China’s Unifying Plan:(10) Timing, Path, and Characteristics of Unification

YE QIQUAN

February 23, 2024

Abstract:

On 10 August 2022, the Chinese central government issued a white paper officially announcing that Taiwan had essentially lost “one country, two systems”. Mainland China has left a window of about three years for peace talks on the basis of this white paper. Since neither Taiwan nor the mainland has the initiative to pursue peace talks, the most likely way to reunify Taiwan is through military means. Mainland China may launch a cross-strait reunification operation at any time from April to September 2026. This military operation will have the following features 1. No political hesitation; 2. Involves an extraordinary number of troops; 3. Focuses on pursuing political goals; 4. Rapid and comprehensive military advance; 5. Slow and protracted political process; 6. Triggers a comprehensive response from the US group; 7. Triggers a period of 3 A comprehensive soft confrontation between China and the West for more than 10 years; 8. Major political steps have been taken in Europe, North Africa, and the Arab region in advance; 9. Taiwan will not quickly establish a political structure without military supervision.

Table of Contents

Keywords:

Cross-Strait; Military Campaign; Unification; Geopolitics; Characteristics

On 10 August 2022, the mainland’s central government issued a white paper on “The Taiwan Question and the Cause of China’s Reunification in the New Era”. It officially announced that Taiwan had lost “one country, two systems in a substantial sense” [1]. At the same time, it maintains a window for peaceful negotiations on aspects relating to administrative systems, economic systems, fiscal policies, financial assistance and the existence of special zone systems.

The mainland central government has not specified how long the window for peace talks will be. However, it is clear that the reunification of Taiwan will be completed during the term of the current central leadership.

I. Factors influencing the timing of reunification

Since the Chinese central government has made it clear that the reunification of Taiwan will be completed during Xi’s tenure, tracking and predicting Xi’s tenure will become an important political science topic. Predictions have been made for a long time. There have been different predictions. But the significance and accuracy of these predictions are low.

1.1 Xi Jinping’s term in office

Predicting Xi Jinping’s term in office is a very complex task. It is basically impossible to complete this political science project by using Western linear thinking to speculate on the most complex Eastern affairs.

The length of Xi Jinping’s tenure is closely linked to the following Chinese factors

Xi Jinping’s political prestige
Xi Jinping’s physical condition
The outcome and process of completing the action to unify Taiwan

The above three key points influence each other. The results of these influences will ultimately determine Xi Jinping’s presidency and Xi’s ability to influence Chinese politics after his term ends.

Studying the length of Xi Jinping’s tenure will be a complex and tedious exercise. But Xi Jinping’s tenure is not the key factor in initiating the move to unify Taiwan. The author is not prepared to continue the discussion in this article.

1.2 Concentration of public opinion

China is the most difficult country in the world to govern. China has always been the world’s most populous country. China has always been a single country with the most complex geographical shape. China is the only country that has always inherited written history. Ordinary people in China are the most rebellious political force in recorded history. Dynasty changes in Chinese history have all basically been the result of internal public resistance rather than invasion by foreign enemies.

Famous politicians in Chinese history have always regarded public opinion as the foundation of national stability.

The concentration of public opinion will also be an important factor influencing Xi Jinping’s launch of unified action.

1.2.1 The Concentration of Public Opinion in Ancient China Determined the Change of Dynasties

In addition to China’s Song Dynasty, the main reason for its demise was the invasion of foreign enemies. The main reason for the change of other dynasties was that ordinary Chinese people abandoned the ruling group.

1.2.2 Modern Ordinary People Chose the Communist Party of China

From the beginning of the First Opium War in 1840 to the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese people spent 100 years searching for a path of national development. In the end, they chose the path of national development chosen by the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of China.

An attempt at the path of limited industrial capitalism

In the First Opium War and the Second Opium War, huge China was defeated by small countries; countries with huge economic aggregates were defeated by countries with small economic aggregates. These factors made Chinese politicians think about the country’s development path. Chinese politicians represented by Lin Zexu, Li Hongzhang and Zhang Zhidong began to imitate the development path of Western countries. Because China’s agrarian capitalism has a long history, their efforts cannot fundamentally change China’s reality. Their attempt could be defined as a limited path to industrial capitalism. Ultimately, this path has failed.

Exploring a religious nation

The Taiping Rebellion of 1850-1872 was unlike any other Chinese peasant uprising in history. It has a unique cultural symbol and spiritual pillar. That is “introducing Western religion to save the country”.

The Taiping Rebellion was very close to political goals. The military power of the central government was completely defeated by the Taiping Rebellion.

However, some local military forces had spontaneously sprung up in China. These spontaneous civil military forces eventually defeated the Taiping Rebellion. This is a typical example of how the path of religious nation-building is resisted by Chinese culture.

An Attempt at the Autonomy/Self-Reliance/Small Group Model

For European cultural and philosophical logic, small government, small groups, small countries and individualism are effective means of solving complex problems. It may even be the fundamental solution to all problems. China’s pioneering politicians have also made unremitting efforts to explore this path.

The Southeast Joint Protection Campaign in 1900 was the beginning of the quest for local autonomy in various provinces and regions in China.

The Sichuan Road Protection Movement in 1904 was a typical case of Chinese local governments seeking the right to self-determination in local affairs.

Before the Wuchang Rebellion in 1911, almost all the leading officials in China’s provinces had completed preparations for localisation and warlordism.

The direct result of the 1911 Wuchang Rebellion was the end of China’s dynastic model of government. At the same time, the independent and autonomous model of governance of China’s provinces began.

In fact, until October 1949, China had a situation where the central government and local governments coexisted. China’s governance model is similar to the co-governance or autonomy model of provinces and regions.

The discussion on China’s autonomy/co-governance/small group governance model has lasted for 50 years. The results proved that this model could not solve the perpetual war and chaos in China, nor could it effectively resist the aggression of foreign enemies.

Experiments with the Total Industrial Capitalist Model

The history of the Republic of China on the mainland is essentially the history of the experiment of the road of comprehensive industrial capitalism in China. The economic system and the political system of the Republic of China were completely copied from the European (German) system. There were also periods of rapid economic growth. As capital quickly fled from the countryside and agriculture to the cities and industry, the agricultural sector shrank across the board. This threatens the very survival of large rural areas and the majority of the farming population. This is the fundamental reason why the vast majority of the people in China oppose and abandon the government of the Republic of China.

The agrarian capitalist road and the Communist Party of China

The army led by the Communist Party of China has all the characteristics of a peasant uprising army. The main characteristics are spontaneity, no salary, idealism and agricultural and rural characteristics.

The army led by the CCP is mainly composed of scattered peasant uprising forces. By focusing on agricultural and rural issues, the CCP has won the support of the largest number of people. In the end, this spontaneous, unpaid army defeated the army backed by the state apparatus.

Because this army embodies the most powerful public opinion in China and the ideals of the Chinese peasants, it has strong fighting capabilities. This army, backed by idealism, made great military achievements in the Korean War even though its weapons and equipment were obviously inferior to those of the United Nations forces led by the United States. Move the United Nations forces from North Korea to South Korea.

1.2.3 Commitment to Taiwan’s reunification is the foundation of Xi Jinping’s political power

After Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin became the leader of China’s most powerful political group. Jiang Zemin was President of China from 1993 to 2002. His tenure as Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party lasted longer than his 14 years as President of the country.

During the 10 years that Hu Jintao served as China’s president from 2002 to 2012, Jiang Zemin continued to lead China’s most powerful political power bloc. In China’s internal elections in 2002 and 2007, Jiang Zemin’s political clique continued to dominate the electoral process. Xi Jinping, chosen by Jiang Zemin’s clique, eventually became the elected president and Li Keqiang, chosen by Hu Jintao’s clique, became the elected prime minister.

In 2010 and 2011, Xi Jinping was sidelined by Jiang Zemin’s clique. The Jiang group is preparing to replace Xi Jinping with Bo Xilai[2]. Xi Jinping was then in the most difficult political dilemma. It is incredible that since March 2012, Xi Jinping has suddenly become stronger and tougher. Xi has openly challenged the two most powerful political blocs at the time: Hu Jintao’s clique and Jiang Zemin’s clique. What is even more incredible is that Xi Jinping won the ultimate victory in this political struggle.

During this difficult period, the only political force that could defeat the Jiang Zemin clique and the Hu Jintao clique was the power of public opinion to unify Taiwan. Xi Jinping has used China’s most powerful force, public opinion, to concentrate China’s scattered political resources and build his own political power.

During his tenure, Xi Jinping has publicly and formally committed to the Chinese people to complete the reunification of Taiwan.

Xi could use this promise to extend his term. But if the public begins to question his commitment, it could quickly undermine his political ability. The Taiwan issue is undoubtedly a double-edged sword.

1.3 Chinese ancestor worship

Many Westerners believe that the Chinese lack faith, but this is a misconception. The most deeply rooted beliefs in the hearts of Chinese people are ancestor worship and hero worship. Chinese people worship not only their own blood ancestors, but also the heroes of Chinese history. Nearly 100% of Chinese primary school students know several heroes in Chinese history. Becoming a hero in history and a hero in the family tree is the strongest impulse in every Chinese person’s heart.

Even a universally recognised hero like Mao Zedong had obvious shortcomings. Mao Zedong’s shortcoming was that he failed to complete the task of unifying Taiwan. Now Xi Jinping has ushered in a period of historic opportunity. He has the opportunity and the ability to achieve this great feat. He won’t miss this opportunity.

1.4 Xi Jinping’s health

The world political community now recognises Xi Jinping as a powerful politician. Xi Jinping has the initiative to extend his term as president. Xi Jinping also has the initiative to determine the timing of Taiwan’s reunification. However, Xi Jinping’s health will be an important factor limiting Xi Jinping’s decisions. Xi Jinping was born in 1953. In 2026, Xi Jinping will be 74. In 2032, Xi Jinping will be 79.

1.5 Rules for recording and interpreting Chinese history

China has the longest and most complete historical record in human history. The Chinese know a great deal about the heroes of their 3,000-year history. Chinese people worship not only their blood ancestors, but also their common heroes in history. To become a worshipped god in history is the strongest desire of every Chinese person.

The professional ethics of historians require them to record history as impartially as possible. But everyone who writes history has his or her own emotional preferences. Future generations of people who interpret history not only have emotional preferences but also different political needs.

For example, during the Spring and Autumn Period, it was recorded that the younger brother of King Zhuang of Zheng State, the Big Uncle in Jing City, rebelled. While criticising the rebels, historians also criticised King Zhuang for failing to fulfil his elder brother’s responsibility to educate his younger brother.

There is a historian called Sima Qian who is highly respected by the Chinese people. Even the best historian like him is bound to praise some and underestimate others. For example, Sima Qian obviously gave low marks to people like Wei Qing and Huo Qubing, who made great historical achievements.

For example, the government-people conflict that occurred on 28 February 1947 in Taiwan could be interpreted by Taiwanese independence forces as mainlanders persecuting Taiwanese. It is generally believed that 400,000 Taiwanese were killed during the Japanese occupation of Taiwan. However, Taiwan independence advocates unanimously believe that Japan is the country most friendly to Taiwan’s development.

Even in mainland China’s modern history, there can be windows of misunderstanding. For example, there is a debate about who made the greatest contribution to the Huaihai campaign. Another debate is is who was the real commander of the Battle of the River Crossing.

As long as there is a window in history that can be misunderstood, misinterpreted or misconducted, this history will surely be interpreted in different ways by future generations. These different interpretations may even have completely opposite meanings.

How Xi Jinping avoids the historical window of misunderstanding will also be an important factor in launching a unifying action.

1.6 Mainland China’s political cycle

In 2032, Xi Jinping will be 80 years old. If Xi’s health is guaranteed, he is likely to serve as president from 2027 to 2032. In other words, China could take steps to unify Taiwan between 2026 and 2031.

Each major election in China usually lasts between 9 and 11 months. This means that the 21st Communist Party of China election will be held from December 2026 to February 2027. The 22nd election of the Communist Party of China will start around January 2032.

The political operating cycle of mainland China will be an important factor in launching the action to unify Taiwan.

II. Forecast for the unification timetable

In May and June 2022, Ye Qiquan predicted military operations in the Taiwan Strait in 2026 in articles discussing the conflict between Russia and Ukraine [3, 4].

The basic points supporting Ye Qiquan’s prediction are as follows

1 Mainland China’s political operation cycle

The Chinese people’s worship of historical heroes
Characteristics of recording and interpretation in Chinese history books
Xi Jinping’s health status
Domestic political pressures in China

After the Chinese Communist Party revised its party constitution in 2017, Xi Jinping will no longer face legal opposition to his succession as president from 2027 to 2032. But he will face political opposition. The most powerful political force in China will remain the public opinion of ordinary Chinese people for some time to come. This is the will of mainland China to unify Taiwan. It is also the cornerstone of Xi Jinping’s political power. Once mainland public opinion questions Xi Jinping’s commitment to Taiwan reunification, Xi Jinping’s political base will be weakened. Xi Jinping could be attacked by various opposition forces.

Xi Jinping certainly has a good chance of suppressing these doubts and objections. But Xi faces another problem. Will Xi Jinping nominate and install a president-elect at the 22nd National Congress of the Communist Party of China?

If Xi Jinping confirms that his health can ensure that he will not appoint the president-elect at the 22nd leadership collective, then the Taiwan reunification operation could be launched in 2030 or 2031.

However, the possibility of a president-elect in the 22nd leadership group cannot be ruled out. If this happens, will there be a controversy such as “Who was the leader of the Huaihai Campaign? Attention to this issue may be the most important factor in Xi Jinping’s move to bring forward the date of Taiwan’s reunification to 2026.

How to reach the highest point in history, how to ensure that great achievements are not diluted by the historical window, how to gain stronger public support, and how to ensure that political energy is maintained for a longer period after leaving office are all issues. These are issues that Xi Jinping will have to consider as he launches unifying action.

These factors are the reasons why Ye Qiquan predicts that Taiwan’s reunification will begin in 2026.

III. Opportunity for Peace Talks

In October 2019, an article warned that Taiwan was at risk of losing the political benefits of one country, two systems. If work starts in 2019, Taiwan will have 6 to 7 years to seize the opportunity of the political preferences of one country, two systems.

On 10 August 2022[1], the central government officially deprived Taiwan of its substantial two-system preferences. However, there is still a window of opportunity to negotiate people’s livelihoods and economic benefits. From then on, Taiwan has 3 to 3.5 years to seek maximum economic and personal political benefits for ordinary Taiwanese people.

However, based on Taiwan’s political inertia over the past 40 years and the current political reality, the Taiwanese people will not have the initiative to pursue “one country, two systems”. They are likely to continue to lose a three-year window for peace negotiations. Here’s why:

Taiwan has built a strong moat and is opposed to political negotiations.
Taiwan is addicted to the atmosphere of political correctness;
Impossible to produce a political strongman to reverse the current political environment.

3.1 Solid Opposition to “One Country, Two Systems”

3.1.1 In Lee Teng-hui period

During the intra-party election period, Taiwan’s main political tone is to recognise “one country”. Lee Teng-hui did not have the political basis to oppose “one country”, but he had power to “oppose the mainland and two systems”. Anti-mainland was the political tradition of the KMT for decades. Another reason is that cross-strait reunification is not in the interests of the United States and therefore not in Taiwan’s economic interests.

It is Lee Teng-hui’s political achievement to change Taiwan’s political environment from anti-mainland and anti-two system to anti-two system, anti-one country and anti-unification. Lee Teng-hui established Taiwan’s “anti-one country” and “anti-unification” political foundation by manipulating the “two-nation theory”, “pause province government” and “direct election” of Taiwan’s leaders. These have also encouraged the growth of Taiwan independence consciousness in Taiwan.

3.1.2 In Chen Shui-bian period

Chen Shui-bian’s rise to power was closely linked to Lee Teng-hui’s manipulation of Taiwan independence consciousness. This gave Chen Shui-bian a political basis for being anti-two systems and anti-one country from the beginning of his administration.

US President George Bush, who came to power in the same year as Chen Shui-bian, adopted a tough foreign policy towards China when he came to power. This gives Chen Shui-bian the diplomatic space to operate against one country and two systems. At the same time, it also encourages the rapid growth of Taiwan independence consciousness in Taiwan.

On 11 September 2001, the 911 attacks on the United States took place. The United States then launched a series of wars to suppress the uprisings in the Arab world. Since then, Taiwan has essentially and permanently lost its historic opportunity for independence.

Chen Shui-bian later said, “If you can’t do it, you can’t do it indeed.” This was because he knew the reality of international politics that Taiwan independence was no longer possible.

When Chen Shui-bian hesitated in the face of reality, the Taiwan independence forces accused him of squandering historic opportunities for Taiwan independence. This is the real reason why the Red Shirts Camp (Red Shirts Army) launched campaign named “Million Voices against Corruption, President Chen Must Go”. Anti-corruption is just a pretext.At the same time, there was another corruption case called the “Lafayette Warship Case”. This case involves the former president of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui. This case involves a larger amount of corruption, and more evidence has been revealed than in the Chen Shui-bian case. However, no one went after Lee Teng-hui. Instead, because Lee Teng-hui actively supported Taiwan independence, he became the spiritual leader of the Taiwan people.

Although the mainland introduced the “Anti-Secession Law” to suppress Chen Shui-bian, it was during Chen Shui-bian’s term that Taiwan independence consciousness reached its peak in Taiwan. Anti-one country, anti-two country became the mainstream public opinion in Taiwan at that time.

3.1.3 In Ma Ying-jeou period

While the Red Shirt camp, controlled by the “Taiwan Independence Forces”, denounced Chen Shui-bian under the guise of “anti-corruption”, Ma Ying-jeou used “clean and honest” as his campaign platform and won Taiwan’s 2008 election. Well aware of the strength of Taiwan’s pro-independence sentiment, Ma Ying-jeou focused on the “president for all the people” strategy during his term in office and repeatedly made concessions to Taiwan independence. They didn’t even dare to do something as simple as correcting history textbooks, which had added some information about Taiwan independence during the Chen Shui-bian period.

In order to suppress Chen Shui-bian’s moves towards Taiwan independence, mainland China once enacted the “Anti-Secession Law”. This law gives Taiwan enough room to manoeuvre to maintain the status quo. It gave Ma Ying-jeou the political space to maintain a balance between pro- and anti-independence forces.

Another relatively successful strategy during Ma’s term has been to manipulate the “1992 consensus argument”. Steer the struggle over political differences to the lower risk levels of “supporting” and “opposing” the 1992 Consensus. In this way, he fished in troubled waters and safely completed his eight-year term.

Figure 1: During the tenure of a Pan-Blue President (recognizing one country), the Pan-Green Camp (pursuingin dependence) grew rapidly. (Source: National Chengchi University Election Research Center).

Since the direction of the struggle shifted to the “1992 Consensus”, the issue of “one country, two systems” had not become a major issue for the time being. However, during Ma Ying-jeou’s term in office, Taiwanese independence consciousness continued to grow rapidly. Awareness of “Taiwanese” identity had reached an all-time high. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that during Ma’s term, anti-one country, anti-two systems was the main direction of political consciousness in Taiwan, and it had been higher than before ever.

3.1.4 In Tsai Ing-wen period

Tsai Ing-wen won the 2016 elections in Taiwan. Her political foundation lies in the growth of Taiwanese independence consciousness since Lee Teng-hui.

During Tsai’s time, mainland China’s political, economic and military capabilities have been able to stand alone against the strength of the US alliance. This is an era in which Taiwan has completely lost the possibility of independence.

Tsai Ing-wen’s continued pursuit of Taiwan independence is tantamount to sacrificing the overall interests of the Taiwanese people for her personal interests.

Because of Tsai Ing-wen’s personal shortcomings, she must use her Taiwan independence consciousness to protect herself. The dissertation proposal is a classic example.

Figure 2: During the administration of Pan-Green President Tsai Ing-wen, the number of independent options did not increase further (Source: National Chengchi University Election Research Center).

Under the basic facts of political strength, more and more Taiwanese people are gradually recognising the political reality. Although Tsai Ing-wen has repeatedly promoted the Taiwan independence movement, the two major public opinion factions of “independence as soon as possible” and “leaning towards independence” have gradually declined during her term. Instead, the “maintain the status quo” option is gradually gaining ground.

The increase in opinion polls in favour of the status quo does not mean that opposition to “one country, two systems” has diminished. Opinion polls for “unification as soon as possible” and “in favour of unification” are at historically low levels. The sum of the two is less than 8%. Even if we take into account the 4.5% who ‘maintain the status quo and decide later’ and the 5.8% who ‘have no reaction’, both are seen as forces that do not oppose one country and two systems. Less than 18% of respondents are not against one country and two systems. It can be seen that the forces against one country and two systems still dominate in Taiwan.

3.1.5, In 2019 specially

2019 has been a year of fierce struggle between the Taiwanese authorities and the central government. Tsai Ing-wen’s government was deeply involved in the anti-handover riots in Hong Kong. Through a series of public statements by the central government, Ye Qiquan felt that the central government was preparing to withdraw the political benefits previously promised to Taiwan by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping. He believes that the way to serve Taiwan’s interests is to proactively seize the last opportunity of “one country, two systems” rather than oppose it. Ye Qiquan submitted his blog article to a well-known broadcaster in Taiwan, hoping to attract the attention of the Taiwanese people. But the fact is that not even Taiwan’s boldest pan-blue mouthpiece dares to raise the issue. No one dares to talk about such issues, which is beneficial to the blue camp and for the long-term interests of the entire Taiwan people. This shows the strength of Taiwan’s Anti-“one country, two systems”.

3.1.6 After 2024

Regardless of whether the force that wins Taiwan’s 2024 election comes from the blue camp, the green camp, or the white camp, Taiwan’s opposition to “one country, two systems” will not diminish.
After 2024, Taiwan’s public opinion ecology will not change significantly.
Taiwanese politicians will not risk “losing their own interests” and tell the real political truth.
Taiwan does not have the political and cultural environment to produce a political strongman, nor is it capable of producing a political strongman who can reverse the political trend and lead a new political path.
In 2022, the mainland has severely restricted Taiwan’s political space[6] and Taiwanese public opinion is even less likely to accept this harsh version of two systems.
Although Taiwan’s next leader is likely to moderate the confrontation with the central government, the mainland will not engage in political negotiations with someone who is not recognised by Taiwanese public opinion.

3.2 Taiwan’s political shortcomings

3.2.1 Failure to recognise the urgency of political reality

In 2005, Chen Shui-bian actually recognised the impossibility of Taiwanese independence.

In 2019, any observer can see that China is withdrawing the political benefits it once promised to Taiwan. But there is still no Taiwanese who has truly stood up and told the political truth for the overall interests of Taiwan.

To this day, the Taiwanese people are completely blind to the growing strength and power of mainland China in the world power system. The Taiwanese people are also completely blind to the inability of the United States to operate and maintain the power system. The Taiwanese people still have unfounded and extensive expectations that the Americans will intervene in Taiwan’s affairs.

The inability to clearly see the political direction and urgency of political responsibilities is the main reason why the Taiwanese people will not take action for peace talks.

3.2.2 Lack of ability to interpret the political language of the mainland

Most Taiwanese may seriously lack the ability to understand the political language coming from the mainland. Some people who have the ability to understand the mainland’s political language are unwilling to come forward to publicly interpret it. This is another major problem in Taiwan’s reality.

As early as 2019, some onlookers predicted that China would abandon its long-standing “one country, two systems” policy.

On 10 August 2022, when mainland China officially promulgated the white paper on its policy towards Taiwan, Taiwan finally officially lost the “one country, two systems” principle.

The August 2022 White Paper imposes far stricter political restrictions on Taiwan than the 2005 Anti-Secession Law. This document has been on the table for almost a year, and no Taiwanese are willing to come forward to interpret it.

Another major problem in Taiwanese society is that no one has stepped forward to promote a process that is substantially beneficial to Taiwan. Even those who understand the political reality are allowing Taiwan’s interests to be harmed.

3.2.3 Wise men unwilling to reveal the emperor’s new clothes

If no one in Taiwan knows about the mainland’s 2022 version of the two-system plan, this assumption is completely at odds with statistical laws and political reality.

As a matter of fact, although this document has been on the table for almost a year, no Taiwanese has yet come forward to interpret it.

The content of Mainland China’s announcement [1] of 10 August 2022 is now translated into the vernacular [6] as follows:

(1) All previous political commitments made by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping are invalid. Everything must be renegotiated.

(2) Taiwan has no diplomatic rights;

(3) Taiwan has no right to command the military;

(4) Taiwan’s leaders must support the mainland and accept direct supervision and management by the central government.

(5) Other aspects of people’s livelihoods that can be discussed include not taxing Taiwan, maintaining the administrative system, maintaining the economic system, etc.

(6) The remaining political space is not given for free, but has to be negotiated.

(7) It is the historical responsibility of the mainland to maintain this window for peace talks.

(8) The remaining time for political negotiations will not be too long. The unification process will be completed during the term of the present leadership.

(9) Oppose the maintenance of the status quo.

(10) Oppose US intervention. If the Americans want to intervene, the mainland will dare to kill them.

3.3 Politicians fail to change the political atmosphere

3.3.1 Comments from Taiwan’s major political figures

Chiang Ching-kuo is not a real political strongman

During Chiang Ching-kuo’s rule in Taiwan, neither his “unwillingness” nor his “incompetence” prevented Taiwan independence forces from carrying out political liquidation of the Chiang family.

Whether it is the origin of the “Jiangnan Case” or the result of the “Jiangnan Case”, they clearly show the context and direction of the “Taiwan independence forces” to liquidate the power of the Chiang family. This liquidation process resulted in Chiang Ching-kuo’s public and formal commitment. He stated that the political history of the Chiang family in Taiwan would officially end after his term.

Ye’s Nine Points was published in 1981, and Deng’s Six Points was published in 1983. Both dates coincided with the stabilization of Chiang Ching-kuo’s political position in Taiwan. Chiang Ching-kuo ultimately gave up on his historic achievement of unifying the country. Whether it was due to his disappointment in the liquidation of the Chiang family from Taiwan independence force or his own fear of the mainland, this abandonment cost him an important historical position in Chinese history.

Lee Teng-hui is more mediocre than talented.

Lee Teng-hui is a person who has made significant achievements in developing Taiwan’s independence forces. Through the dispute over his two-nation theory, he successfully blocked the progress of the National Unification Guidelines he promoted. At the same time, he was prevented from using the 1992 Consensus to expand diplomatic space. While in office, he froze the operations of the Taiwan Provincial Government. He established a political process for direct election of Taiwan’s leaders. It was his move that became the basis for the rapid fermentation of Taiwan independence consciousness.

Lee Teng-hui’s period was the best period in Taiwan’s history for pursuing Taiwan independence. Compared with mainland China, Taiwan has strong economic strength, and the US alliance actually pursues a policy of containing mainland China.

However, Lee Teng-hui was unable to effectively use the economic power and external political power at the time to quickly promote Taiwan independence, nor was he able to effectively attack political opposition forces such as Zhao Shaokang and James Soong.

At the same time, Lee Teng-hui’s term is also a good opportunity to pursue national reunification. Ye‘s Nince Points is very close to the political space of “confederation” or “complete autonomy” sought by Taiwan independence forces [6]. If Taiwan negotiates “one country, two systems” before Hong Kong does, it would definitely have the best political space and a set of best national leadership positions.

Lee Teng-hui is the first (and only) politician in Taiwan’s history who has had the opportunity to do more in both directions of reunification and independence. But he played both sides of the ball and squandered a historic opportunity. This makes it impossible for him to become an important figure in the history of Taiwan independence or reunification.

Chen Shui-bian is smart but not tough

Chen Shui-bian’s victory in Taiwan’s election depended not only on Lee Teng-hui’s support but also on his own cunning. But he has never been one to use power boldly or to wield much power.

Chen Shui-bian can be seen as the main proponent and archetype of the Taiwan independence process. During his tenure, he not only opened three cross-straits links with the mainland to deepen economic ties, but also issued a “one country, one side” speech to rapidly promote the process of Taiwan independence. The rapid fermentation of Taiwan’s independence consciousness occurred during his tenure. The new US president, George Bush, who took office in the same year, adopted a tougher China policy than Clinton, giving Chen Shui-bian more political space to manipulate Taiwan independence.

Whatever the reason, Chen Shui-bian eventually stopped the process of Taiwan independence. Even though Chen Shui-bian is considered the person who has done the most in the process of Taiwan independence, he still cannot appease the accusations made against him by the Taiwan independence forces.

Opportunistic politician Ma Ying-jeou

In the history of Taiwan’s government, Ma Ying-jeou is the politician with the least political aspirations and sense of political responsibility. The Taiwan independence forces cultivated by Chen Shui-bian provided Ma Ying-jeou with bargaining chips in his dealings with the mainland. The “Anti-Secession Law” provides space to maintain the status quo and gives Ma Ying-jeou a bargaining chip to appease the Taiwan independence forces.

Throughout his term, Ma Ying-jeou has used the excuse of being the “people’s president” to repeatedly squander the Kuomintang’s power in the national power system. Not only did he fail to carry out even the easiest “revision of the history curriculum”, he also caused the Kuomintang to lose its party assets and the Kuomintang to lose its power to continue to intervene in Taiwan’s political game.

Ma Ying-jeou, who was seen as the most incorruptible, was liquidated by the Taiwan independence forces as soon as he left office. And he has no pan-blue political support. Objectively speaking, Ma Ying-jeou is not even as good as Su Zhenchang, an unsuccessful politician, in terms of execution and ideal pursuit.

Although Ma Ying-jeou has been lucky enough to meet the central leaders personally, he will not leave a record in future history textbook, because whether in Taiwan independence issues or in reunification of Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou has not done anything valulablly worthy of being recorded in history.

Tsai Ing-wen really hurts Taiwan

Tsai Ing-wen’s ability to manipulate the Taiwan independence issue even exceeds that of Chen Shui-bian. This ability belied her other shortcomings, including the subject of her doctoral thesis.

During Tsai Ing-wen’s tenure, the number of U.S. officials visiting Taiwan was the largest. These include a large number of members of the House and Senate, and even the No. 4 figure in the U.S. power structure.

In the context of major changes in political, economic, and military forces, the result of going against the trend is that the harder you work, the more injuries you get. Tsai Ing-wen is actually the weakest leader in Taiwan’s history of governance.

After Tsai Ing-wen came to power, Taiwan lost the “central line of the Taiwan Strait”; mainland warships sailed into sight of Kaohsiung Port; the central government held live-fire exercises around the entire island of Taiwan; Taiwan officially lost control of the southeastern airspace; US military officers recognized the J-20 The encounter with the F35 in the air was very professional; American warships and even aircraft carriers surrendered routes and pre-arranged exercise areas to Chinese warships.

The above-mentioned seemingly serious incidents are actually superficial phenomena. The biggest event that truly seriously harmed Taiwan’s political interests was “Taiwan’s loss of one country, two systems” [1, 5]. But objectively speaking, this change will bring huge benefits to the future of the entire country, and will ultimately be rewarded by the people of Taiwan. But this process will inevitably be accompanied by short-term or even medium-term pain over Taiwan.

In the future, whether historians who for Taiwan dependence or for China’s unification, these who hate and oppose each other in both groups will label Tsai Ing-wen a historical sinner.

Lien Chan Missed the chance

In 2004, Chen Shui-bian was responsible for 319 shooting incidents and ultimately defeated Lien Chan by an almost narrow margin. Lien Chan’s failure was not only the reason for “Chen Shui-bian’s demon sword”, but also the reason why the Taiwanese people were hesitant on the road to reunification or to independence.

Although history cannot be taken for granted, Lien Chan’s typical academic spirit is similar to that of Huang Wei and is the basis for going against the wind. The greater significance of Lien Chan’s failure is that Taiwan lost the closest opportunity to one country, two systems.

Typical Taiwanese Wang Jinping

Some people may disagree that Wang Jinping is a typical Taiwanese. However, if viewed from the perspective of statistical principles, it is inevitable that Wang Jinping used “free rein” and “laissez-faire” methods to cultivate himself into an important political figure in a short period of time.

Wang Jinping said something meaningful. He said cross-strait affairs should be treated as commercial mergers, and both sides should pursue their own best interests. Wang Jinping’s remarks represent the simple philosophical views of most Taiwanese people. In fact, one of the reasons why Taiwanese people are unwilling to recognize mainland China as their leader is due to economic interests. They are afraid of losing.

At the same time, Taiwanese people attach great importance to be a big boss. This is another important reason why Taiwanese want to unify with the mainland but do not want to be unified by the mainland.

Taiwanese are also a relatively united group of Chinese people. They don’t stick together in exactly the same way as Zhejiang and Wenzhou people. They all want to be the big boss or follow a super powerful boss. After following their boss, they would become more obedient and loyal to their boss.

From this perspective, perhaps Wang Jinping and Chen Shui-bian are both typical Taiwanese. Perhaps, they can be seen as two typical aspects of Taiwanese people.

3.3.2 Failure to develop strong leaders

After 11 September 2001, Taiwan completely lost its historic opportunity for independence. Even Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen, no matter how they manipulate the issue of Taiwanese independence, have no chance of declaring Taiwanese independence. On the contrary, the more they fight, the more they hurt. Taiwan’s political space is gradually shrinking, while Taiwan is running more and more against mainland China.

If there is no room for Taiwan independence, does that mean there is still a chance for politicians in Taiwan to talk about one country, two systems? Based on a comprehensive analysis of political reality, there is no such possibility in Taiwan. Here’s why.

(1) Characteristics of the decentralised electoral system

The advantages and disadvantages of a decentralised electoral system are that it does not produce strong politicians through peaceful and mediocre elections. Without strength, there is no power. Without power, there is no opportunity to do “anti-politically correct” things. The political climate is irreversible.

Domestic political divisions are the basis for the emergence of strong politicians.

1) Donald Trump has a strong appearance and personality, but he is not a really strong politician. Nevertheless, he has made a fortune by exploiting the country’s divisive issues.

2) India’s ‘Modi’ has become a political strongman through years of manipulating domestic divisions, religious conflicts and other confrontational events.

3) Turkey’s ‘Erdogan’ is also a strongman who has made a name for himself over the years by manipulating divisive issues in the country.

4) Thailand’s ‘Thaksin’ also began by exploiting Thailand’s huge urban-rural divide. His family has controlled the rise and fall of Thai politics on this issue.

5) Russia’s “Putin” is also a strong leader born of domestic divisions.

It is impossible to produce strong leaders through peaceful elections. Peacefully elected leaders tend to have lower levels of political intelligence than the average population. This is because their power comes from a broad electoral base with ordinary political skills.

(2) There is currently no opposition voice in Taiwan.

Anti-mainland and anti-unification speech is free in Taiwan. But the same cannot be said for pro-mainland and pro-unification rhetoric. The pro-mainland comments that mainlanders often see online have no impact in Taiwan. If there are no incidents of division and conflict, there is no room for political manipulation and therefore no room for strong leaders to emerge. There is no room to reverse the political climate.

(3) Taiwan’s military is not a strong political force.

Taiwan’s military not only lacks the military capabilities to match its military equipment, it also lacks political capabilities. Through nearly 20 years of observation, Taiwan’s military leaders have always been politically weak. They are totally incapable of resisting the power of the political leaders. This is a basic fact. Therefore, there is no basis for negotiating one country, two systems with the mainland through a military coup.

3.4 Opportunities repeatedly missed

3.4.1 Chiang Ching-kuo lost his great contribution to unification

When Chiang Ching-kuo ruled Taiwan, he had the ability to determine the future direction. His basic philosophy is to oppose Taiwan independence. But he did not promote the unification process. Taiwan’s huge economic advantages and Taiwan’s political dependence on the United States may be the main reasons. The political liquidation of the Chiang family by the Taiwan independence forces caused Chiang Ching-kuo to lose the motivation to pursue political achievements, which may be a more important reason.

3.4.2 Mediocre talents hesitated

Lee Teng-hui faces a historic opportunity that is extremely rare for other Taiwanese politicians. Whether it is for Taiwan’s reunification or independence, any one else can achieve more than Lee Teng-hui did acctually.

Lee Teng-hui froze the operations of the Taiwan Provincial Government. He also initiated the process of direct election of Taiwan’s leaders. These actions laid the foundation for the development of Taiwan’s independence consciousness. With his practical support, Taiwanese independence activist Chen Shui-bian won the right to govern Taiwan.

At the same time, Lee Teng-hui formulated the “National Unification Programme” during his tenure. It was during Lee’s tenure that the 1992 Consensus was reached with the mainland.

In the end, Lee Teng-hui achieved no major successes in promoting either Taiwan independence or unification.

3.4.3 No one can promote unification

After Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen all had no inner impulse to pursue unification. The Taiwan independence background of Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen is relatively easy to understand. The phenomenon of Ma Ying-jeou from the pan-blue camp better reflects the inner thoughts and philosophical logic of the Taiwanese people. I don’t want to make the effort, but I also want to get real benefits.

3.4.4 Political inertia cannot be stopped immediately

The signal that the central government will take action to unify Taiwan is unmistakable.

Ye Qiquan has repeatedly predicted that the final date for military reunification will be no later than April 2026 to September 2026 [3]. This man had considerable political foresight. Just two months after the Russian-Ukrainian war broke out, some people predicted that the war would be limited to a certain region. It is also predicted that the war will not end until at least the end of 2026. Russia will set up about 7 local governments in Ukraine. Ukraine will inevitably be partitioned[3,4].

It is worth noting that Ye Qiquan predicted in 2019 that Taiwan would lose the political benefits of one country, two systems. This negative prediction for Taiwan was confirmed by mainland officials three years later.

If Ye Qiquan’s prediction of the timing of Taiwan’s reunification is credible, then Taiwan still has about three years to engage in peace negotiations.

However, Taiwan’s political atmosphere has built a high wall against “one country, two systems”; it is impossible to produce a strong politician to reverse the political atmosphere; there are no more opportunities to reverse the political atmosphere; therefore, Taiwan continues to miss out on the remaining opportunities for peace talks.

Basically, it can be judged that the shell of one country, two systems and the three-year peace negotiation window left by the mainland will eventually be thrown away by the Taiwanese.

3.4.5 Final implementation of the military plan

The probability that China will use military means to unify Taiwan is close to 1. Taiwan will be unified through forced means that is a destiny or spell.

IV. Characteristics of military operations

When the mainland central government launches cross-Strait military operations, they generally have the following characteristics.

(1) There will be no obvious political hesitation.

(2) Deploy at least four times the actual strength required.

(3) Attention is paid to the pursuit of political objectives;

(4) The military enterprise develops rapidly and extensively;

(5) Political processes are slow and protracted;

(6) Provoke a slow and heavy response from the American group;

(7) Provoke a comprehensive soft confrontation between China and the West lasting more than three years;

(8) Make major political moves in Europe, North Africa and the Arab region.

(9) Taiwan will not quickly establish a political structure without military supervision.

4.1. There will be no obvious political hesitation

Political hesitation is common. Taking Putin as an example, the launch of the first phase of special military operations is a typical real-life example of political hesitation. To this day, it cannot be said that Putin is completely free of political hesitation.

Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law is a typical example of mainland China’s political hesitation in modern times. Even if as great as Mao Zedong, as cautious as Lin Biao and as witty as Deng Xiaoping, they have had political hesitations.

The plan for military action against Taiwan is a systematic plan that the mainland has been fully planning for 14 years. Various preparations have to be made in all aspects and links.

Looking back at Xi Jinping’s political performance in 2012 and 2019, we can conclude that he has various characteristics to become a political strongman. This person has a strong and keen ability to integrate, collect, and unite political forces; he has a strong political ability to reverse an adverse situation; he is good at discovering opportunities and finding the key points in the chaos; he acts decisively and resolutely and rarely shows political hesitation.

4.2. The investment should be at least 4 times the actual number of soldiers required;

Throughout Chinese history, military issues have always been subordinated to political goals. In mainland China, military issues have always been one level below the political structure. Therefore, Taiwan’s military problems can be predicted from the perspective of political science.

If we assume that the mainland’s military force of 50,000 can completely defeat Taiwan’s military force of 260,000, then we can basically assume that the mainland will send at least 200,000 military personnel to the island of Taiwan, or even double or more . This is not for a military objective, but for a political one.

(1) Showing China’s military strength to the American electorate.

Mainland China needs to carry out military tests quickly to demonstrate its strength to American voters. This shows that Taiwan is incapable of resisting mainland China’s military operations. It is impossible for the US to use the island of Taiwan to launch military operations against the mainland.

(2) Showing China’s strength to European politicians.

The mainland must make it clear to European politicians that they have no chance of using military procedures and military means to seek interests in East Asia. Because of Europe’s own political and military weaknesses, direct military action against China would risk the complete deconstruction of European political power.

(3) Increasing military difficulties for the US alliance

If Europe’s adventurous mentality disappears, Japan’s willingness to go to war will gradually weaken. The proportion of political and military emergencies in the United States Group will increase.

4.3. Rapid and extensive development of military operations;

This is an extension of the previous point. The Chinese central government will use super-intensive firepower to carry out a fierce military push. The process is similar to using an 8-pound sledgehammer to crush a peanut. At the same time, this military process is designed to convey an image to the American and Japanese voters. That is, the United States and Japan have no chance of intervening in China’s unified military operations. At the same time, China also hopes that this rapidly advancing military action will cause political hesitation among European politicians, thereby increasing the difficulty and time of European decision-making on Asia policy.

4.4. Focus on pursuing political goals;

In principle, it can be assumed that the results and process of military operations will not consume too much energy for the political leaders of mainland China. The process of pursuing this outcome is not as complicated as the Taiwanese imagine.

However, how to use the shell of military operations to achieve as many political goals as possible will be a key consideration for the mainland’s central government.

4.5. The political process is slow and protracted;

This is the manifestation process of the external characteristics mentioned in the previous point.

4.6. It provoked a slow and heavy response from the American group;

The Americans must respond to this incident in China. Not responding is suicide. Wrong response is still suicide. The response of the US government and military is based on responding to the needs of voters, allies and system management. More importantly, the United States must also respond to the political needs of mainland China.

Theoretically, there are two broad categories of U.S. response packages to China’s unified actions: pre-incident response packages and post-incident response packages[X].

4.6.1 Pre-Response Package and Post-Response Package

Pre-response package.

The Americans know what China will do, and they know when China will do it. It is in the best interests of the United States to deal peace talks with the Chinese first. But this response plan does not serve the personal interests of American politicians. Anyone who dares to openly negotiate peace with China will find his political career immediately ended. This is a structural flaw in decentralised electoral systems. It is difficult to do anything that is in the long-term interest of the country. Therefore, this set of response plans, which exists in theory, does not exist in practice.

Post-event response package.

There are at least three sets of tools in this kit. One is the appeasement plan. One is a comprehensive economic war plan. One is a comprehensive military war plan [X].

4.6.2 Appeasement Plan

The appeasement plan is a relatively difficult plan to implement. It requires close cooperation between the Chinese government and the US government. At least three basic conditions are needed to realise the appeasement plan.

(1) Show the American and European voters in advance that China is ready for the nuclear option. Moreover, China’s nuclear power is enough for the US and European voters to remove the nuclear option from the US-China conflict script. It could even remove the option of all-out military war from the US-China conflict script.

(2) Quickly and comprehensively end the military process of war against Taiwan. Show American and European voters that China’s military capabilities are not flawed.

(3) Conduct small to moderate contact warfare. Demonstrate military expectations to Western bloc voters through low-level warfare. That will show a fact that the American group cannot win military conflicts in East Asia battlefield. But the US group cannot fail in this East Asian conflict. Therefore, the implementation process of the military appeasement plan is actually a very difficult political process, not a purely military process.

Unless there are very fortuitous factors, it is unlikely that American politicians will actively choose this option. However, it is not impossible that in practice the military actions of both sides will be downgraded with the support of public opinion, thus implementing the military appeasement plan.

The timing of the military appeasement programme is difficult to assess, but it has certainly existed both in theory and in practice. A military appeasement programme can also be included as a complement to a comprehensive economic warfare programme.

4.6.3 Comprehensive economic warfare

Comprehensive economic warfare is the option that the American group is most likely to choose proactively.

The United States must take a tough political stance against China. Any response must be labelled “tough”. This level of toughness must meet the political needs of “appeasing American voters”, “appeasing European voters”, “appeasing European politicians”, “intimidating the Arab world” and “intimidating South American and African countries”. The process of implementing a comprehensive economic war is controllable. The frontiers of economic warfare can be moved slowly in many directions and tested step by step. Total economic war would be a favourite among European politicians as a less risky response. It can even be included as an add-on to a total military war response package.

4.6.4 Total military war:

Total military war is an option that the United States tries to avoid because the risks of total military conflict are difficult to control. Even low-level military conflicts can easily exceed the control capabilities of politicians and quickly escalate into high-level wars. This is because the people of China and the United States have been preparing for a total war for a long time, including ideological preparations, political preparations and military preparations.

Once either China or the United States suffers heavy losses in a medium-level conflict, public opinion will be quickly inflamed. In this case, an increase in the level of war response is an almost inevitable consequence. There is little politicians can do about it. This is also an important reason why the military policy of appeasement is difficult to implement in practice.

China has a different focus from the United States. China is more able to withstand total war. But China still hopes to do its best to avoid a rapid outbreak of all-out war. One reason is that China believes that its capabilities in a war of attrition are stronger than those of the United States and its alliance. Another reason is that China has not yet developed the political and philosophical aspirations to completely destroy the US imperial system [Y]. This is an important basis for China and the United States to sit down and negotiate after a conflict.

In fact, China is not politically and philosophically ready for a full-scale war.

In fact, China is not politically and philosophically ready for a full-scale conflict. China is reluctant to overthrow the US-led imperial system. This political hesitation will become the basis for mainland China’s military hesitation. This makes the Chinese central government a passive party in the escalation process of military conflicts (except for the European direction).

There are still many political forces in the world that are not in line with the interests of China, the United States and Europe. Perhaps they are not willing to let China and the United States share world power. Maybe some of them are ready to intervene in global chaos. These factors may also become factors promoting the escalation of military conflicts between China and the United States.

4.7. Trigger a comprehensive soft confrontation between China and the West;

South Korea, Japan and Europe are all core members of the American group. The coordinated introduction of comprehensive sanctions against China by these core members is fully in line with political procedures.

4.8. Key political initiatives in Europe, North Africa and the Arab region

4.8.1 The political weakness of Japan and South Korea

Japan and South Korea were undoubtedly involved in the early stages of the conflict between China and the United States. Therefore, China will have no political hesitation in formulating plans against Japan or South Korea. As the intensity of the war increases, South Korea and Japan will have to gradually withdraw from the war process and even from the US alliance.

As long as the Japanese believe that China will not suffer a total or catastrophic defeat, they will not really commit themselves to a Sino-American conflict scenario. But they will pretend to be fully committed. China can prepare enough props to cooperate with Japan. Because Japan has huge political shortcomings compared to China [7]. Japan is effectively a politically powerless actor. China does not need to make an explicit commitment to Japan to force Japan to withdraw from the war process. Faced with China, Japan has no better plan than to surrender to China [7].

The Koreans have been actively looking for ways to develop the country. But in the context of the conflict between China and the United States, even if they want to cause trouble, they are actually the most powerless party. Its reactions and positions are heavily influenced by other interested parties. South Korea can only react passively to the reactions of the United States, China, North Korea, Russia and even Japan [7].

4.8.2 China faces risks from Europe

If we continue to pay attention to Europe’s diplomatic response to China over the past two decades, we can believe that Europe does not just have the idea of being passively involved in the Sino-US conflict. In fact, it can be said that Europe has an inherent hostility towards China. Europe will not only passively join the Sino-US conflict, but also actively seek the endogenous need to completely defeat China [8].

European powers are China’s biggest variable. This is an important factor leading to political emergencies in China. Unlike Japan and South Korea, the European powers have greater freedom of choice than Japan and South Korea. Their inherent impulse to attack China is stronger than that of Japan and South Korea. This means that they will always be on the lookout for opportunities to intervene.

Europe is not within striking range of China’s land-based weapons. This is another important basis for its active choice. This means that China should not and cannot have any political hesitation about Europe’s direction. China must make strong preparations in advance and directly deter Europe in advance.

Europe also has a fatal flaw in dealing with China. This is the basis for China’s containment of Europe.

4.8.3 China is inadequately prepared for Europe

If the Chinese central government can politically hesitate in a certain direction, the most likely direction is the European one.

Data on political science research in recent years show that there is a wide disparity in Chinese political scientists’ research on Europe. Chinese political scientists focus on Japan, South Korea, India, the Philippines and Russia’s hostility towards China. At the same time, they ignore Europe’s strong hostility towards China. This reluctance could have significant consequences. If Europe, Japan and the United States act early, quickly and simultaneously, China will suffer huge political losses. Although it is impossible to reverse the results of military operations across the Taiwan Strait, it will have a significant impact on the subsequent economic response phase and increase the possibility of a full-scale military war. This will put enormous pressure on China in the early stages of a full-scale military war.

However, European intervention will carry huge political costs and risks for Europe. China can fully demonstrate this capability and China’s tough stance in advance. Appeasing Europe is very risky for China, even riskier than for Japan and South Korea. [8]

4.9. long term military oversight.

The governance model that the Chinese central government will implement after Taiwan’s reunification will depend on the international political realities at the time and China’s geopolitical considerations. However, it is clear from other existing discussions that some people worry that identity alienation will have significant and long-term political consequences for ethnic integration and ethnic separation [5]. If such concerns are factored into policy considerations, a relatively quick transition away from military oversight would be an unrealistic goal.

Based on general assumptions, military rule for 10 to 30 years is a common political expectation.

Summary

Reference

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Ye QiQuan. Three Possible Ceasefire Lines of Russia-Ukraine War. PPPNet. Feb. 23, 2023. https://en.pppnet.net/three-possible-ceasefire-lines-of-russia-ukraine-war/
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