China’s Unifying Plan:(3) USA’s Options

 

First Submitted

3 Oct. 2022

Updated Released

29 March 2023

29 Feb. 2024

Abstract:

In response to China’s unifying actions across the Taiwan Strait, the United States theoretically has six sets of response plans. Two sets of preventive plans and four sets of post-event plans. Preventive, whether it is a pre-negotiation plan or a pre-emptive containment plan, can achieve more desirable results for the United States. But at the actual operational level, based on the political systems of the United States and its allies, these two sets of preventive response plans basically have no chance of being implemented. After China launched the military unification operation, the political, economic and military responses of the countries of the US alliance to China were smooth and appeased public opinion. On the basis of comprehensive political sanctions, the American alliance also has three different sets of additional response plans. They are a total economic war plan, a military appeasement plan and a total war plan. Whichever response plan the US alliance chooses, its starting point and possible outcomes point to “stop loss”. It is difficult to see how the US alliance can benefit from actions against China. Once a full-scale war breaks out between China and the United States, it is very likely to trigger chaos with huge consequences. The chaos could spread to Europe, Asia and Africa. Based on the pessimistic prediction of the outcome of an all-out war between China and the United States, it is not ruled out that the US alliance will adopt another unexpected alternative. That is, a laissez-faire approach.

Keywords:

United States; Reaction; Options; China; Reunification; Taiwan Strait; Military action; Sino-US conflict

 

Various signs clearly indicate that China’s unification action can no longer be stopped and blocked [1, 2, 3]. China’s military actions in the Taiwan Strait have a completely different significance for the United States than any other war since the Second World War. This war will undermine (undermine, destabilise, weaken, deconstruct) the American-led imperial order and could lead to the partial or even total deconstruction of the imperial core consisting of the United States and Europe. For the United States and Europe, the best response is actually to cut their losses. The likelihood of zero losses or even positive gains from military action against China is slim.

The American alliance’s stop-loss plan can be executed in two directions. One direction is before the response and the other direction is after the response. There are different response options in each direction. These include: pre-peace negotiation planning, pre-deterrence planning, comprehensive economic sanctions in the context of post-event political sanctions, military appeasement planning, and total war planning. There may even be a case for laissez-faire.

I. Pre-negotiation Plan

The premise of the pre-negotiation plan is that the US group has made it clear that China’s pace in resolving the Taiwan issue cannot be stopped. The United States does not want China’s unifying actions to further undermine the existing imperial order. Therefore, comprehensive political negotiations will be initiated with China. China is not expected to become the leader of powerful anti-order forces or the leader of anti-order groups.

1.1 Basic Contents of the Previous Peace Negotiation Plan

1.1.1 The announced framework for Taiwan’s Two-system will not be talked

Since the Chinese central government issued a white paper on the Taiwan issue on 10 August 2022, the central government has clearly refused to grant Taiwan “substantial one country, two systems” treatment. This is the framework that has been announced. It is difficult for the Chinese central government to back down from this public stance [4,5].

Since the Chinese central government’s unification timetable has been finalised, there is actually not enough time for negotiations to change the unification approach issue.

The Chinese central government will, in principle, regard negotiations on the unification approach as a political trap. Taiwanese politicians also do not dare to bear the stigma of “surrendering” and “selling out Taiwan”.

The best outcome is for the United States to force Taiwan not to resist, and for the mainland to relax restrictions on insurrection and surrender.

1.1.2 The Legal Status and Military Presence of the United States in East Asia

After China unifies Taiwan, once China uses Taiwan Island as a “land bridge” or “land sword”, it will severely restrict the United States’ ability to exercise “freedom of action” in the Sea of Japan and surrounding areas.

If China and Russia engage in deep cooperation, China’s capabilities can be strengthened from both north and south around the sea of Japan. This poses a more serious strategic challenge to the United States.

The legal status and military presence of the United States in East Asia are key issues affecting the political and military pillars of the US imperial order. This should be the United States’ main demand in the negotiations. At least the US hopes to maintain its presence in Japan more than 20 years militarily and politically. And USA also hope that the future East Asia Cooperation Zone can accommodate the United States.

1.1.3 Issues of political cooperation in East Asia

Political and economic cooperation in East Asia will be a major concern for China. At the same time, this is also the issue of most concern to the United States. If China gains a geopolitical advantage on the island of Taiwan (perhaps even at the northern end of the Sea of Japan) and subsequently strengthens political cooperation with Japan, South Korea and Russia in East Asia, it will be a perfectly predictable process for the United States to gradually withdraw from East Asia.

Forcing the United States to withdraw from East Asia is a major development issue that cannot be avoided in the course of China’s history. It is difficult for the United States to stand still completely in this regard, and it is also difficult for the United States to make major substantive concessions.

• China’s diplomatic experts may use multiple steps and complex techniques to allay U.S. concerns, gradually advancing the process in small steps.

How to promote the operation of the East Asia Cooperation Zone without creating a confrontation between China and the United States in East Asia requires politicians to think deeply about various plans and variables.

1.1.4 China will not further weaken US political power

The United States wants to ensure or confirm that China will not interfere with or oppose other U.S. policy decisions beyond China’s geopolotical surrounding. Properly maintaining the United States’ effective “power gap” is the basis for the United States’ concentration of wealth through power. It has taken vast amounts of wealth and taxes to keep an expensive imperial machine running.

1.1.5 China’s economic decision-making and jurisdiction

Whether China can promise not to further weaken Europe’s economic power is a key issue for Europe.

Whether China can make gains in economic decision-making and economic jurisdiction is the focus of China’s attention.

Europe, China and the United States need to make progress on this substantive issue. This is an important part of China’s integration into the US-led imperial order. If the three parties engage in tit-for-tat on this issue, it will become an obstacle to comprehensive policy coordination.

1.1.6 Freedom of navigation within the contiguous zone of maritime areas

This is not a critical issue, but it may become a secondary issue in the negotiations over the political and economic power of China and the United States. This kind of non-essential issue could become the lubricant of critical negotiations.

After China has expanded its geopolitical advantages around Taiwan Island, the United States’ freedom of navigation in the waters surrounding China will no longer be a significant weakness or real threat to China. It can not only benefit USA in paper politics, but also profit China in true interests.

After the two sides reach a cooperation and integration agreement, China’s freedom of navigation in the contiguous zone of US waters will not become an example of China challenging US authority.

1.2 Benefits of pre-negotiation

Pre-negotiation can include all issues of concern to both parties, and both parties can reach an agreement through compromise and communication. For the defenders of the existing order, this is the safest and most certain way to stop losses. It will not lead to major changes in the overall power structure.

For challengers, reducing the risk of military conflict while gaining substantial benefits is also the best way to ensure political success.

1.3 Defect, obstacles and the importance of prior negotiation

The political reality is complex. The political solutions that are most beneficial to one country or group are often the most difficult to implement within the West bloc. There are two main obstacles to reaching a pre-negotiation plan with China. The first is the controversy over the plan within the leadership of the US-West Group. The second is the resistance of public opinion in the countries of the US-West bloc.

1.3.1 Resistance to decision-making

The political and economic positions of the European countries and the United States did not completely coincide. The European powers had different interests from USA. The EU’s own decision-making mechanisms are inefficient. These factors make it difficult to reach a unanimous understanding on China’s political concessions.

Even if certain political concessions to China are forced through within the ruling establishment, stubborn opponents may use public opinion to block implementation of this plan package.

Even if a political compromise with China is temporarily accepted, it may become the source of future power struggles.

1.3.2 Public opposition

The political decision-making process in the United States and European countries is significantly influenced by the power of public opinion. At present, the basic line of public opinion throughout the West world is still hostile to China. They see China as an economic enemy, a political enemy, and even a philosophical and ideological enemy. In fact, the West world and China occupy different positions in the power structure. The United States and Europe are the defenders of the existing power order. And China is a member of the group of challengers to the power order. Until public opinion in the West world changes its hostility towards China, any political compromise with China will be rejected by the west public opinion.

Any west politician who tries to force a pre-agreement with China will face pressures and risks that will end his or her political future.

1.4 The importance of pre-negotiation planning

From a practical point of view, a pre-negotiation plan is almost impossible to achieve.

Although impossible to implement, the secret discussions and contacts for the pre-negotiation plan were factors that drove the implementation of the post-event appeasement plan. This is the main significance of the existence of the pre-negotiation plan.

The process of formulating a pre-negotiation plan will enable American policymakers to clearly understand the important issues that affect national interests. It will then focus firmly on these important issues and seek solutions.

The process of developing a pre-negotiation plan would allow U.S. and Chinese policymakers to focus on the issues that matter most to them and to each other. The process also helps policymakers assess each side’s balance over time. Then the pace of action on both sides will continue to adjust. This political development may give rise to a peculiar form of struggle. It is to avoid imposing unbearable political defeats on the enemy on the premise of securing one’s own political interests. This strange fighting mentality can help to avoid the worst results for one or both parties. This strange way of political struggle will leave enough room for political manoeuvring for subsequent comprehensive political negotiations.

Although there is no room for the implementation of the pre-negotiation plan, it is of great existential importance.

II.  Preemptive Containment Plan

2.1 Terminology

The preemptive containment plan refers to the US alliance preparing a series of tough and comprehensive military plans in advance before China launches its military operations to unify Taiwan. The US alliance conducts advance operations or preparations even before China launches military operations. The starting point is to directly prevent mainland China from landing on the island of Taiwan by deploying strong forces in advance. This can lead to many different outcomes.

There are only three ways to successfully prevent China from landing on Taiwan.

2.1.1 Preventive blockade prior to process:

The US coalition forces enter the Taiwan island directly ahead of China. This can directly and effectively prevent the Chinese central government from landing.

2.1.2 Tackle in process:

Absolutely superior military forces have been pre-positioned in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. When China launches its unification campaign, the US coalition can quickly and deliberately interdict (block, destroy, defeat) mainland China from the island of Taiwan.

2.1.3 Nuclear deterrence following process:

As soon as mainland China launches a unifying action, U.S. forces will immediately test a small nuclear device on a small island or reef of unknown ownership in the South China Sea, directly raising the level of war to the highest level. Prevent the Chinese central government’s landing action from the standpoint of direct use of nuclear devices for all-out decisive war.

2.2 The End Point of the Preemptive Containment Plan

The Preventive Containment Plan has a clear starting point, which is to prevent the Chinese central government from landing on the island of Taiwan. But its end point varies widely. The uncertainty and uncontrollability of the endpoint are the main reasons why it is difficult to implement the Preventive Containment Plan.

2.2.1 Endpoint 1: All-out military showdown between China and the United States

In order to station troops on the island of Taiwan in advance, USA must break through not only the domestic legal restrictions, but also the restrictions of international law. If the United States chooses this option without any surprises, China and the United States will immediately trigger a full-scale and comprehensive military confrontation. China may even choose a comprehensive confrontation with the US-led imperialist order.

2.2.2 Taiwan independence

If the US alliance defeats or destroys the Chinese air and naval forces in the early stages of the war, the Chinese mainland will eventually lose the ability to project its troops across the sea, Taiwan will be completely separated from the Chinese mainland, and this will lead to Taiwan’s independence.

2.2.3 Major military failure on USA

The comprehensive military failure of the US alliance and the subsequent comprehensive political failure of both China and the US

The US alliance concentrates heavy forces in a small area, and these forces are completely exposed to China’s surveillance system. This puts the American alliance in great danger. It is possible that the American alliance will suffer a total military defeat after a short but sharp military attack.

A total military failure of the US alliance may trigger a total political failure of the United States. It may even trigger a comprehensive political failure for both China and the United States.

2.2.4 Accelerating or Intensifying the Process of Border Movement in Europe

Total war will inevitably involve the leading countries of the existing world order. It will inevitably trigger a comprehensive confrontation between China and the countries in the power stratum of the existing order. This means that the European countries will definitely join the front line against China. At present, the process of moving borders in Europe has actually started, or at least is about to start. Once Europe intervenes in the East Asian war in 2026, China will definitely intervene, accelerate and intensify the process of border movement in Europe. This will certainly trigger a realignment of European power structures. And it could deconstruct the power structure of the whole of Europe and even the whole imperial order led by the United States.

2.2.5 Uncontrolled use of nuclear weapons

If the United States takes the lead in using nuclear weapons to intervene in the East Asian war in 2026, there is a very high probability that it will provoke a similar response from China.

Once the US group’s coalition forces suffer heavy military losses and political defeats, the likelihood of the US group taking the lead in using nuclear devices will rapidly increase. It will also trigger a similar response from China.

Once the East Asian war opened up the use of nuclear weapons, the probability of nuclear weapons being used in the European battle zone also increased rapidly.

Once the United States is attacked by two or more other countries at the same time, the stability of the American continent, which does not have a united culture and a common historical background, will inevitably lose its balance quickly.

If the leadership of the United States is quickly weakened, Europe will quickly lose the power to maintain balance and stability. A process of chaos and redistribution of power across the continent would undoubtedly be set in motion.

2.3 Possibility of a preemptive containment plan

Two major obstacles have actually prevented the implementation of the preventive military plan. The probability of its implementation is almost zero.

2.3.1 Dual restrictions under national and international law

The domestic and international laws over the US alliance countries are rules of behaviour established to maintain the existing imperial order. In order to effectively implement preemptive containment plan, these existing rules must be broken. This is tantamount to dismantling the legal and philosophical pillars of the existing imperial order itself, and risks accelerating the collapse of the system.

2.3.2 Uncontrollable endpoint

Uncontrollable endpoints or uncertain prospects are obstacles to political decision-making. For any leadership group, power group or management centre, any uncertain prospect is the basis for political failure.

And among the various foreseeable endpoints, there are several possibilities with extremely high costs. The fear of these consequences reduces the chances of adopting preemptive containment plan to almost zero.

III. Reactive Comprehensive Political Sanctions

It is a relatively simple political process for any West country to launch a response plan after China’s military operations have begun. China’s military actions will first provoke public reaction in the countries of the US alliance. Political, military and economic action in line with public opinion is a low-risk, high-reward plan for politicians in various countries. Regardless of the different post-event response plans, comprehensive political sanctions are a necessary option in any plan. The role of comprehensive political sanctions is mainly reflected in the following three points.

3.1 Stabilising the political situation in U.S. group

Immediate political sanctions against mainland China’s military actions are the easiest to implement and the most beneficial for the West Group. It can ensure that the government remains proactive in the face of turbulent public opinion. In the current political context, where the United States and Western European countries are generally hostile to China, public opinion in various countries must generally demand that the government take a tough stance against China. It is difficult for the United States and the Western alliance countries to avoid this political choice.

3.2 Stabilising the imperial order

If China’s military actions are not legitimised in advance, then sanctioning China is an inevitable choice to stabilise the imperial order. This political response must be tough enough to prevent further political collapse or weakening of the imperial order. The level of political sanctions must be strong enough to deter opposition forces in the Arab world, African countries and South American countries.

3.3 Preventing further expansion of China’s political gains

No matter how many layers of veils are used to hide the Chinese central government’s takeover of Taiwan, the essence is that China has gained enormous geopolitical advantages. It has effectively weakened the maritime jurisdiction of the United States. It has also weakened the political power of the United States based on sea power. More importantly, it will weaken, compress, and ultimately potentially displace the US military presence in East Asia. The US military presence in East Asia is one of the main pillars of the US imperial order. Unfortunately, it will not be as strong as it has been.

This kind of geopolitical superior China takes will shrink the political power of Japan and South Korea gradually or quickly. It can push these two East Asian countries move closer to China therefore. And then it may even completely replace the United States’ political advantage in East Asia.

One of the main purposes of comprehensive sanctions West Group takes is to prevent or slow down this process.

3.4 Probability of implementation

As the main supporting component of any post-event response plan, the probability of implementation of comprehensive political sanctions is infinitely close to 1. Without this response process, it would be equivalent to the United States choosing the last option: laissez-faire. A laissez-faire approach would be tantamount to a full admission of the extreme weakness of the US-led imperial order.

IV. Comprehensive Economic Sanctions

In response to China’s military actions, the US alliance can imposes comprehensive political sanctions and tough economic sanctions on China. This is the surest and most reliable way to stop the losses for the leadership group of the existing order.

The rapid introduction of comprehensive political sanctions can quickly stabilise the domestic public opinion of the power groups. The subsequent economic sanctions must try to meet or coordinate the following three requirements. That is, to appease domestic public opinion, maximise the economic interests of the power groups, and limit China’s political and economic gains as much as possible. Therefore, comprehensive economic sanctions must have the following characteristics

4.1 Have strong political significance

High-tech fields; fields that are well known to the public; fields that have an impact on public opinion in Western countries will be the main targets of economic sanctions. All sanctions must have political significance, which is a prerequisite for appeasing domestic public opinion and preventing political chaos.

4.2 Dynamic features

Economic sanctions are gradually introduced and gradually adjusted. The starting point of economic sanctions is to sanction China as much as possible. At the same time, economic sanctions must try to avoid hurting the country that initiated the sanctions too much. Sanctioning China is quite a complicated process.

4.3 Reforming the existing economic structure

Sanctions will definitely have a negative impact on China that will force China to find new ways to promote the stability of its economy. The efforts China does will definitely lead to changes, large or small, in the current economic structure.

4.4 Execution Period

Because of the position of the Chinese economy in the global economic structure, sanctions or restrictions on Chinese products will inevitably cause huge shocks throughout the supply chain. After a period of adjustment, the list of some sectors or products that cannot be replaced by other countries will become increasingly clear. The content of these lists will inevitably be expanded under the impetus of productivity factors. This is an indicator of a gap in the economic sanctions.

Once these economic demands are met by political forces, the gradual restoration of economic relations with China will become a historical necessity. In other words, the length of the effective period of sanctions depends on China’s strength in the international economic system.

It is estimated that there will be severe sanctions for 3 to 5 years. From the 4th to 5th year, both parties will begin to seek cooperation.

V. Military Appeasement Plan

If comprehensive political sanctions and comprehensive economic sanctions do not succeed in calming public opinion within the US bloc, it is reasonable to expect that a military intervention will follow or even take place at the same time in a moderate way. The military plan has a final political project to stop the losses. Prevent further political losses; prevent China from expanding its political gains; or at least slow down the pace of China’s expansion of its political gains.

But when it comes to military conflict, especially against China, all politicians will be cautious. Controlling (containing) the level of conflict as much as possible should be the first priority of all politicians in both sides. Therefore, the military appeasement programme has its historical stage. It will certainly have the following characteristics.

1) Frontline military commanders must have political qualities;

2) Ensure that every conflict and battle must have significant and widespread propaganda effects and political gains;

3) Battles should be limited to small or medium-sized with political boundaries;

4) The overall effect of the war is pursued without any side suffering a major defeat;

5) Political disputes continue to escalate and political sanctions continue to be enhanced.

6) Continued political engagement behind the veil of war to avoid a major defeat for either side;

7) Political objectives: Maintain US power to station troops and freedom of navigation in East Asia; prevent US political status in the Philippines from being seriously weakened; and ensure that an East Asian Cooperation Zone is not established in 10 to 20 years.

8) Aim of military action: to manage public opinion through military operations and ultimately to promote comprehensive political and economic negotiations. Military action is not the end goal of the military appeasement programme. Its purpose is to manage public opinion through military action. Explaining the fact that the US group cannot defeat the opponent will be a good way to guide public opinion. To promote comprehensive political and military negotiations by changing public opinion.

VI. Total War Plan

There is a geopolitical focus that China’s reunification directly weaken the strength of one of the four major military pillars that the United States deploys around the world. This actually weakens the ability of the United States to govern world. The fact that China’s central government has taken over the island of Taiwan reduces the “freedom of navigation” the United States operate freely around the Taiwan Strait, the Sea of Japan and the Philippine Sea. Indeed, it undermines America’s ability to lead the imperial order.

The purpose of the United States and its allies in responding to China’s unifying military operations is mainly focused on the following points.

(1) Reassure domestic public opinion and maintain domestic political stability;

(2) Preventing China from gaining more geopolitical interests in East Asia;

(3) preventing or slowing down the expansion of China’s geopolitical advantages in the South China Sea.

These goals can be achieved not only through peace negotiations and military appeasement programmes. All-out war is also an option.

6.1 Three main ways to trigger a full-scale Sino-U.S. War:

1) Comprehensive overall war plan designed in advance.

 A designed full-scale war plan can respond to China’s military operations quickly.

• A consequent total war out of control.

If a military appeasement plan goes out of control, it will gradually escalate into a full-scale war.

• A total war driven by external factors.

Other external powers are not going to tolerate the United States and China sharing global leadership peacefully.

6.2 Trends and Predictions of Total War

6.2.1. Both sides avoid hitting the enemy hard unless it reaches the level of a major war response

If China and the United States ultimately achieve an undefeated outcome at the national level, it is highly likely that it will be a political outcome jointly pursued by politicians on both sides.

6.2.2 The US alliance cannot invade Chinese soil

Once China has landed on the island of Taiwan, the chances of the US alliance occupying Chinese territory are slim. This is the physical basis on which China cannot be defeated. It is also the greatest military and political difficulty for the US alliance. Unless nuclear weapons are used to achieve some degree of possibility of victory for the US alliance.

6.2.3 The American alliance has global advantages.

In the area 2,000 kilometres from the coast, the American alliance has an absolute advantage. This is the material basis for the American alliance to launch a comprehensive and extensive war. China’s sea routes to Australia, South America, Africa and Europe will be severely restricted. China’s economic activities will be severely affected in wide area far from land.

6.2.4 China has regional advantages.

Once a full-scale war begins, the political and military power of the US alliance will quickly and completely withdraw from East Asia. This process may be proactive or reactive, but the result will be the same. If the United States does not initiate this transfer process, it can basically be assumed that the United States is not prepared to engage in a high-intensity war with China. As soon as the US alliance makes its decision on a high-intensity war, the transfer must be carried out immediately. 

Even if the United States does not take the initiative to initiate the transfer of military power, it does not rule out the possibility of initiating the process through passive factors. Negotiations between China and the United States clearly influence this process.

6.2.5 Outcome of major battles influenced by random factors.

If there is a chance of a decisive battle, the location of the battlefield is most likely to be in the waters near Australia, Indonesia and the Solomon Islands. Or in other places where the military power of China and the United States is almost equal. Therefore, the outcome of a large-scale decisive battle will be heavily influenced by random factors.

These random factors include the following:

1) The special ability of political genius to manipulate surrounding geopolitical forces;

2) The special ability of political genius to weaken the enemy’s overall strength;

3) The ability of military genius to quickly exploit local advantages on the battlefield and discover the enemy’s major weaknesses;

4) The impact of sudden climatic or environmental changes on warfighting capabilities;

5) Sudden political shifts in local geopolitical forces;

6) The ability of combat forces to fight in real combat environments.

6.2.6 Protracted war hurt China

If the US launches a “protracted war” to block China’s sea lanes, it will deal a heavy and unbearable blow to China. China will inevitably start the process of “building a parallel economic system” and “weakening Europe to weaken the attrition war capability of US alliance”.

6.2.7 Protracted War Weakens the United States

Given China’s strong secondary and primary industrial capabilities, a protracted war is a sure way for China to defeat the United States militarily. The United States and its alliance cannot defeat China in a war of attrition.

6.2.8 Protracted war damage Europe

If the United States takes the initiative to start a “protracted war”, China’s best response is to intervene deeply in Europe’s border movement process. China will speed up and intensify Europe’s border movement process. At the same time, it will accelerate the deconstruction process of the European power structure. The process of deconstruction of European power may be the opening ceremony of the retreat of the United States to the American continent.

6.2.9 The United States not suffer “national failure”.

Whether the USA defeats China or is defeated by China in a major war, as long as the war enters a protracted war mode, the US-led imperial order will inevitably be reorganised, reconstructed or updated. The US-led, European-centered imperial order will inevitably face tremendous turmoil.

Although China or its alliance has the capacity to realistically threaten the US-led imperial order, China does not yet have the capacity to defeat the United States at the national level. Even if the United States relinquishes its world leadership for active or passive reasons, the national strength of the United States will not be significantly weakened in the short term.

6.2.10 Global chaos is likely

The chaos of European order.

The weakening of Europe is an important part of China’s efforts to weaken the US alliance’s ability to sustain war. Unless the core European countries actively break with the existing imperial order. Both approaches will lead to the same result, which is chaos in the European order.

Russia is approaching the entire eastern bank of the Dnieper.

Russia is targeting the entire eastern bank of the Dnieper River as a new national security border to counter Europe’s culture war (which can even be defined as a philosophical war) of “depriving Russians of their European identity”[6].

The risk of deconstruction of European power.

Russia, Turkey, Iran and pan-German forces will become the new major power groups in Europe. Even countries like Syria, Saudi Arabia and Algeria are ready to intervene in the reorganisation of European power.

The rise of the Arab world.

The Arab world is psychologically, economically and politically ready to intervene in the turbulent world process.

African resistance.

Although Africa’s power is not currently concentrated, once “visionaries” find an “economic way”, “political way” or “philosophical way” to increase Africa’s value, it will be natural to integrate the power of the whole of Africa. .

6.3 Probability of occurrence

6.3.1 Total war is not a priority for the US

In the event of total war, regardless of victory or defeat, the probability of withdrawal of US power from East Asia is close to 1 [7].

A military draw is a total political, military and economic failure for the United States. It will inevitably trigger a series of subsequent events.

Whether Europe intervenes in this Asian war or not, it will lead to the deterioration of the close relationship between the United States and Europe [6].

It may trigger a process of fact-finding in which the land power (or land-based power) suppresses the sea power (or sea-based power).

The United States and the American Alliance cannot win a war of attrition.

6.3.2 Total war is not China’s priority

China’s prosperity depends on the US-led imperial order.

1) The growth of China’s international status and power depends mainly on the wealth created by the hard work of the Chinese people. On the other hand, it also relies heavily on the US system of evaluating wealth to confirm China’s wealth. The United States is willing to break this link, but the Chinese are opposed to breaking this link.

2) An all-out war will bring about uncertain changes in this wealth creation and certification system. It is difficult to predict which side will have a greater negative impact.

Chinese philosophical issues

1) China see that the US-led imperial order has operational difficulties;

2) China believes that the main reason for the operational difficulties of the imperial order is the high cost of operation;

3) China is not willing to become the successor leader of this expensive order model;

4) There is no historical opportunity for China to create a large power gap with other countries. A enough large power gap is the basis for leading an expensive world order under American imperial model; (unless the current predicted political environment is exceeded, China will have difficulty in obtaining an enough large power gap).

5) China does not want the United States to give up its leadership over the world order until a better philosophical way is found to support China;

6) China’s current philosophical system does not support a single polar power order or system. China’s existing philosophical logic cannot provide the necessary elements for the G1 power system to effectively run. China’s best philosophical solution, at least for now, is to support the G2 solution.

6.3.3 Third parties are not going to sit back and watch China and the United States share the leadership of the world.

1. Even if China and the United States do not give priority to a comprehensive war, there is no guarantee on other third party promote a full-scale war.
2. The European war in 2022 has actually started a turbulent process in Europe. It may only open a small gap for the time being. Maybe the turmoil in Europe still has a chance to be quelled. But there is a very high probability that the process of European border turbulence will be intensified or accelerated.
3. Europe is where the world’s wealth is concentrated. It is also one of the most important economic markets. Many countries have already made political and ideological preparations. They are ready to seize the opportunity to plunge into chaos at any time in order to gain more national interests.
4. Africa has always been a continent marginalised by the current economic and price order. Whether a “visionary” can find the key to organising and directing this huge force will be another major factor of change affecting the world order.

VII: Laissez-faire plan

One unexpected solution cannot be completely ruled out, namely the laissez-faire solution. Although laissez-faire plan is a low-probability event, it cannot be completely ruled out theoretically. The feature of this plan is that the United States and its allies consistently indulge, obfuscate and even deny that China’s unifying military actions have anti-imperialist characteristics. The reasons are as follows:

1. The United States generally judges that the risks and damage of its response to China outweigh the consequences of letting it go;
2. The cost of maintaining the US-ledimperial order is too high; the United States is already preparing to relinquish its power and responsibilities;
3. Both America and Chinahave secretly reached a tacit understanding, an undisclosed draft agreement, or a practical agreement before or after China’s unification campaign;
4. The United States is willing to work with China to rebuild a power system;
5. American elites believe that giving up the costs and power of maintaining the imperial order will not affect the real benefits of the United States;
6. The United States believes that resuming domestic expansion rather than international expansion may have a higher input-output ratio.

Summery

In response to China’s unifying actions across the Taiwan Strait, the United States theoretically has six sets of response plans. Two sets of preventive plans and four sets of post-event plans. Preventive, whether it is a pre-negotiation plan or a pre-emptive containment plan, can achieve more desirable results for the United States. But at the actual operational level, based on the political systems of the United States and its allies, these two sets of preventive response plans basically have no chance of being implemented. After China launched the military unification operation, the political, economic and military responses of the countries of the US alliance to China were smooth and appeased public opinion. On the basis of comprehensive political sanctions, the American alliance also has three different sets of additional response plans. They are a total economic war plan, a military appeasement plan and a total war plan. Whichever response plan the US alliance chooses, its starting point and possible outcomes point to “stop loss”. It is difficult to see how the US alliance can benefit from actions against China. Once a full-scale war breaks out between China and the United States, it is very likely to trigger chaos with huge consequences. The chaos could spread to Europe, Asia and Africa. Based on the pessimistic prediction of the outcome of an all-out war between China and the United States, it is not ruled out that the US alliance will adopt another unexpected alternative. That is, a laissez-faire approach.

Reference:

1. Ye QiQuan. China’s Unifying Plan: (1) Shaped by 2012, Works in 2026. PPPNet. Mar. 29, 2023. https://en.pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026/
2. Ye QiQuan. China’s Unifying Plan: (9) Mainland and Taiwan Lost the Intersection of Two Systems. PPPNet. Mar. 29, 2023. https://en.pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan9-lost-intersection-of-two-system/
3. Ye QiQuan. China’s Unifying Plan: (10) Timing, Path, and Characteristics of Unification. PPPNet. Mar. 29, 2023. https://en.pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan10-timing-path-and-characteristics/
4. Interpret: China. The Taiwan Question and China’s “Reunification” in the New Era. CSIS. Aug. 10, 2022. https://interpret.csis.org/translations/the-taiwan-question-and-chinas-reunification-in-the-new-era/
5. Ye QiQuan. China’s Unifying Plan: (8) Evolution of China’s Two-system Proposal. PPPNet. Mar. 29, 2023. https://en.pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan8-evolution-of-chinas-two-system-proposal/
6. Ye QiQuan. China’s Unifying Plan: (7) European Uncertainty. PPPNet. Mar. 29, 2023. https://en.pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan7-european-uncertainty/
7. Ye QiQuan. China’s Unifying Plan: (6) Evolution and Stability: Geopolitics around China. PPPNet. Mar. 29, 2023. https://en.pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan6-geopolitics-around-china/