China’s Unifying Plan:(4) Imagined Sino-US Conflict Scenario

YE QIQUAN

March 29, 2023

Table of Contents

Abstract:

For China’s military operations in the Taiwan Strait in 2026, the US alliance can have multiple response plans. But any plan that does not include a military response cannot effectively placate public opinion in the United States and its allies, cannot effectively maintain the authority of the existing imperial order, and cannot effectively prevent the rapid expansion of China’s geopolitical interests. But the risks of the military option are also clear. How to control the scale of military conflict and avoid inflicting heavy military losses on the enemy will become a major challenge for politicians in hostile countries. In the course of military conflicts, China’s advantage lies in its ability to choose the time to start a war and the location of the battlefield. Given China’s defensive offensive strategy, it is difficult for the US alliance to land on Chinese soil. This is the material basis for ensuring that China does not suffer a comprehensive military defeat. The United States enjoys comprehensive military and political superiority throughout the world. China does not have the capability to deal a major blow to the United States at the national level. Even if US military power returns to the Americas, it will not significantly weaken the political and economic strength of the United States. Many factors give the United States the psychological advantage to proactively escalate its military response. The United States even has the psychological advantage of being the first to use nuclear weapons in an actual conflict. In addition to sufficient political understanding between politicians on both sides, a large-scale mobilisation of anti-nuclear public opinion on both sides may be more important to prevent nuclear war.

Keywords:

War; Across the Taiwan Strait; Reunification; Sino-US Conflict; Response; Plan; Stage; Hypothesis

Based on China’s launch of military operations across the Taiwan Strait in 2026, the US alliance has initiated a series of response actions. These response actions could trigger an all-out war between China and the United States. There could be 3 different versions of total war between China (alliance) and the US alliance. The three versions differ in the details. But the basic structure and the basic path of development are very close. The following discussion will try to leave out the differences between the three versions. The focus will be on the main path.

I: Three versions of Sino-US total conflict

The military appeasement plan of the US alliance went beyond the control of the politicians during the operation and escalated into a full-scale war between the two sides;
The comprehensive and all-out war plan proactively planned by the US group in advance was implemented;
The suffocating economic war against China stimulates China’s initiative in the comprehensive all-out war.

II: Strenge features and tone of the war

2.1 New historical features

If an all-out war breaks out between China and the United States this time, it must have a strange feature. This feature appears for the first time in the 3,000-year history of fully documented wars. It is to take the lead in weakening or eliminating the opponent’s ability to sustain the war. Compared with previous wars, which mainly focused on eliminating armed forces on the battlefield, this China-US war will mainly focus on weakening the enemy’s ability to sustain war. Before reaching the highest level of war response, both sides may even try their best to avoid dealing a heavy military and political blow to the other side.

Since the first war records appeared in ancient Chinese history books, up to the First and Second World Wars, and even the major wars after the Second World War, all have focused on destroying, annihilating and defeating the enemy’s military capabilities on the battlefield. The total military defeat of a party means that this party has lost its military and political capabilities.

There is no shortage of military strikes in this coming war. Moreover, military strikes can be more complex, varied and cruel, and they can cause greater casualties.

Strikes from space; military actions that rely heavily on space capabilities; operations beyond visual range; land warfare capabilities that suppress sea warfare capabilities; political manipulation that fully intervenes in the military process; the actual use of nuclear devices or for mutual deterrence in imminent war situations; these A series of new military forms and new characteristics will leave a strong mark on the historical process.

2.2 The first war with new characteristics in history.

This is the first all-out war in human history that focuses on the ability to sustain war. The importance of eliminating military capabilities on the battlefield and killing armed personnel has taken a back seat in this war.

III. Level of Response and Escalation Process of Sino-US War in 2026

III. Response Levels and Escalation Process of 2026 War

3.1 Level 1 Response: Harassment Warfare

Harassment warfare can appear in the Jingsui military plan and the overall war plan, and become a common part of both plans.

In order to cooperate with the comprehensive political sanctions and the comprehensive economic sanctions, while carrying out the propaganda war, the United States and various allies have launched all-round and multi-point harassment operations against China. It is characterised by armed confrontation at the level of sub-military conflict.

At this stage, the Western European countries, Japan, South Korea and Australia are all powerful assets of the United States. In Myanmar, Thailand, India, Kazakhstan, the Philippines and other places near the China-South Korea maritime border, near the Diaoyu Islands and near Scarborough Shoal, hot spots of chaos could arise to increase political and military pressure on China.

Even major US political investments in Pakistan and Afghanistan cannot be completely ruled out.

China will initiate or support political claims by Turkey, Iran, Syria and Palestine. As a reciprocal response to political harassment by the American group. If new political flashpoints emerge in Africa and the Middle East, China will not hesitate to join them.

This stage will not last long because the United States has an overwhelming advantage over China in this stage of the struggle. China will do its best to avoid being in a negative situation for a long time.

3.2 Level 2 Response: Semi-contact Warfare or Low-Level Proxy Warfare

Whether China is the first to escalate the response level or the US Asian proxies are the first to escalate the conflict level, small-scale actual combat conflicts will occur at this stage.

At this stage, India, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and Myanmar could all become important assets to the United States.

China is certain to create new flashpoints in Europe and deliberately expand the existing chaos. Expanding the chaos of the Russian-Ukrainian war and initiating or escalating the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Exploiting existing and potential flashpoints in North Africa and the Far East will also become China’s political and military choice.

This level of military conflict is strictly a side effect of the political war and does not have the characteristics of an independent and complete military conflict. However, it is a necessary stage and preparation for the occurrence of actual military conflicts.

3.3 Level 3 response: low-intensity hot war

After experiencing the transition and trial process of semi-contact war or low-intensity proxy war, low-intensity hot war will be an inevitable follow-up process.

3.3.1 Characteristics of low-intensity hot war

This level of conflict has typical characteristics of combat, resulting in a certain level of casualties and loss of military assets. However, neither side has suffered major casualties. The foundations of the national economy have not been affected on a large scale.

3.3.2 Main Characters in low-intensity hot war

In a small-scale, low-intensity hot war, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, the Philippines and Myanmar could become positive assets for the United States.

In China, an individual member still faces group fights. China’s main response plan is to support non-specific existing anti-American and anti-European forces. China still uses symptomatic solutions to deal with local conflicts.

This stage has brought China into a period of extreme political anxiety. China is in a state of political hesitation (anxiety) between conflict control and escalation. In general, China will not directly intervene in the Palestinian issue at this stage. But it has begun to develop close political relations with most Palestinian’s neighbours.

In-depth cooperation between China and Russia is not currently in China’s implementation plan. However, as China and Russia have different expectations of political cooperation, there may be some low-level mutual grievances between China and Russia.

3.3.3 South Korea Begins to Withdraw from War

Whether proactively or passively, South Korea will begin to prepare to withdraw from actual combat after experiencing one or more low-intensity hot wars.

No matter what state of war China (group) or the US group is in, South Korea will be the first country in the US alliance to withdraw from the battlefield. The withdrawal of South Korea from the battlefield marked a serious retreat of US political power in South Korea. This political and military retreat by the United States will be difficult to recover from after the war.

3.3.4 South Asia context in low-intensity hot war

The border between India and China will remain hostile but relatively peaceful. India will be lightly involved or never enter the low-intensity hot war phase.

There may be people in the Indian army who try to go beyond the guidance of politicians. They may even try to significantly escalate the border conflicts. A warning response from China at a critical moment is enough to reignite India’s fear of China. India cannot effectively mobilise China’s military and political resources.

Myanmar and India have similar overall trends, but Myanmar is more volatile than India. In other words, Myanmar’s attitude towards China has two polarities. Either Myanmar will not participate in anti-China actions, or Myanmar will be more active in the US league than India. If Myanmar intervenes in the Sino-US conflict, the damage to China will be slightly greater than what India can make.

The United States’ reengagement in Afghanistan will not substantially change or mobilise China’s military involvement, but it may involve some of China’s political involvement. However, this solution has a very poor cost-benefit ratio for the United States, unless the United States really has no other realistic and feasible solution.

It is difficult for the United States to activate Pakistan’s anti-China military functions. However, the United States could provoke domestic unrest in Pakistan in order to create political concern or confusion in public opinion in China.

3.3.5 Chinese Background in low-intensity hot war

US allies have significantly increased the frequency of surveillance and inspections of cargo ships entering and leaving China’s high seas ports. Economic activity in China is severely restricted.

China is launching a global political movement. China has interfered openly and extensively in various political hotspots in Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and the Far East.

A military conflict at the level of a low-intensity hot war is not enough to trigger China’s direct entry into Palestine. This level of military conflict is also insufficient to trigger “real alliance-level” cooperation between China and Russia, unless Russia takes strong action to promote this possibility.

3.3.6 European background in low-intensity hot war

1) Chaos in several European hotspots is inevitable. Chaos is growing in North Africa and the Middle East. The process of mobility on Europe’s borders is in danger of being revived, accelerated or intensified.

2) The core European powers are engaged in endless debates about intervention in Asian wars, and it is difficult to form a unified collective opinion.

The direction Europe chooses will determine the intensity of China’s response and will also seriously affect Europe’s prospects.

3.4 Level 4 Response: Moderate Intensity War

3.4.1 Early indicators

The United States has redeployed troops originally stationed in Japan and South Korea, a typical indicator of US preparation for a medium-intensity war.

The relocation of the US East Asia garrison and even Japan’s main fleet to the Philippines, Guam or islands in the Indian Ocean can be seen as a characteristic indicator that the United States is preparing for a higher level of war. This is also a typical characteristic indicator that China and the United States are preparing for a medium-intensity war and a high-intensity war, respectively.

3.4.2 China’s laissez-faire and hesitation

China will allow the US coalition to redeploy its combat forces. China does not want to be the party that takes the initiative to improve its war-fighting capabilities. China’s reaction may be based on the following reasons.

1) China’s plan to reunify Taiwan does not include plans to repel the United States or to expel the United States in East Asia.

2) China does not intend to actively defeat the United States in its countermeasure plan to deal with the military response of US allies.

3) China is not willing to comprehensively overthrow the US-led imperialist order and therefore is not willing to take the initiative to comprehensively attack the US coalition forces.

4) China will not prevent the US and Japan from mobilising troops in areas such as the Philippines. This redeployment is not entirely detrimental to China, either militarily or politically.

3.4.3 South Korea’s withdrawal from the war process

The reason for South Korea’s withdrawal from the war was not China.

1) South Korea does not have the capability to fight a medium-intensity war. South Korea cannot deploy its main military forces far from home. The basic reason why South Korea withdraws from a medium-intensity war is that South Korea does not have the political capability to sustain a medium-intensity war. South Korea is not only militarily weak, but a more serious problem is that it is politically weak.

2) South Korea can declare neutrality and close all US military facilities in South Korea. This would be in exchange for retaining its major military capabilities. These forces are necessary to maintain the balance of power on the Korean peninsula.

3) Coordinating Russia’s political stance on North Korea is a very cautious concern for China. China does not want high-level hostilities between South Korea and China, nor does it want South Korea’s military strength to suffer a devastating blow. Even if China wanted to issue a stern warning to South Korea, it would rather attack South Korea’s economic facilities and maintain its military strength.

3.4.4 Japan Begins the Process of De-Americanisation

Japan’s de-Americanization process begins with the realignment of its armed forces.

Whether it is the result of active initiation or the passive result of being attacked by China, once the Chinese group and the American group start a medium-intensity war, Japan’s de-Americanisation will be an inevitable result. This result also started the political process of de-Americanisation in Japan.

3.4.5 China is involved in complex operations.

China has been actively involved in complex operations in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. These operations must have begun with the outbreak of low-level hot fighting. These operations will escalate as the war enters the medium term.

More complex and deeper processes of cooperation between China and Russia, China and Iran, China and Turkey, China and Afghanistan, China and Syria, and China and Egypt can be initiated at this stage.

China’s relations with the Middle East, especially with the countries surrounding Palestine, will become even closer. But at this stage, China will not directly intervene in the Palestinian issue.

The depth of Sino-Russian cooperation is closely related to Europe’s attitude towards China. China is paying close attention to Europe’s strategy for an East Asian war in 2026. Europe is also paying attention to Sino-Russian cooperation on the European battlefield. Europe’s attitude towards war in Asia and China’s attitude towards the European battlefield are now officially two sides of the same coin.

3.5 Level 5 Response: Major War

3.5.1 The likelihood of Japan withdrawing from the battlefield

A medium-intensity war, no matter how much damage it does to China, will be a historic trigger point. It would begin the process of withdrawing US military and political influence from Japan. Once the United States is convinced that it cannot prevent China’s geopolitical expansion in a major war, Japan’s withdrawal from the battlefield will be an inevitable result.

The United States cannot defeat China in a conventional war. This is a hypothesis with a very high probability [1,2,3]. Therefore, Japan’s withdrawal from the battlefield is also a high-probability hypothesis.

3.5.2 Options for the United States in East Asia

The chances of preventing an American retreat in East Asia depend on whether the United States can defeat China in a major war and effectively prevent China’s political and geopolitical expansion. This kind of opportunity is difficult to control in advance, difficult to predict in advance, and highly susceptible to unexpected events.

3.5.3 Europe cannot devote all its energy to the war in Asia

The Russo-Ukrainian war has reopened the process of border shifts between European countries. Many countries are already psychologically and even politically ready to join the process of great upheaval. Once China and the United States start preparing for war, the process of border instability between European countries will accelerate and intensify. Starting and accelerating the process of deconstructing European power is a necessary measure for China to prevent Europe from joining the Asian battlefield.

3.5.4 It is hard for the United States to win

There is no pressure on China to maintain its power system and therefore no pressure to seek total victory. This fact gives China the political initiative to choose the battlefield. On the battlefield chosen by China, the United States has no chance of landing on Chinese soil. This deprives the United States of the opportunity to defeat China completely. Once China and the USA enter into a war of attrition, the process of deconstruction of the US imperialist order has actually begun.

3.5.5 The USA will not suffer national failure

Even if a major war breaks out, the US will not suffer national defeat. China does not have the strength to defeat the United States nationally, nor does it have the determination to defeat the United States nationally. But the big problem for the United States is the pressure to maintain the imperial order.

3.5.6 America’s chances of defeating China

The United States does not have no chance of defeating China in an all-out war. A less risky approach to failure is to use nuclear weapons in a war.

3.6 The nuclear war option

The possibility of a nuclear war between China and the United States cannot be ruled out.

The USA cannot defeat China in a conventional war. This is a highly probable assumption [1,2,3]. This high-probability assumption also puts China and the United States in a dilemma about whether to use nuclear weapons.

The use of nuclear weapons is an inevitable choice for the escalation of the war between China and the United States.

3.6.1 The United States’ Options to Maintain the Imperial Order

Table 1: US response plans and outcome projections
	Maintain influence over Taiwan	Maintain order in Europe	Sino-US cooperation in East Asia	Maintain presence in South Korea	Maintain presence in Japan
Pre-negotiation plan	N	✔	✔	✔	✔
Military appeasement plan	N	✔	？	？	✔
Low intensity hot war	N	？	？	？	✔
Medium intensity hot battle	N	？	N	N	？/ N
Major battle	N	？	N	N	N / ？
Nuclear war	？	？	N	？	？
Tabulation: Ye Qiquan (PPPNet www.pppnet.net)

3.6.2 The United States faces significant risks from conventional military conflict

Table 1 provides a visual comparison of the risks facing the United States. Once the conflicts and reactions between China and the United States go beyond the scope of the “Preventive Peace Talks Plan” and the “Military Appeasement Plan”, the United States will face the risk of South Korea and Japan withdrawing from the military alliance. The only way to reverse this series of risks is to opt for nuclear war.

If the United States has a strong will to maintain the existing imperial order, the nuclear war option is a realistic pressure option.

3.6.3 The United States Has the Psychological Advantage to Proactively Escalate the Level of War

The United States is the core of the current imperial order, and its global layout and global alliance strength far exceeds that of China (group). The United States has strong military and political advantages in regions of the world beyond the range of China’s intermediate-range missiles. China cannot inflict a national-level military defeat on the United States. Even if the United States were to suffer a major military defeat, or even if the imperial order were to be deconstructed, the withdrawal of US military power to the Americas would be enough to prevent America’s real national power from being significantly weakened. The deconstruction of the existing imperial military order does not necessarily mean a serious erosion of US economic and political power. Many factors suggest that the United States has an internal impulse to proactively escalate the level of warfare in order to avoid military defeat in a conflict with China.

3.6.4 Factors inhibiting the nuclear option

(1) Preventing nuclear war at the technical level

Preventing the outbreak of nuclear war at the technical level means that Chinese and American politicians use their ability to influence the political and military situation to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war at the decision-making level.

Chinese and American politicians must maintain complete control over the course of the war throughout the war and ensure that the political and military capabilities of frontline commanders are coordinated. At the same time, both China and the United States must avoid inflicting a major military blow on the other side. For example, do not sink an aircraft carrier and do not inflict more than 5,000 casualties on the other side in a single battle.

risk. The final decision on the national policy of the United States and its allies rests with the voters. The final decision to prevent or start a nuclear war rests with the voters. As the risk of war increases, the decision to de-escalate or escalate cannot effectively be left to politicians.

(2)Preventing the occurrence of nuclear war at a substantive level

Preventing the occurrence of nuclear war at a substantive level means preventing the nuclear option based on public opinion.

Since Western politicians are unable to prevent their constituents from using nuclear weapons, the primary responsibility for preventing nuclear war will inevitably shift to Chinese politicians.

To fundamentally prevent the nuclear option, China must disclose its credible nuclear capabilities before taking military action against Taiwan. If it is finally confirmed that China’s nuclear force exceeds 3,500 nuclear warheads, public opinion in the countries of the Western alliance will prevent a nuclear war.

Summary

Reference:

Ye QiQuan. China’s Unification Plan:(4)USA’s Options. PPPNet. Mar. 29, 2023. https://en.pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan4-usas-options/
Ye QiQuan. China’s Unification Plan:(2Comprehensive Hostility Context of USA. PPPNet. Mar. 29, 2023. https://en.pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-comprehensive-hostil-context-of-usa/
叶其泉. 联盟战争强度评估系统：中美在东亚周边的全面战争结局推测. PPPNet. Dec. 9, 2023. https://pppnet.net/group-war-strength-system-predicting-china-usa-war-around-east-asia/
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