China’s Unifying Plan:(6) Evolution and Stability: Geopolitics around China

YE QIQUAN

March 29, 2023

Abstract:

If the United States and its alliance decide to use military means to respond to the challenges posed by China’s unified actions, Japan and South Korea will inevitably be involved. And they will be the main or key force in the early stages of the conflict and in low-level conflicts. Given that South Korea does not have the political capacity to confront China, Russia or even North Korea on its own, once either China or Russia expresses a clear intention to prevent South Korea from continuing to participate in the game, South Korea will have to begin the process of withdrawing from war operations. And it will deactivate the US military assets in South Korea. If the United States decides to launch a war beyond the medium response level, it will be an inevitable and necessary choice to withdraw the US military forces stationed in South Korea and Japan and move them beyond the range of China’s short- and medium-range missiles. Not only can this help the United States maintain military pressure on China, but it can also remove itself from the reach of China’s main firepower. The Philippines is almost the only realistic choice for the United States. Given the weight of the Philippines in the United States’ overall war, the United States will certainly invest considerable political resources here until a fundamentally stable G2 order is established. Even after the G2 order is stabilised, the United States will continue to invest significant political resources in the Philippines in order to assume the role of Japan and South Korea in maintaining the United States’ global influence.

Table of Contents

Keywords:

Sino-US conflict; Asian war; geopolitics; Japan; South Korea; Philippines

Once China and the United States enter the process of military conflict, military challenges from China’s neighbouring countries will be China’s immediate pressure. It is extremely important for China to formulate various plans in advance. How to deeply understand the geopolitical changes around China is an important basis for the United States to formulate contingency plans for China’s actions to unify Taiwan.

China is a world power with the most complex geopolitical situation around it. China has 14 land neighbours. It also has maritime disputes with seven maritime neighbours. But complex geopolitical situations do not always mean negative consequences. As long as China has the ability to steer geopolitical trends, the complex geopolitical situation does not mean an entirely negative political effect. But if China loses its ability to guide geopolitical trends, the complex geopolitical situation will have a major negative impact on China. Therefore, when discussing the changes in geopolitics around China, the turning point must be whether China has the ability to guide the direction of geopolitics. And in these two situations, based on the political attitudes of neighbouring countries towards China, these countries can be classified into two groups. One is the countries with basically stable position. Another is that with unstable political position.

Table 1: Political Attitudes of China’s Neighbouring Countries
Political Position	Strong China	Weak China
Basically stable	Afghanistan, Bhutan, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Vietnam	Afghanistan, Bhutan, Brunei, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, North Korea, Russia, Tajikistan
Unstable	Japan, Philippines, South Korea,	Japan,India, Myanmar, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam
Tabulation: Ye Qiquan (叶其泉 PPPNet www.pppnet.net)

Causes and geopolitical predictions of a weak China

In the conflict scenario in East Asia around 2026, the conditions for the emergence of a weak China are very unlikely. To achieve this goal, it will be necessary to resort to the power of the whole of Europe or to engage in a decisive nuclear war. However, for both of these solutions, China has basically effective cracking solutions [1,2].
Even If the US alliance succeeds in creating a political situation in which China is weak, it will basically not cause a serious decline in China’s geopolitical power. The basis of this speculation is the political price that the United States and Europe will pay to win this situation. These costs are not sufficient to create a clear gap in the political power of the United States and Europe vis-à-vis China.

Causes and geopolitical predictions of a strong China

China’s defensivelyoffensive strategy can effectively prevent the military superiority of the US alliance in East Asia and the surrounding region [1,3].
China is capable of initiating or intensifying the process of deconstruction of European power[2].
China may have effective nuclear deterrence capabilities.

The political attitudes and development of unstable countries surrounding China will become an important force that cannot be ignored in the conflict between China and the United States. The changing course of these geopolitical forces will further influence the development of the situation.

I. Japan’s Sino-American War Tour

Japan has a strong inner impulse and political aspiration to completely defeat China. At the same time, Japan is an American colony with all the attributes. If there is a military conflict between China and the United States in Asia, Japan will definitely be involved. Moreover, in the early stages of the conflict, Japan will be the main or even the key force. But once the conflict between China and the United States reaches a medium level of war, Japan will be faced with the dilemma of following the United States or following China. Once Japan is convinced that the US alliance cannot defeat China in a conflict, it will face realistic options to mitigate the intense political pressures from China. These pressures include historical issues, post-war settlements, domestic unrest and geopolitical pressures on the northern and southern ends of Japan’s four islands.

If there is a military conflict between China and the US in Asia in 2026, Japan will be an active member of the US alliance. And it has played a key role in the early conflicts.

However, Japan has a fatal flaw in the whole process of Sino-US conflict, which is that it is difficult for Japan to actively control its own destiny. This shortcoming placed Japan in a complicated political environment throughout the conflict. Japan’s fate and policy choices are seriously subject to external influences.

1.1 Japan’s Shortcomings in Relations with the United States

1.1.1 National defence dependence

Japan’s defence capabilities are almost entirely dependent on the United States. As a country that was defeated in World War II, Japan still has no military system for national defence. Its national defence functions are nominally carried out by the United States. Without an independent defence policy, Japan’s military decision-making power is completely controlled by the United States.

1.1.2 Political dependence

Japan’s political decision-making process is heavily influenced by the United States. As a country without an independent army, it is logical that it will lose its political decision-making power if it loses its military decision-making power.

Japan’s post-war political structure was established by the United States; Japanese politicians are tightly controlled by the United States; these two factors ensure that Japan’s political decision-making direction completely follows the political direction of the United States.

1.1.3 Economic dependence

Japan’s post-war economic recovery benefited from the American imperial system. At the same time, Japan’s economic development framework is also tightly controlled by the United States. In the process of scientific and technological development, Japan has achieved many scientific and technological breakthroughs. However, Japan’s scientific and technological breakthroughs are often judged to be “in the wrong direction of scientific research”. The reason for this is that Japan’s scientific and technological strength does not have a strong political foundation. As soon as Japan’s scientific and technological breakthroughs come into conflict with the political and economic interests of the United States, they are strangled by political forces. The domestic economic policies of the United States and the economic restrictions specifically aimed at Japan have become the external structure of the Japanese economy.

1.2 Japan’s shortcomings in Japan-China relations

1.2.1 Historical shortcomings

Japan has a serious flaw in its national history. This defect is due to the violent conflict between Japan’s long history and its modern development history. This flaw has become a real psychological burden for the Japanese people. How to alleviate, amend, correct, cover up or eliminate this flaw is still a major practical problem facing Japanese politicians and ordinary citizens. This problem may even seriously affect Japan’s national political direction.

1.2.2 Political shortcomings

In terms of the political environment, Japan has the political shortcomings of its post-war arrangements. Political terms such as “four-island restriction” and “Ryukyu trusteeship” have become sharp swords in Japan’s political capabilities after the war. This flaw has become a major source of political anxiety and hesitation in Japan.

1.2.3 Geographical flaws

After China lands on the island of Taiwan, it will have a major geopolitical advantage over Japan. This geographical advantage will be reinforced by China’s economic and military power. Once China makes full use of Taiwan Island’s function as a “land bridge” or “land sword”, it will seriously reduce Japan’s political power, which is parasitic on the sea power system. Taiwan Island will become an important pillar for China to extend its land power, cut and compress its sea power, and thereby compress the political power parasitic on its sea power.

Today and for a long time to come, China also has the ability to work with third parties to create new geopolitical advantages in the Northern Sea of Japan. China now even has the initiative to start this process.

1.3. Japan’s choice of war

1.3.1 Active choice

Japan has the inner impulse and the political will to defeat China completely. There are many factors driving Japan’s endogenous urge to defeat China once and for all.

(1) Relieving the historical burden;

(2) Removing the political shortcomings of the post-war arrangements;

(3) Prevent China from quickly assuming economic and political power;

(4) reap huge geopolitical gains from defeating China.

1.3.2 Passive choice

In the face of war, Japan has no real initiative. Its right to choose is essentially the military decision-making power of the United States. This political fact dictated a military hypothesis. That is, once there is a conflict between China and the United States, Japanese military power will become the vanguard of the American alliance. Japan will fully participate in the early process of a military conflict between China and the United States, or in the process of low- and medium-level military conflicts. And it will play the main role or the key force in the conflict.

1.3.3 Difficult military process

(1) Whether based on active pursuit or passive choice, the hypothetical probability of Japan’s involvement in a military conflict with China and the United States is infinitely close to 1.

(2) Judging from the existing political inertia, the US military alliance is often regarded as having comprehensive military, economic and political advantages by default. There is a high probability that Japan will be optimistic about the military conflict process and will evaluate its results positively in the early stages.

(3) South Korea’s allies in the US military alliance will be blocked first and begin the process of withdrawing from war operations [4]. This reality will weaken or even destroy Japan’s confidence in its military achievements.

(4) Once China gains the initiative on the Asian battlefield or the level of Sino-US conflict escalates to a medium level, Japan and its allies will inevitably choose their military plans passively. Its characteristic is to move effective military forces stationed in Japan and South Korea to the Philippines or other garrison points. Their purpose is to escape the effective range of China’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.

(5) The withdrawal of the US alliance forces from East Asia will inevitably reduce the passive pressure on Japan to participate in the war.

(6) Once the US forces are withdrawn from East Asia, Japan will have a historic opportunity to escape its colonial character.

(7) With the withdrawal of US forces from East Asia, Japan will also have the opportunity to determine its foreign policy independently. Japan has a historic opportunity to rethink Japan-US relations and Japan-China relations. Japan will face important choices.

1.4 Major Factors Affecting Japan’s Policy Direction

The Japanese have complex national characteristics. They are intriguing and suspicious, and they act recklessly and decisively. These two seemingly incompatible traits are complexly combined in their national character. Therefore, it is not impossible that Japan will make atypical political decisions. The following are probably the most important points for Japan to consider when making policy choices.

1.4.1 Japan’s Military Importance

Is Japan the weight that can determine the outcome of the conflict between China and the United States? This will be at the heart of Japanese policymakers’ thinking.

If Japan has a significant ability to influence the outcome of the war, it will gain political initiative during the war process and even more initiative in the distribution of power after the war. Japan’s military importance will be constantly tested in the early and middle stages of the war.

If the tests confirm that Japan does not have the ability to significantly influence the outcome of the war, Japan can only drift with the tide during the war. Change its position at any time according to the dynamics of the war in order to achieve the greatest national interests.

1.4.2 Military capabilities and war response levels of the US alliance

Whether the U.S. alliance can defeat China in a high-reaction level military conflict is another key issue facing Japanese policymakers.

If the military conflict between the US alliance and China does not exceed the level of the “appeasement plan”[5], the United States will not face the option of withdrawing from East Asia. Japan does not need to consider the deeper question of whether to follow the United States or China.

Once the U.S.-China military conflict enters the intermediate response stage, or even the stage of “preparing to enter the intermediate response conflict,” Japanese policymakers will find themselves in a confused state of “following A or B.”

As long as China does not fail in a mid-level war or a major war-level conflict, China can ensure its political expansion in East Asia. Japan will inevitably face the reality of “choosing A or B”.

1.4.3 China’s economic power

China’s economic power (strength) is another important factor for Japanese policymakers to consider when making political decisions. If the United States eventually decides to exclude China from the current economic system, China will inevitably face pressure to rebuild a “parallel economic system”. China’s economic influence; the market capacity of the Chinese-dominated economic system; Japan’s prospective gains (or losses) from entering the Chinese-dominated economic circle; these are all considerations that influence Japan’s choice.

1.4.4 Political benefits and risks of following the United States

No matter how you look at it, Japanese politicians have only one goal, and that is to protect Japan’s national interests as much as possible.

The political gains and losses of following the United States are as follows.

1) There will be no major domestic political turmoil;

2) There will be no major economic turmoil;

3) China cannot defeat the United States domestically, and the United States is still the world’s most important political force;

4) No major economic gains are expected. Japan has had many breakthroughs in economic direction, but they have been abandoned by political power and economic arbitration power, and have failed to produce the expected benefits;

5) Will face huge risks of China overturning the post-war arrangements;

6) Will face political, economic and military cooperation between China and Russia in the Southern Kurils or the Northern Sea of Japan;

7) will face the risk of China inspiring domestic separatist forces;

8) face the risk of China supporting Ryukyu separatist forces or even directly intervening in Ryukyu’s political status.

1.4.5 Political Benefits and Risks of Following China

1) Ameliorate the historical grievances between Japan and China, or at least not further exacerbate the level of hatred;

2) Adequately reduce China’s pressure to deconstruct Japan’s existing national structure and lay the foundation for the eventual easing of tensions with China;

3) Integrating the scientific research forces of two (or even four) countries in a cooperative manner can avoid repeated failures in scientific and technological investment;

4) Easing the geopolitical pressure created by China in the Southern Kuril Islands;

5) Get rid of the post-World War II colonial attributes and gain independent political decision-making power;

6) Facing economic exclusion and political attack from the United States;

7) Facing the political risk of internal unrest caused by the United States.

8) Facing the risk of the United States supporting Ryukyu separatist forces or even directly intervening in Ryukyu’s political status.

1.5 Basic Prediction on Japan’s Military process in East Asia War

1) The probability that the United States will successfully implement the “pre-peace negotiation plan”[5] to resolve the Sino-US conflict is extremely low. This fact determines that the US political and military presence in East Asia will inevitably be damaged.

2) The United States has a certain probability of launching the “military appeasement plan”[5]. If the politicians of both camps finally succeed in controlling the level of military conflict at a low level of response, the United States will eventually be able to maintain a certain degree of “political and military presence in East Asia”. Japan will remain in the US alliance.

3) As soon as the United States shows that it cannot defeat China in medium-level conflicts and above [1, 3, 5], Japan will quickly turn away from the United States and join the Chinese alliance. Japan will definitely take advantage of this historic opportunity to reduce its historic liabilities instead of continuing to increase its historic costs.

4) Japan does not have the ability to face China’s political pressure alone. It is an inevitable choice for Japan to reduce its own historical burden and realistic geopolitical pressure.

5) Once Japan decides to withdraw from the US alliance, the probability of taking further political and military steps is very high.

6) If China has a strong ability to establish a parallel economic system, or has a strong ability to split the current economic system, or the current economic system cannot exclude China’s power, joining a China-led economic alliance is a reality that Japan must consider.

II. South Korea’s East Asian war journey

The inherent characteristics of Koreans can be described as strong, even ruthlessly strong. They are not satisfied with mediocrity in the political arena. In the era of the Chinese imperial order, they were proud to call themselves “Little China”. In the era of the American imperial order, they called themselves the “Jerusalem of the East”. South Korea often takes the most conspicuous actions to closely follow the political decisions of the United States. South Korea wants to become a country with strong political influence.

But unfortunately, in the military conflicts between China and the United States in Asia, South Korea is the most powerless participant. Although South Korea has more independent decision-making capabilities than Japan, South Korea’s political decisions are seriously affected by the political decisions of neighbouring countries. Regardless of whether it is the United States, China, Russia, Japan or even North Korea, any political decisions made by these countries will seriously affect South Korea’s decision-making ability, decision-making status and decision-making direction.

2.1 The United States’ influence on South Korea

The United States has extensive and profound political, economic and military influence in South Korea.

1) South Korea is the second largest US military base in Asia. The wartime command of the South Korean military belongs to the United States. The United States has deployed several missile tracking and surveillance systems in South Korea. The United States skilfully uses surveillance, explosives, protests, coups and even assassinations to effectively control the fate of South Korean politicians.

2) In the event of a military conflict between the United States and China, South Korea will undoubtedly be a member of the US alliance. On the front line of the conflict between China and the United States.

3) If the conflict between the US and China remains at the level of the “military appeasement plan” and below, it shows that the US and China have a tacit understanding not to seriously change the geopolitical situation. At this level of conflict, South Korea remains on the front line of the US-China conflict and will not have a major impact on South Korea’s national interests.

2.2 China’s Influence on South Korea

China has a comprehensive and multidimensional political, economic and military influence on South Korea.

1) China’s existing influence on South Korea is mainly reflected on the economic level. At the economic level, the US and European markets have a greater influence on South Korea. So South Korea is actually more accepting of American and European economic policies.

2) China has real geopolitical advantages over South Korea. However, China has been unwilling to use this weapon for more than 60 years, so Korean politicians and ordinary people will forget this important fact.

3) China understands the reality of South Korea. If South Korea behaves mediocrely in the Sino-US conflict, China will not show excessive resentment towards South Korea.

4) China has the ability to provoke a war on the Korean peninsula at any time. China has the ability to provoke conflicts on the maritime border between China and South Korea at any time. China also has the ability to destroy South Korea’s national economic base at any time.

5) If South Korea seriously offends China, China may attack South Korea directly. The attack is likely to focus on ground military facilities and the economic base. China may not specifically seek to severely damage South Korea’s naval capabilities.

6) China will not allow South Korea to join a war at the “medium response level” or higher. South Korea will not be able to resist China’s political will.

2.3 Russia’s influence over South Korea

Russia has a geopolitical advantage over South Korea. Although this advantage is hidden because of its weak economic power, Russia has the ability to activate it at any time.

1) Russia’s influence on South Korea is more likely to be achieved through proxies.

2) Once Russia decides to attack South Korea, it can be an indiscriminate attack. We will not deliberately maintain any aspect of South Korea’s military strength.

3) If Russia decides to activate and use its geopolitical power in East Asia, it will put tremendous pressure on South Korea.

2.4 North Korea’s influence on South Korea

North Korea’s influence on South Korea is profound and complex.

1) Although both North and South Korea are seeking reconciliation, it is unlikely that any major progress will be made for some time. During the military conflict between China and the United States, the confrontation between North and South Korea may intensify.

2) North Korea has a psychological advantage over South Korea. Although this advantage cannot really be superimposed on political advantages, it can be superimposed on military capabilities.

3) North Korea actually has a geopolitical advantage over South Korea, although South Korea does not actually recognise this.

4) Cooperation between China or Russia and North Korea is of great concern to South Korea. The slightest disturbance will attract South Korea’s attention. This is an important reason why South Korea cannot devote its full attention to the conflict between China and the United States.

2.5 Military tour of South Korea in the US-China war

1)In the early stages of the Sino-US conflict, active participation in US-led military operations was in line with South Korea’s national interests and the interests of South Korean politicians. As a colony of the United States, South Korea has its national interests and the interests of its politicians to follow the direction of the mother country.

2) South Korea can participate in various military operations in the early stages of the Sino-US conflict. It can also participate in all low-level military conflict operations.

3) Once the US decides to withdraw its military forces beyond the range of China’s short-range ballistic missiles and medium-range ballistic missiles, it will start the timetable for South Korea’s withdrawal from the US-China military conflict.

4) Compared with the United States, China has a greater capability to destroy South Korea’s national interests. China will not allow South Korea to participate in medium-level wars and major military operations to reduce China’s risk in a full-scale conflict. South Korea is unable to resist China’s political determination.

5) South Korea also has no ability to resist Russia’s political decisions. Once Russia launches war actions against South Korea through proxies, South Korea will have to compromise with Russia. Even when Russia threatens to do so, South Korea backs down.

6) Of course, South Korea has the real ability to resist North Korea’s military attacks, but only if there is no background of Chinese or Russian intervention. Any military action by North Korea cannot exclude complex background factors. Any typical military action by North Korea is also an important factor in forcing South Korea to withdraw from the Sino-US military conflict process.

2.6 Summary for South Korea

South Korea is an inevitable party in the Sino-US conflict script. Is an important member of the American league. It is also a major player in early and low-level conflicts. But South Korea does not have the political capacity to engage in a full-scale war with China, Russia or even North Korea. This political shortcoming allows South Korea to intervene actively in low-level conflicts, but not in medium- or high-level war operations. As the level of war response increases, it is expected that South Korea will quickly withdraw from the war process.

III. India’s position and response

India is an important factor in China’s national interests. It is reasonable to assume that India may become the focus of China’s foreign policy at some point in the future.

For historical reasons, any major event that is unfavourable to China will be embraced and welcomed by the Indian people and politicians. Indians have never lacked enthusiasm to participate in any major event against China.

Assuming that there is a military and political confrontation between the United States and China over Taiwan around 2026, India will undoubtedly be an active participant. India has the opportunity to participate in military conflicts ranging from harassment warfare to semi-contact warfare.

It can be predicted that India will not engage in any intensity of hot war conflict against China. Even if some reckless figures in India try to do so, the Chinese have the capability to easily stop India before the hot war phase.

India’s ability to mobilise China’s political and military resources during the Sino-US military conflict is very weak. China could have cold-shouldered India’s hostility during the Sino-US conflict.

3.1 India’s strong animosity towards China

India’s strong hostility towards China is based on the memory of the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Based on border disputes and geopolitical pressures, India’s hostility towards China will continue for a long time.

Hostility towards China is not only a political problem for Indian politicians, but also an effective weapon for Indian politicians to unite domestic public opinion and defuse domestic conflicts. Continually provoking the memory of this hostility, and even adding to it, will be a norm in India’s diplomatic and domestic operations.

India’s strong hostility towards China is an important factor in pushing India to join the campaign against China.

3.2 India’s demographic advantage.

In English-speaking public opinion circles, India’s demographic advantage has been repeatedly emphasised as an important factor in India’s victory over China. Not only is India about to overtake or has already overtaken China in terms of total population, but the age composition of its population is also more reasonable than that of China.

In Ye Qiquan’s national system for assessing the intensity of war, population factors are an important assessment parameter. Population supports a country’s ability to continue to participate in wars and its ability to recover national power after wars [6].

Figure 1: Sikh temples in North America attract non-Sikhs and non-Indians 1

However, the advantage in population size and age composition cannot be fully reflected in India’s war-fighting advantage. Ethnic composition is also an important factor in measuring a country’s will to unite. Factors such as India’s complex ethnic composition, linguistic separation, differences in beliefs, caste levels, etc. may become negative factors affecting the country’s war capability (these factors have not yet been adequately reflected in Ye Qiquan’s national war intensity calculation system [6]).

Sikh temples in North America not only serve as political discussion bases for Sikhs, but also attract a wide range of youth who has even non-Indian nationality or non-Sikh background. Sikh temples in North America have been modest but persistent in spreading their political message. India’s northeastern states have yet to catch up with the central states. The rich southern region and the central political region also have their own demands.

For the foreseeable future at least, it will be difficult for India to convert its demographic advantage into a political or military advantage over China.

3.3 India’s geopolitical power

The Indian Ocean is the world’s busiest and most important economic corridor. India’s geographical location gives it strong naval capabilities and political power that is parasitic on naval power. This means that India naturally has a strong ability to influence China’s economic channels.

The “Malacca Dilemma”, which China has emphasised and feared for the past 30 years, has mobilised a large part of China’s political and economic resources. But in fact, the Malacca Dilemma is not the same as China’s dilemma of the century. Once China has the advantage of land power to suppress US sea power in East Asia, it will be natural to extend China’s land power influence throughout Southeast Asia. And this prospect is close to reality.

But China may face some pressure on the Indian Ocean routes. Although this pressure will not be as severe as the “Malacca Dilemma”, it may consume or strain China’s diplomatic resources for a longer period of time.

3.4 India’s nuclear advantage

Allowing the emergence of nuclear proliferation and nuclear deterrence around China may be the most insidious strategic design of some politicians who are deeply hostile to China. However, apart from making the management of the imperial order more difficult, this insidious design will not actually pose a real strategic deterrent to China. The Chinese are using their philosophical thinking to easily dissolve the nuclear deterrents of those countries that share land borders with China. Instead, the strategic deterrence originally intended to be imposed on China has been transformed into a deterrent of national annihilation against these countries.

3.5 India’s fatal flaw

The organisational capabilities of the government, the sense of national belonging of the people, the insurgency in the northeastern states and the peculiar geographical structure are all major weaknesses that India has in dealing with China. These factors constitute India’s strategic weaknesses in dealing with China. China already holds the key to addressing these major weaknesses. And Indian policymakers are well aware of this fact. The deep understanding of this strategic fact by politicians on both sides is the fundamental reason why the Sino-Indian border will remain basically stable during the Sino-US conflict.

Politicians in both China and India are aware of their respective geopolitical realities.

Even If some politicians or military personnel become blind during the Sino-US conflict, China can still inflict a major psychological shock and substantial political and military pressure on India with a very small investment.

India does not have the capacity to mobilise China’s political and military resources.

IV. Unrest from Vietnam, Myanmar and Pakistan

Once China has a military conflict with the United States, or is preparing for one, American policymakers will certainly try to exacerbate the various conflicts between Vietnam and Myanmar, its two neighbours, and China.

Myanmar may join in harassment war-level actions against China due to economic temptation or other historical factors, but it cannot substantially mobilise China’s political and military resources.

Vietnam is a country capable of mobilising China’s political and military resources. But at the same time, Vietnam is a country with a high level of political maturity. As long as China does not show any substantial weakness, Vietnam will not participate in actions that consume China’s political and military resources. Of course, it is not impossible that Vietnam will take actions to demonstrate its capabilities or pursue short-term interests in the South China Sea. However, the Vietnamese’s mature political literacy dictates that they will reject any temptation to be hostile to China in order to avoid causing strategic losses to the country.

Pakistan is a country that can indeed seriously affect China’s stability. Indeed, Pakistan has become an important part of China’s national security strategy. There is certainly no possibility of Pakistan taking part in hostile actions against China. However, if the United States is willing to pay huge political costs to create chaos in Pakistan or achieve low-level political cooperation, it will create huge security anxiety among ordinary Chinese people and divert China’s political resources.

V. The Philippines’ Position in the China-U.S. Military Conflict

If the United States decides to engage in a low-level harassment war or proxy conflict with China, Japan and South Korea will certainly be the most important assets of the United States. The Philippines is the most important pillar supporting the outcome of the US war in East Asia.

Ye Qiquan believes that if China and the United States engage in a comprehensive war, not only will China’s combat-level weapons have an “effective range” advantage, but more importantly, China’s strategic-level weapons will also have an “effective range” advantage over the United States [7]. This unproven hypothesis raises the risk that the United States will lose in a war of total attrition. If the basics of this assumption are true, it will be imperative for the United States to find a forward military base that is both close to the combat zone and at the edge of the range of China’s short- and medium-range missiles. The Philippines is almost the only realistic choice that meets these requirements [8].

Because the Philippines plays such an important role in U.S. military strategy, the United States must and will invest a large amount of political resources in the Philippines. Before a basically stable G2 political order is established, China’s desire for a friendly and interactive political relationship with the Philippines will be difficult to realise.

Even after a basically stable G2 political order is established, the Philippines will remain an important member of the US alliance. And it may grow into a pillar replacing the military and political functions of Japan and South Korea. The United States must maintain an effective military and political presence near China’s borders to support its global influence.

Figure 3: Philippines will become a big polar to support US imperial order.

Summary

Reference

Ye QiQuan. China’s Unifying Plan:(4) Imagined Sino-US Conflict Scenario. Mar. 29, 2023. https://en.pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan4-imagined-sino-us-conflict-scenario/
叶其泉. 中国武统计划（6）：欧洲之异数. PPPNet. Sep. 10, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan6-eus-uncertainty-06/
叶其泉. 联盟战争强度评估系统：中美在东亚周边的全面战争结局推测. PPPNet. Dec. 9, 2023. https://pppnet.net/group-war-strength-system-predicting-china-usa-war-around-east-asia/
叶其泉. 中国武统计划（8）:韩国难为之路. PPPNet. Sep. 11, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan8-s-koreas-thorn-08/
Ye QiQuan. China’s Unifying Plan:(3) USA’s Options. PPPNet. Mar. 29, 2023. https://en.pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan3-usas-options/
叶其泉. 国家战争强度模型，兼预测乌克兰战争走向. PPPNet. Dec. 7, 2023. https://pppnet.net/nation-war-strength-model-and-prediction/
Ye QiQuan. China’s Unifying Plan:(5) Risk Assessment of Total Sino-US War. PPPNet. Mar. 29, 2023. https://en.pppnet.net/risk-assessment-of-total-sino-us-war/

Leave a Comment Cancel Reply