(Note: This is a political commentary article of a predictive nature. It focuses on the axis of the development of political science and tries to provide a tool for political thinking. Most of the arguments in the article cannot be supported by documentary sources, so their reliability and authenticity cannot be verified.)
Abstract:
Europe has been in political risk since the 2022 war. A military conflict between China and the United States in 2026 will amplify Europe’s risks. European political uncertainty will be highlighted in the following aspects. Uncertainty in Europe-China relations. Uncertainty about stability and chaos in Europe. Uncertainty about Europe’s political future. Uncertainty about Europe’s geopolitical prospects. Europe has realistically lost the ability to control its own future. Europe’s political and geopolitical prospects are seriously affected by the United States, China and the geopolitical forces surrounding Europe.
Keywords:
Europe; uncertainty; politics; geopolitics; future; prediction; international relation;
To see Europe as a major part of China’s unification problem may be beyond the thinking inertia of most people. But the fact is that Europe could become the biggest risk factor in China’s unification drive and the subsequent Sino-US conflict.
Beyond common political science stereotypes, Europe is actually the region with the most endogenous anti-China sentiment. In fact, anti-China sentiment in Europe is much stronger than in Japan and South Korea. Under the new realistic environment, the possibility of Europe joining the East Asian battlefield and participating in military operations against China is very real. And once this possibility comes true, it will put unbearable political pressure on China and also have a huge impact on Europe’s prospects.
I. Uncertainty in Europe-China relations
1.1 Persistent but fragile friendship with China
Since 1972, Europe’s political attitude towards China has gone up and down. A thin thread of continuous friendship towards China in Europe is vaguely discernible. On this timeline, the European powers have behaved differently at different times.
BRITAIN:
Britain is a traditional political power in Europe. Britain’s political attitude towards China basically reflects the trend of Europe’s political attitude towards China.
Britain established diplomatic relations with the Republic of China before other Western European countries. In the 1980s, Britain followed the trend and joined Western countries in expressing friendship with China. The 1980s was the honeymoon period for China and the whole Western world. Western Europe opened up arms cooperation with China. In 2015, China, France and the UK jointly built a nuclear power plant in the UK, which was once seen as a new step in the friendship between China and the UK. At the same time, the UK has also opened up a number of areas of friendly cooperation with China. But soon this trend of friendly cooperation reached a low point.
France:
In the eyes of the Chinese, France is not the strongest country opposing China. It is generally believed that under-the-table exchanges between France and China began in the era of Charles de Gaulle. The history of friendly cooperation between China and France has never been particularly illustrious. However, there has always been a lack of French origin in the background of China’s weapons research and development, especially that of helicopters.
Germany:
Cooperation between Germany and China is mainly manifested in political non-enmity and economic cooperation. Germany has never played a role in strongly criticising China, which makes Germany generally favoured by the Chinese people. In the era of Merkel’s leadership, Germany’s economic cooperation with China has been very close. Merkel visits China almost every other year.
Italy:
Italy is not the most staunch opponent of China. It was the first country in Western Europe to join the Belt and Road Initiative. During the period of COVID19, China invested a large amount of medical supplies and protective equipment in Italy. Some Italian traces can be found on the chassis of Chinese armoured vehicles and light helicopters.
1.2 Instability of current pillars of friendship with China
1.2.1The political illusion of a basic level of friendship between China and Europe
Ordinary people in China do not see Europe as a hardline political centre opposed to China. This is actually the result of China’s long-term political attitude towards Europe. In China’s propaganda base, anti-China actions in Europe are treated as sporadic and scattered actions. China has always regarded Europe as a political group that is basically positive towards China. China’s countermeasures to Europe’s hostilities are basically limited to “reciprocal countermeasures”, “concrete countermeasures on specific cases” and “countermeasures without amplification or generalisation”.
China is promoting more examples of Europe’s friendship with China. This has long created the illusion that China and Europe are basically friendly.
The UK is the first G7 country to announce its membership of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The UK once announced that it would build the most powerful offshore RMB management centre. The UK, France and China are jointly building UK nuclear power stations. The UK has said it welcomes investment from China across the board. British leaders visit China frequently. All this is interpreted by China as a new round of political process for Britain to be friendly to China. However, the UK soon introduced a series of policies that severely restricted Chinese investment. China was forced to withdraw from an agreement to build British nuclear power stations.
Under Mrs Merkel’s leadership, Germany has visited China once every two years. Economic cooperation between Germany and China took place in an atmosphere of comprehensive coordination. However, after Merkel resigned, the new German leadership quickly made a series of speeches that were unfriendly to China.
When Italy and Europe were hit by COVID19, China quickly supported Italy and Europe with large quantities of medical equipment and personal protective equipment. The gratitude of the Italian and European people to China is heavily publicised by Chinese propaganda tools. However, after escaping the COVID-19 state of emergency, Italian public opinion and politicians quickly supported the statement that “China is responsible for the spread of COVID-19”.
Poland, the Czech Republic and Lithuania all warmly embraced China. Now all three countries have turned against China. Hungary is currently a country that is typically friendly to China, but in the past Hungary’s policy towards China has also experienced repeated turmoil.
1.2.2 The instability of the existing basis for friendship with China
To list some “European countries” with “basically friendly” policies towards China, Hungary, Greece and Serbia can meet the such a loose standard.
Greece’s friendship with China can be seen as a case of necessity. When Greece was abandoned by all its cousins, China was the only saviour. It cannot be ruled out that when Europe is in a position to save Greece, Greece may abandon its China-friendly policies.
Serbia is another case of necessity. At a time when it is facing widespread hostility, China’s help is of great value to it. Russia had also helped this country a lot. But when Russia hit a political low, Serbia could not even publicly express its gratitude to Russia.
Hungary is now an active supporter of China. Looking back at the history of the past 20 years, Hungary also embraced China, then opposed China, then embraced China.
1.3 Firm anti-China political centre
Since the end of the Second World War, the political process in Europe has been basically stable. Looking back at this period of history, it is clear that Europe is a staunch anti-China political centre.
From 1950 to 1953, China and Europe were official enemies on different sides in the Korean War.
In 1952, China was explicitly included in the list of banned countries in the CoCom Agreement (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls acted in 1950 to 1994) and was subjected to export restrictions that were even stricter than those of the Soviet Union.
After Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, Europe gradually established diplomatic relations with The people’s Republic of China.
In 1989, the entire European continent used the pretext of civil unrest in China to impose comprehensive political, economic and military sanctions against China. Compared to the 1992 Los Angeles riots in the United States, this case far surpasses that of China in 1989 in terms of the level of chaos, the number of deaths and the level of state violence. Not a single European country blamed, condemned or disagreed with the United States.
In 1992, France sold 60 advanced fighter jets and a range of combat missiles to Taiwan.
In the 1990s, various extreme measures were taken to prevent free trade with China. These included launching several anti-dumping investigations, reviving the concept of sweatshops, and using alternative local pricing standards rather than actual costs in China to adjudicate anti-dumping cases. Using the concept of carbon neutrality, carbon trading rights are forcing China to make concessions on its energy choices. Once China’s solar, wind and internet products had gained a competitive advantage, anti-dumping and national security excuses were used to prevent Chinese products from entering Europe. In the 2000s, the Xinjiang cotton incident and the Xinjiang concentration camp incident were fabricated to prevent China’s global share of cotton.
Accordingly, the UK announced in 2023 that it would abandon its carbon neutrality target. Germany announced that it would not be able to meet its carbon emission commitments.
In 2000, COVID19 first appeared in China and Europeans declared it a disease of the yellow people and didn’t care. At the same time, Europe condemned China’s anti-epidemic measures as “restricting and depriving human rights”.
In 2021, COVID19 is spreading in Europe. The Europeans propagate that “the Chinese are responsible for the spread of COVID19”. Having allowed tens of thousands of people to die, Europeans must adopt “Chinese-style epidemic prevention measures”.
In 2019, anti-extradition riots broke out in Hong Kong. What was originally a legal amendment by the Hong Kong government to fix a legal loophole was manipulated into a political movement against China. Europe as a whole supported the riots. Britain was deeply involved in this uprising. Accordingly, extremely minor cases of Americans storming the Capitol were severely suppressed by the United States. Europe supported the US crackdown in this case.
1.4 Strong anti-China public opinion centre
In the 70 years of history after World War II, Europe’s political tone towards China has been hostile. This political environment naturally leads to anti-China public opinion among the people.
During the Korean War, Europeans accused the Chinese of being cruel and warlike. They forget that both World War I and World War II were started by Europe. Europeans accused China of massacre and denial of human rights for its response to the 1989 riots. Instead, they legitimised the far worse death toll and state violence that occurred in 1992 in USA. To attack China, the Europeans define the Dalai Lama as a liberal because he opposes the Chinese government. In doing so, they completely ignore the fact that the Dalai Lama is the only remaining slave owner in modern times. The Dalai Lama and his nobles used mattresses made by human skin and containers made by human skull as recently as the 1950s.
Around 2015, Europe accuses China of exacerbating climate change through its manufacturing activities. In 2023, the British and Germans have no moral shame in announcing that they cannot meet their carbon neutrality commitments because they cannot afford it economically.
In 2019, Europeans supported the people who rioted in Hong Kong. In 2021, Europeans supported the US government’s crackdown.
Looking back at China’s 40-year history of rapid economic growth, there is a lot of overlap with Europe’s history of economic decline. Europeans believe in that the Chinese have “stolen”, robbed, confiscated and suppressed their economic power, economic jurisdiction, conceptual creativity and political power.
After the cases of German women raped by refugees, the German people unanimously found various excuses for the rape in order to prevent hostility towards the refugee group. Tolerating refugees is the political correctness of Europe, and no interference with this political correctness is allowed.
There is another case. A British-born journalist of Chinese descent asked a woman of white descent how she defined Britishness. The white woman replied directly that the British should be “white, European, Christian nation”. And she added: “I could be born in a stable, it doesn’t make me a horse. People should stay in their respective nations”. Europeans do not feel any psychological burden or moral shame about making racist remarks towards people of Chinese descent. This proves that anti-Chinese sentiments have (or at least are becoming) another form of political correctness in Europe.
1.5 China’s European policy before 2022
Why do the Chinese ignore Europe’s long-term, intrinsic and substantial hostility towards China? The main reason is the Chinese government’s European policy inducement. Before 2022, China’s policy is to support an united and strong Europe and a strong euro. China hopes Europe as strong to relief the political pressure over China from USA. Europe’s strength has also been conducive to the establishment of a polycentric imperial system. The polycentric imperial system is China’s preferred philosophical solution for participating in world governance.
1.6 China’s European policy after 2022
The European war that breaks out in 2022 not only weakens Europe’s political power, but also shatters China’s expectations of a strong Europe. The European war in 2022 fully demonstrates a political fact. That is “Europe is an American colony”. Europe has all the characteristics of a colony. [1]
As an American colony, once China comes into conflict with the United States, Europe can only become a burden to China, rather than a political pressure relief valve. Weakening Europe will become an important part of China’s efforts to weaken the United States’ long-term war capabilities. China will inevitably turn its policy of “supporting an united and strong Europe” into a policy of “weakening Europe”. Ye Qiquan articulated this hypothesis in an article on 18 June 2022. [1]
In April 2023, a simple speech by China’s ambassador to France, Lu Shaye, may become a clear label that China has changed its fundamental policy towards Europe.
Before Lu Shaye’s speech, China had never launched an active political attack on Europe. When China counter-attacks political attacks from Europe, it also strictly limits the intensity and scope of its counter-attacks. At the same time, China also uses propaganda strategies to minimise the political impact of Europe’s attacks. In short, China was trying its best to maintain the illusion that Europe and China are in a friendly environment.
Lu Shaye’s speech may have ushered in a new era. That is, China no longer tolerates Europe’s reckless attacks. China’s counter-attacks are not limited to individual cases, but are aimed at weakening Europe’s political foundations.
1.2.4 China can promote, accelerate or intensify the process of European border movement
1.3 The 2022 War Has Changed China’s Fundamental Strategy Towards Europe
In May 2022, Ye Qiquan predicted that China might change its fundamental policy towards Europe[1]. The European war that breaks out in 2022 shows the fundamental nature of Europe. That is, Europe cannot play the role of a buffer valve for China’s political pressure. Accordingly, Europe has all the attributes of an American colony. Once China comes into conflict with the United States, Europe can only become China’s problem and cannot help China.
l Europe has all the characteristics of a “colony”. The active participation in a war that weakened Europe’s own political and economic power marked Europe as having all the characteristics of a colony.
l Europe, with its colonial character, will become (or has become) a huge burden for China, rather than the “political pressure relief valve” that China expects.
l Although Europe has the impulse and even the actual effort to get rid of the control of the United States, it cannot change the political fact that Europe is actually the power bloc of the current imperial system. Europe and China are actually in different camps of “defenders of order” and “challengers of order”.
lCausing Chaos in Europe, or the deconstruction process of European power, is an important step to prevent colonised Europe from intervening in the Asian battlefield.
l The weakening of colonised Europe was an important step in weakening the ability of the American alliance to sustain (long-term) war.
On 21 April 2023, the Chinese diplomat LU SHAYE may have heralded a new era. His speech may confirm that China has begun to implement a new policy towards Europe.
II. The instability of the European power structure
When discussing whether Europe will continue to interfere in China’s affairs and whether Europe will intervene in future Sino-US military conflicts, the 2022 European War is an extremely important factor. This war has had a profound impact on Europe’s political capabilities, political future and possibilities for political development.
2.1 War in 2022 to weaken Europe
The European war of 2022 is an extremely important factor when discussing whether Europe will continue to interfere in China’s affairs and whether Europe will intervene in future Sino-American military conflicts. It is the 2022 European War that has put Europe in an unfavourable political situation.
The war that broke out on 24 February 2022 is widely referred to as the “Ukrainian war” and the “Russian-Ukrainian war”. But perhaps a more appropriate name would be “New European War” or “2022 European War”, because it is a real European war. It is comprehensively weakening Europe’s political capabilities, economic prospects and geopolitical power. The effects of this war on Europe are mainly reflected in the following aspects.
The whole of Europe was involved in this war. The outcome of the war also affects the whole of Europe.
Europe is permanently divided into a European part and a Russian part, thus setting Europe on a long-term process of mutual exhaustion.
The Europe’s overall political and economic strength has been comprehensively weakened. Europe is losing its ability to share world power.
Changes in Ukraine’s national borders have triggered a process of border shifts between European countries. This has created long-term political chaos in Europe.
2.2 The Ukrainian Trench and a Divided Europe
Ye Qiquan believes that geopolitical power is one of the most powerful war capabilities of countries and groups when they are faced with the risk of all-out war. It is also the most effective strategic deterrence capability of countries and groups. [2]
One of the main starting points of the 2022 European war is the construction of a solid geopolitical dividing line, the Ukrainian trench. This Ukrainian trench divides the whole of Europe into two mutually hostile parts, the European part and the Russian part. It not only divides a powerful geopolitical force into two parts, but also makes the two parts hostile to each other, consuming and weakening each other. Europe is losing its potential to become a strong pillar in the future world power order.
The trenches in Ukraine will have the effect of dividing Europe for at least the next 50 years. The longer the war in Ukraine goes on and the more brutal it is, the stronger and the longer it will last.
2.3 Multiple weakening effects
(1) Europe and Russia have lost an important historical opportunity for “reconciliation and cooperation”;
Since the collapse of the Red Empire in the 1990s, Russia has actively pursued reconciliation with the West. This path to reconciliation has been up and down and not very smooth. The reasons are complex and varied. But Europe’s lack of initiative is certainly one of the main reasons. No matter how many reasons Europe has to delay the reconciliation process with Russia, triggering a confrontation between Russia and Europe will definitely only cause greater losses to Europe’s overall interests. As a result, Europe’s weight in the world power system has decreased.
(2) The historic opportunity to settle Sino-Russian oil and gas transactions in euros has been lost;
Long before the outbreak of war in 2022, Russia signed a long-term oil and gas supply contract with China. The settlement method explicitly specified in the contract is the euro. This will strongly support the long-term value of the euro. The 2022 war resulted in the Russian currency being banned from the SWIFT international interbank settlement system. The euro has also lost a cornerstone of its value.
(3) Increase the economic operating costs of both Europe and Russia;
Ye Qiquan believes that one of the starting points of the 2022 war is to create a solid “Ukrainian trench” to cut off cooperation and contact between European subjects and Russia [1]. This trench will separate the core of Europe from Russia for at least the next 50 years. Russia has lost its European market and Europe has lost its stable raw material base. This fact will inevitably increase the economic operating costs of both parties and thus reduce the market competitiveness of both parties.
(4) There will be long-term chaos in the core of Europe;
As early as May 2022, Ye Qiquan predicted that this European war would not end before 2026. Moreover, Russia will not suffer a major military defeat before 2026. After 2026, the direction of this European war will be seriously affected by the course of the Asian war in 2026 [1,3,4]. If the basis for this assumption is indeed correct, Europe will inevitably be plunged into long-term chaos.
(5) Depriving Russians of their “European” identity and planting nuclear landmines in Europe’s security and stability.
From an Asian perspective, it is difficult to understand Europe’s stubborn rejection of the Russians’ European identity. Although modern Europe’s capacity for conceptual creation and linguistic expression has reached a very high level, the constant statements excluding Russians are still extremely shocking. “Russians are not from the Caucasus”; “Russians have Mongolian blood”; “Russia will never become an empire without Ukraine”; “Ukraine is the largest country in Europe”. These similar linguistic and cultural expressions recur in important linguistic environments.
The historical trajectory, philosophical basis and humanistic foundation of the Russian people are all based on the identity of “Europeans”. Forcibly deporting them and depriving them of their European identity will certainly provoke hatred and backlash among Russians. Europe’s long-term security and stability is thus being laid like a nuclear mine.
III. Uncertainty about Europe’s political future
3.1 Uncertainty about the borders of European countries
Another clear effect of the European war in 2022 is that the process of border flows between European countries has started (or is starting).
3.1.1 Uncertainty on the Russian-Ukrainian border
Ye Qiquan made predictions in April, May and June 2022. He believes that changes in Ukraine’s borders are inevitable. The first is uncertainty on the Russian-Ukrainian border. The figure below briefly illustrates Ye Qiquan’s predictions.
Predictions about the Russian-Ukrainian border include the following
The Russia-Ukraine war will be limited to the L1 and L2 lines for a long time.
If there is a ceasefire, it will be relatively stable, whether the ceasefire line is on the L1 line or the L2 line. The ceasefire between the L1 and L2 lines is relatively unstable.
Russia will set up about seven local governments on Ukrainian soil to resist long-term pressure from the US group.
Russia has considered the L1 line as a new security border to protect national and ethnic interests. And within 100 years, the possibility of Russia moving to this new security line is real.
3.1.2 Uncertainty about the borders of the four countries.
Ye Qiquan also predicted another possibility for 2022. Even Ukraine’s current allies will contribute their efforts to work with Russia to achieve the “Yugoslavisation” or “Somaliisation” of Ukraine. Poland, Romania and Hungary have all publicly declared that Ukraine’s borders are unnatural. The pursuit of national borders by these three countries has not yet been realised. They will not give up the pursuit of their ideals easily.
3.1.3 Uncertainty about the extent and intensity of chaos in Europe
Europe has indeed lost the ability to control its own future. Ukraine’s border movement will inevitably have more complex knock-on effects. The degree of chaos in Europe is mainly determined by the decisions of the United States, Russia and China. The political decisions of these three parties are a dynamic process of mutual exchange and influence. The uncertainty of this complex interactive process determines the uncertainty of the level of chaos in Europe. Poor Europe! Poor European!
3.2 Uncertainty about Europe’s geopolitical future
Since the division of Europe into a “European part” and a “Russian part”, Europe has lost the ability to determine its own geopolitical future.
The geopolitical future of Europe is uncertain. The following international political factors may have an important impact on Europe’s geopolitical future.
3.2.1 The United States’ insistence on the G1 order
At present, the political science community as a whole seriously underestimates the value of Donald Trump and Elon Musk. Donald Trump once won the US presidential election. In 2024, either Donald Trump or Elon Musk could run in the US presidential election. If one of them wins the election, or even if they don’t win the election but get a large number of votes, it will have a very important political significance. It means that the Americans are thinking about reforming the management model of the world order. This process of reform and exploration will take such a long time. Today, there are political and philosophical values that call this process of exploration “Trump’s Reform”, “Trump-Musk’s Trial”, or “Trump-Musk’s Exploration”.
This exploration is characterised by questioning the correctness of the current G1 Order. It also questions the synchronicity between securing the world order and securing US interests. The outcome of this exploration is currently uncertain, but it can be predicted that it will continue in a certain period.
At the same time, the United States is showing its determination to maintain the G1 system. A typical manifestation of this determination is that lots of Americans, represented by Joe Biden, are using legislation to prevent any future transformation of the American system.
3.2.2 US tolerance for the G2 system
The United States’ exploration of world order management methods will also be influenced by another factor. This is China’s claim to world leadership. China should not have a strong will to implement the G1 system. For many years, China has publicly demonstrated its willingness to promote a “multipolar world”. That is, a polycentric imperial order. But it is clear that the basis for a multipolar world does not currently exist. Europe’s current political and geopolitical power has been severely weakened. Europe has all the characteristics of an “American colony”. After Russia was removed from the European region, its weak economic capacity could not support its responsibilities as a pole of world power. Pan-Turkish, pan-German and pan-Arab forces would have no chance to take shape without a major and prolonged chaos.
Therefore, it can be predicted that the main philosophical challenge in the United States will continue to be the “G1 or G2” question for some time to come.
To what extent will the United States tolerate the G2 system? How much pressure will China put on the United States? How can the benefits and harms of the G1 or G2 system be calculated? These are not only real problems facing the United States and China, but also problems that will affect Europe’s prospects. Europe is bound to be involved in the dispute between the United States and China.
3.2.3 European intervention in the East Asian war in 2026
Whether Europe intervenes in the East Asian war in 2026 will be an important turning point in the development of European politics and geopolitics. If Europe chooses not to intervene substantially, the level of chaos in Europe will not be exacerbated and expanded by the Chinese factor.
If Europe chooses to intervene in the East Asian war in 2026, not only will the chaos in Europe’s core areas be intensified, but the scope of the chaos may spread widely.
3.2.4 China’s anti-intervention plan for Europe
As mentioned above, China has changed its basic policy towards Europe. China has changed its basic policy from supporting “a united and strong Europe” to “weakening Europe to weaken the long-term war capability of the American group”.
Once Europe intervenes in the military conflict between China and the United States, China will inevitably impose a series of countermeasures on Europe. China currently has a political advantage in deciding whether to counterattack Europe. China also currently has a political advantage in determining the level of countermeasures against Europe. In other words, when China and Europe face political conflicts, China has comprehensive advantages.
In addition to countering European attacks, China can also take preventive measures to weaken Europe. These preventive measures even come in different levels and strengths. Warning level, threat level, low-level blocking, substantial weakening, etc.
3.2.5 Political will and physical preparation of other third parties.
Another result of Europe’s weakness is that Europe’s geopolitical development paths are seriously affected by the surrounding geopolitical forces.
It is an undeniable fact that the United States and Europe face difficulties in maintaining the existing world order. In addition to the challenge from China, other political forces may be unwilling to tolerate the United States peacefully sharing world leadership with China. There are at least the following potential group forces that may be involved in entering a chaos to strive for top geopower status.
Pan-Turkic power.
Turkey is a typical force opposed to the post-World War II political order. The expansion of national interests has always been a dream for Turks. The direction of Turkey’s expansion cannot be determined recently. Turkey may have its priorities, or it may change its expansion plans according to changes in international politics.
Pan-German power.
Compared to Germany’s economic power, the political recognition of Germany by the current world order is underestimated. Similarly, the political recognition of Germany by Europeans is also underestimated. Worse than underestimation, there are now philosophical ideas and political programmes in Europe that further weaken Germany’s political standing. The disharmony between economic power and political status will inevitably lead to discontent among Germans. This discontent could be the catalyst for the awakening of a pan-German union. And the chaos in Europe could become the motivating condition.
New Arab power.
The reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran shows that there is no political impossibility. Nor is Arab reunification impossible. Arabs have been yearning for a new world order for almost a hundred years. The possibility of great Arab heroes emerging from chaotic times cannot be ruled out.
New Russian group
The confrontation between Ukraine and Russia cannot exclude another political possibility. This means that ethnic and state relations in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus will undergo new entanglements and integrations.
It can be said with relative certainty that Russia already has an advantage in eastern and southern Ukraine. Ye Qiquan defined this conclusion as a slightly advanced political fact rather than a prediction.
Ye Qiquan has an even bolder prediction. He believes that Russia has regarded the L1 line as a new frontier to protect the Russian nation and national security. In the 100-year history, the probability that Russia will advance to this line is very high. Russia may even be able to use its political genius and wisdom to speed up the process.
During this historical process, the three Baltic countries have been in an extremely passive political environment. All sorts of political possibilities can arise by chance.
IV. Uncertainty about European involvement in an East Asian war in 2026
Even if Europe is in a very unfavourable political position, it may be difficult to escape an East Asian war in 2026.
4.1 Colonized position makes Europe difficult to escape the East Asian War
Europe may be forced to enter a war, even if it is aware of the enormous risks of participating in an East Asian war. European political decisions are controlled by the United States. The United States also controls much of Europe’s financial and military power.
4.2 China-hostile public opinion supports war against China
Public opinion in Europe has always been firmly hostile to China. Public opinion is against political compromise with China. Europe will proactively seek ways and chances to defeat China completely.
4.3 Political weakness cannot withstand China’s counterattack
Militarily, Europe has been affected by the battlefield in Ukraine. China’s political stance on this battlefield has become the main source of China’s political pressure on Europe.
The Middle East and North Africa, which are close to Europe, have always been politically unstable. China’s political attitude towards this region will increase the political pressure on Europe.
In terms of political jurisdiction, Europe has lost its dominance. As shown by Chinese diplomat Lu Shaye’s statement on the political status of the former Soviet Union, China has abandoned its defensive strategy on political jurisdiction. A series of political mistakes accumulated over the decades in Europe will become tools for China to weaken Europe’s political stability.
4.4 Uncertainty about the course of the war
Even if Europe unanimously decides to join the East Asian war in 2026, this political decision is risky. How will Europe coordinate the concentration of military power? How can the risk of military failure be countered? Can it ultimately gain an advantage over China’s military power? Can Europe’s defence capabilities be effectively maintained after a military attack? Can Europe’s internal stability be maintained after a massive transfer of military power to Asia?
The above questions will all determine whether Europe will intervene in the Asian war. And China can make these issues harder and harder when China want to do at any time.
5. Uncertainty of Political Favour in the New Power Order
5.1 Uncertainty in the new world order
China’s unified action will inevitably create political difficulties for the United States and Europe. This action by China is tantamount to China’s formal claim to power. That is to say, China is formally demanding to participate in the sharing of world leadership. However, the United States’ response plan and the results of this power claim are full of uncertainties.
Accordingly, it is naturally uncertain how Europe will participate in the US response plan and how it will face the consequences of the US plan.
5.2 Uncertainty over the new economic order
As the United States responds to China’s assertiveness, there is uncertainty not only about its military and political programme, but also about its economic programme.
Does the US have a plan to exclude China from the existing economic system as part of its response to China? If there is such a plan, will Europe split in two? Will Europe as a whole lean towards the American economic bloc or towards the Chinese economic bloc? Will one part of Europe join the Chinese economic bloc and another part the American economic bloc?
5.3 Uncertainty of preferences in the G2 system.
Even if the United States eventually accepts the G2 plan as the basic order of the empire, at least two centres of power will emerge in this order. An American group and a Chinese group. What about Europe? This is a political question that Europe will inevitably face, and it is also a philosophical question. Europe can respond in the following ways
It is biased towards the American core and forms a secondary core group with the United States. This will help to maintain the relative advantages of Western forces in the G2 system.
Favour China or maintain equidistance diplomatic relations between the United States and China. This can form a G2 system similar to three pivots.
With China’s support, create a G2 imperial order close to the G3 system.
Rapid rapprochement with Russia and Europe to form a G2 imperial order close to the G3 order.。
Summary
Europe has been in political risk since the 2022 war. A military conflict between China and the United States in 2026 will amplify Europe’s risks. European political uncertainty will be highlighted in the following aspects. Uncertainty in Europe-China relations. Uncertainty about stability and chaos in Europe. Uncertainty about Europe’s political future. Uncertainty about Europe’s geopolitical prospects. Europe has realistically lost the ability to control its own future. Europe’s political and geopolitical prospects are seriously affected by the United States, China and the geopolitical forces surrounding Europe.
References
- Ye QiQuan. Whose War? Players winning or losing in Russia-Ukraine War. PPPNet. Feb. 11, 2023. https://en.pppnet.net/players-winning-or-losing-from-russia-ukraine-war/
- 叶其泉. 国家战争强度模型，兼预测乌克兰战争走向. PPPNet. Dec. 7, 2023. https://pppnet.net/nation-war-strength-model-and-prediction/
- Ye QiQuan. Three Possible Ceasefire Lines of Russia-Ukraine War. PPPNet. Feb. 23, 2023. https://en.pppnet.net/three-possible-ceasefire-lines-of-russia-ukraine-war/
- Ye QiQuan. Confined Walls still work in Russia-Ukraine War at least by 2026. PPPNet. Feb. 23, 2023. https://en.pppnet.net/confined-walls-still-work-in-russia-ukraine-war-by-2026/