could be gradually promoted to nobles. Nobles could be stripped of their privileges and become commoners.
v Promote the first class tax system. Deprive the nobility of their right to tax. The tax-free privileges of the nobility were a gift from the king. For the first time in recorded history, the power of taxation became a direct power of the crown. v Qin became the only state among the kingdoms of the time to have truly centralised power. v Qin had the strongest ability to concentrate national financial resources. This is the main reason why the Qin state was able to repeatedly launch large-scale wars and unite other six states. |
v Great success has led to an exaggerated belief in the deterrent power of force.
v Repeatedly stripping the nobility of their privileges diminished the people’s admiration for the path to advancement. v Excessive the use of force to expand the Empire’s territory rapidly and uncontrollably. v There did not use military force within the Empire to prevent rebellion. v Neglect to gain popular support in newly conquered territories. |
| Centralisation and feudalism coexisted in the Han dynasty | The Western Chu dynasty restored feudalism |
| v vClearly Aware of the powerful governing ability of centralised power
v vClear Awareness of the scope of centralised authority v vExtensive Use of reward system to replace feudal system and appease military merit groups v Feudalism was partly introduced to supplement the empire’s ability to govern. v vClearly understood the short-term nature, necessity and risks of the feudal pacification model. |
v Mistakenly attributed the fall of the Qin dynasty to the centralised system.
v Not good at applying the reward system and using feudal plans to appease military merit groups v Restore the feudal system and wasted the huge power gap in the early days of the dynasty. v Wasting the ability to govern brought about by the huge power gap |
| Branched Inheritance to weaken Lords | Weaken Lords through depriving territory |
| v A slow but low resistance way to weaken lords. | v A fast and furious way to weaken lords, but encounter strong resistance |
| Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty naturalized the Huns | Lord Chen usurps King Jiang’s power |
| v The first two-system solution in history. The Huns customary law was implemented inside the naturalised areas. The Han dynasty management system was implemented outside the naturalised areas.
v Utilize the huge economic and cultural attractions to gradually guide the Huns to actively and smoothly integrate into the Han cultural mechanism. v The The huge military power gap between the Han Dynasty and the Huns was the guarantee and background for the completion of the integration process. |
v The originally weak foreign nobility, after more than 10 generations of continuous accumulation, eliminated the power gap between the royal power and the nobility.
v The weakening and disappearance of the isolation between the royal power and the nobility was the external cause of the change in the royal power. v The economic and military power of the nobility exceeded the power of the royal power, which was the fundamental reason for the change of power. |
| Emperor Guangwu of Han Dynasty’s New Deal | New Deal of the New-Dynasty |
| v Excellent political and military skills helped him to establish a dynasty.
v Not only suppress super-rich families, but he also relies on wealthy families to establish a ruling order. v Disarmament, tax cuts, support for agriculture v The people’s livelihood system was neither comprehensive nor more advanced than the New-Dynasty’s, but it was ultimately successful. v A strong power differential ensures a strong taxing power. A strong taxing power guarantees economic recovery and development. |
v The First attempt at a comprehensive social security system in history.
v Land reform, every person own land; redistribution of social wealth, restraining rich families and supporting poor families; use of fiscal policy to stimulate the private economy; pioneering use of the National Bank to lend money to the private economy. v The weakening power gap did not help to open up the financial resources of the empire. Advanced land, financial and fiscal reforms continued to fail because they were not supported by fiscal sources. v Failed realised that the chaos of the Western Han Dynasty was due to the weakening of the power gap, but instead tried to restore the feudal system and maintain an imperial order by further weakening the power gap. v Strengthening a weaken order through a way to weaken its own power that is an ineffective idealistic prescription。 |
| Emperor Guangwu of Han Dynasty’s success | King Fu Jian’s Lenient Policy |
| v vIt is both good at using addition to establish the power gap and good at using subtraction to widen the power gap.
v vSuperior military skills are the basis of his military success. v vExcellent’s political skills enabled him to mobilise scattered political resources. This is the basis for his many comebacks from defeat. |
v Good in using addition to build extreme power.
v Weaker than using subtraction to increase or maintain power gap. v The power advantage established by superior military capability cannot last long. v An accidental military defeat triggered a comprehensive defeat. v vThe short-term power gap narrows, triggering the collapse of the ruling order. |
| The bravery of Emperor Wu of Wei Dynasty | The cowardice of Emperor Wen of Wei Dynasty |
| v The The foundation of the uprising was weak, but it faced many difficulties and dangers and achieved great successes.
v Heroic. Dare to look down on a wealthy family. It was the first of its kind to apply the principle of meritocracy. v Collect Heroes from the grassroots and wealthy families at the same time. A stable power structure was established. v Able to take advantage of wealthy families without being constrained by them. |
v Strong on the outside, but weak on the inside, succumbing to the wealthy family.
v Having the best hand, but very poor results. v Share long-term government power to wealthy families in exchange for short-term benefits. This policy sowed the seeds of the Wei dynasty’s loss of power. v Sharing royal power with the aristocratic families that results in a very small power gap. A stable power structure could not be maintained. It triggered more than 200 years of national chaos after the Wei Dynasty. |
| Abolition of the chieftaincy in the Ming and Qing dynasties | State Governor, Family Forces and Jiedu Envoys |
| v Attract people through cultural and economic advantages. Subsequently, cultural power was used to maintain stability.
v Replace the chieftaincy system to the bureaucracy in remote areas if the power gap is appropriate. v When the general direction is right, even if you make many mistakes in the details, you will still get good results in the end. |
v Initially They were helpful in maintaining central leadership. But in the end they weakened the central government’s power gap.
v Once The central power is weakened by accidental factors, the central government loses the effective power gap to dominate the operation of the order. v Even Super-political players with excellent political talents cannot save big systemic mistakes by excellent detail skills. |
| Bandit crackdown in Guizhou province (Later Period) | Rebellion in Guizhou Province |
| v The policy of moving from harsh repression to lenient comfort is the basis for solving the banditry problem in Guizhou. | v In In 1949, the old regime in Guizhou Province quietly surrendered to the Communist regime.
v Guizhou’s surrender was the quietest and smoothest process in the country. The least amount of military force was used in Guizhou Province. v Guizhou The old regime’s system was quickly and smoothly replaced by the new regime’s management system. v Six Months later, banditry broke out in Guizhou. Almost all the old military and political personnel who had surrendered rebelled. v Guizhou went from being the province with the smoothest surrender to the most serious banditry in the southwest (of the country). |
| Suppression of bandits in Guangxi Province (Later Period) | Suppression of bandits in Guangxi Province (Early Period) |
| v The policy of moving from lenient comfort to harsh repression is the basis for solving the banditry problem in Guangxi. | v The The initial phase of bandit suppression in Guangxi was relatively smooth.
v The more bandits are suppressed, the more complex the war becomes. |
| Governance in the autonomous prefectures of Yunnan Province | Chiang Kai-shek and Hu Jintao’s bribery towards Taiwan |
| v Full respect for local leaders
v Various policies are based on leniency, but are not overly accommodating. v The huge cultural, economic and military gap is the basis for ensuring the stability and security of Yunnan’s autonomous prefectures. |
v Chiang Kai-shek shipped all the gold he could collect in China to Taiwan. This wealth is the basis for Taiwan’s rapid economic development. But Taiwanese people hated Chiang Kai-shek extremely.
v During his tenure, Hu Jintao continued to deliver benefits and goodwill to Taiwan. However, during Hu’s tenure, Taiwan’s independence consciousness rapidly fermented. |
| Integration of the Yi people in Sichuan Province | Hong Kong’s Two System Plan (before 2019) |
| v In 1950, Yi People lived in a slave social system. The level of cultural development also differs greatly among Han societies. Their customs are also different from those of Han society. They don’t even understand that the land they live on belongs to this country. After just over 30 years of integration, the YI people have rapidly entered modern society. There is no longer a great cultural and political isolation from the Han people.
v vCultural Guidance v vCoordinate intervention v vEconomically attractive v vDid not empowering sub-ethnic identities |
v The modern version of the Jiedushi system is more decentralized than the Tang Dynasty.
v The starting point is overly optimistic. There is a huge gap between the results and expectations. v The governance ideas were inherited from the Tang Dynasty. The central government has repeatedly used appeasement programs to deal with local arrogance. v Empowerment of national sub-identities leads to separation of identities and alienation of political stances. |
| Success Cases | Failure Cases |
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Tabulation: Ye Qiquan （叶其泉 PPPNet www.pppnet.net) |
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At present, it is difficult to fathom the Chinese central government’s logic and plan for governing Taiwan. Reviewing the many cases of power integration in Chinese history is undoubtedly a valuable exercise. It can enhance our understanding of future plans for governing Taiwan.