China’s Unifying Plan:(9) Mainland and Taiwan Lost the Intersection of Two Systems

YE QIQUAN

March 29, 2023

Abstract:

As Taiwan’s sense of independence has grown over the years, the Taiwanese people’s hostility to “one country, two systems” is understandable. At the same time, the Taiwanese people have been misled into thinking that the mainlanders want to impose “one country, two systems” over Taiwan. The Taiwanese believe that rejecting “one country, two systems” will have no negative consequences for them. But in mainland China, people’s thinking about “one country, two systems” is complicated. Mainlanders generally believe that “one country, two systems” is a political preference for Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. They originally believed that the political favours they gave would eventually be reciprocated in good faith. However, Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” policy has given negative rewards to the mainland. At the same time, the Taiwanese people’s performance of hatred towards mainlanders has gradually angered ordinary people in mainland China and the mainland’s central government. Since 2016, “one country, two systems” has gradually been labelled negatively by mainlanders. Finally, in August 2022, the mainland’s central government officially withdrew the substantive political benefits of “one country, two systems” from Taiwan. From a political analysis, the substantive Two-system proposal will seriously damage China’s geopolitical interests, leave a window for foreign powers to interfere in China’s internal affairs, hinder the pace of national integration, slow down the pace of China’s history, and bring a huge risk on next split of Taiwan. These are all important reasons why the central government refuses to grant Taiwan “one country, two systems”.

Table of Contents

Keywords:

One Country, Two Systems; Taiwan; Mainland China; Public Opinion; Geopolitics;

1. Taiwan’s Opposition to One Country, Two Systems

1.1 Taiwan’s political aspirations

The phrase “one country, two systems” has a very negative and even evil connotation in Taiwan. Among the Taiwanese people, it means “the mainland is annexing Taiwan”, “the mainland is enslaving Taiwan”, “the mainland is forcing Taiwan”, and “the mainland is imposing ‘one country, two systems’ on Taiwan”.

Opinion poll statistics published by the National Taiwan University Election Research Center show that since 1994, the proportion of Taiwanese who want to maintain the status quo and pursue independence has far exceeded the proportion who want to pursue unification. Since 2002, the top three choices have been ‘maintaining the status quo’, ‘maintaining the status quo forever’ and ‘leaning towards independence’.

Figure 1: Taiwanese attitudes towards unification and independence (Source: National Chengchi University Election Research Center)

Looking at the political demands of Taiwanese politicians and the Taiwanese people, we can list the following different levels of Taiwanese political demands. Full independence, covenant status, federation status, high degree of autonomy and maintaining the status quo. At least maintaining the status quo is a political fact that is basically acceptable to the people of Taiwan. In the statistics of 2022 and 2023, the proportion of “maintaining the status quo forever” is the highest.

1.2 The gap between “one country, two systems” and Taiwan’s political demands

Since Ye Jianying proposed the “one country, two systems” plan for Taiwan in 1981, the mainland’s “one country, two systems” plan for Taiwan has actually gone through five versions of development. These five versions are

1) A quasi-confederate state based on Ye’s Nine Points;

2) A substantial full autonomy system based on the spirit of Deng’s Six Points;

3) A full autonomy system based on the Hong Kong demonstration version;

4) A comprehensive autonomy system based on a scaled-down version of Hong Kong after 2020;

5) and the 2022 official version Two-system without substantial essence.

Gap between Taiwan’s Pursuits and Mainland’s Promises				Legend	Y: All	P: Partial	Noun
Full Independece	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Keep Status Quo	P	P	Y	Y	Y	P	Y
Full Autonomy		P	P	Y	Y	P	Y
Confederation	P	P	P	Y	Y	P	Y
Federation		P	P	Y	Y	P	P
	International Recognition	Foreign Authority	Military Autonomy	Politics Autonomy	Economy Autonomy	Legislative Power	Final Adjudication
Ye’s Nine Points		P	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Deng’s Six Points		P	P	Y	Y	Y	Y
H.K. Demo Version		P		Y	Y	Y	Y
H.K. Lite Version		P		P	Y	P	Y
2022 Official Version				P/?	Y	P	?
Tabulation ：（叶其泉 Ye QiQuan from PPPNet www.pppnet.net)

Table 1: The Gap Between Mainland China’s Five Versions, Two Systems and Taiwan’s Political Demands

From the comparison in Table 1, we can intuitively see that there is no obvious gap between the substantive content of the one country, two systems plan proposed by the mainland before 2022 and Taiwan’s political demands. The only significant gap is that of international recognition. In other respects, Taiwan’s political aspirations are very similar to or equal to China’s commitments.

However, the White Paper (the mainland version of Taiwan’s future decision-making document) released by the central government on 10 August 2022 has severely restricted Taiwan’s political space [1]. The restrictions are mainly reflected in the following three points:

Taiwan has no military command authority;

Taiwan has no diplomatic rights;

Taiwan’s senior officials are supervised by the central government

1.3 Taiwan has lost its best window on the nature of two systems.

1.3.1 Chiang Ching-kuo Let Taiwan Fall

Review the unification negotiations proposed by mainland China and the introduction of Ye’s Nine Points and Deng’s Six Points in 1979, 1981 and 1983. The timing coincided closely with Chiang Ching-kuo’s entrenchment and consolidation in Taiwan’s political arena. But Chiang Ching-kuo ultimately missed the opportunity for a great historical achievement.

The liquidation of Chiang’s family by the Taiwan independence forces caused Chiang Ching-kuo to abandon his political and historical achievements.

The “Henry Liu Case” (“Jiangnan Case”) of 1984 and the subsequent liquidation of Chiang Xiaoyong by the Taiwan independence forces are inextricably linked to the background of the development of Taiwan independence consciousness. With the support of the United States, the Taiwan independence forces used the “Jiangnan Case” to carry out the political liquidation of the Chiang family. This completely ended the subsequent political process of the Chiang family in Taiwan. This is probably the main reason why Chiang Ching-kuo has no motivation to pursue political achievements and historical achievements. Other reasons, such as economic reasons and American factors, may take a back seat.

It is not in line with the political interests of the United States and the economic interests of Taiwan.

The United States, one of the major players in international politics, chose to move closer to the Chinese mainland in order to resist the pressure of the Red Empire. But the unification of Taiwan and China is definitely not in the political interests of the United States.

Taiwan’s economic boom in the 1970s was mainly driven by the US-led imperial order. In the 1980s, Taiwan could not take any decisions that went against the political interests of the United States, as this would seriously damage Taiwan’s economic interests.

1.3.2 Lee Teng-hui is loyal to Japan’s geopolitical goals

Lee Teng-hui has a strong Japan complex. During his tenure, it was in line with his personal ideals to promote the Taiwanese independence trend, which was not dominant at the time, and to prevent mainland China from drawing closer to Taiwan.

During his 12 years in power, Lee Teng-hui greatly strengthened Taiwan’s pro-independence forces, which became an important factor in helping pro-independence activists take power in Taiwan in 2000.

Lee Teng-hui’s main actions to promote Taiwan independence include: freezing the government of Taiwan Province, misinterpreting the February 28 incident, introducing the “ruling power from other provinces” theory, proposing the “two-state theory”, promoting the election of Taiwan Executioner, and supporting Chen Shui-bian.

1.3.3 Chen Shui-bian Promoted Taiwan Independence

Chen Shui-bian seized a good opportunity to promote Taiwan independence. In 2000, the new US President George W. Bush, who came to power in the same year as Chen Shui-bian, adopted a tough policy towards China. Chen Shui-bian had a good opportunity to manipulate Taiwan independence. In his second term, he promoted “one country on each side”, “correcting Taiwan’s name” and “Taiwan’s entry into the UN”.

But after the September 11 attacks in 2001, the US launched a campaign to crush the uprisings in the Arab world. The US needs China’s support. As a result, Taiwan has essentially lost the chance of independence.

The Red Shirt anti-corruption movement that erupted in Taiwan in 2006 was essentially a campaign for Taiwanese independence. It wears the veneer of anti-corruption, but in essence it is dissatisfied with Chen Shui-bian’s slow pace of Taiwan independence. The level of corruption in the “Lafayette Ship” case, which was revealed at the time, far exceeded Chen Shui-bian’s state secret fees and was easier to operate. But no one opposed Lee Teng-hui because of the Lafayette case.

Chen Shui-bian knows that Taiwan independence is out of the question, but others don’t. They accuse Chen Shui-bian of squandering a historic opportunity. This is the real reason why the Red Shirt Army marched against Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan.

1.3.4 Ma Ying-jeou goes with the flow

During Ma Ying-jeou’s two eight-year terms, the unification faction complained that he wasted a great opportunity and failed to promote closer cross-Strait relations. When analysing the causes and consequences, Ma Ying-jeou has typical opportunist characteristics. He only works in areas where there is little resistance. It will not lead to a big failure, and it is impossible to aim for a big success. He clearly knew that the reason for the Red Shirt uprising was not corruption, but dissatisfaction with the pace of Taiwan’s independence. During his tenure, he did not even dare to do things that met with little resistance, such as revising history textbooks, let alone other things that were anti-Taiwan independence.

Ma Ying-jeou’s term coincided with the Hu Jintao period and the early years of Xi Jinping’s administration. The economic, military and political power on both sides of the Taiwan Strait has been reversed in every way. During this historical period, “one country, two systems” has always been Taiwan’s best political interest and political space. This is Taiwan’s best historical opportunity to pursue “one country, two systems”.

Figure 2: During Ma Ying-jeou’s eight years in power, Taiwan’s independence consciousness developed rapidly (Source: National Chengchi University Election Research Center)

The promises made by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping were not denied during the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras, nor were they explicitly denied during the early years of Xi Jinping’s administration. This is a historic window for Taiwan to negotiate the best “one country, two systems” solution based on the public commitments of Ye and Deng. It is a pity that Ma Ying-jeou, a man without ideals, has squandered Taiwan’s historic opportunity.

1.3.5 Tsai Ing-wen bucks the trend

During Ma Ying-jeou’s term in office, the proportion of Taiwanese who consider themselves to be Taiwanese has increased significantly. However, since the Chen Shui-bian era, Taiwan’s path to independence has been completely impossible. In the later period of Ma Ying-jeou’s administration, the mainland not only had political, economic and military advantages over Taiwan, but also gradually developed military advantages over the United States in the region. This fact means that the United States has been unable to prevent the Chinese central government from taking unified action.

Under such historical conditions, actively embracing “one country, two systems” is the only correct way to best serve Taiwan’s political interests in the political space.

A major drawback of the democratic electoral system is that politicians use populist tactics that harm the interests of groups. In order to win the election, Tsai’s group covered up the facts and misrepresented the overall political situation. In particular, her participation in the chaos in Hong Kong in 2019 completely angered mainland public opinion and the central government. So much so that in 2019, the mainland people’s support for reunification by force reached its peak.

Mainland public opinion is also the basis for the mainland central government to deprive Taiwan of the benefits of the two systems in August 2022. On 10 August 2022, the mainland central government officially issued a white paper on its Taiwan policy. This white paper officially declared that “Taiwan has lost the principle of one country, two systems forever” [1]. Taiwan’s political space is under the most severe restrictions since 1981.

1.3.6 Taiwan will continue to lose its remaining prime time

In 2022, mainland China’s new version of the “one country, two systems” plan will still maintain policy preferences in the daily lives of Taiwanese people. These include: tax issues, economic systems, government structures, whether there is a special economic zone structure, etc. However, the 2022 version of the white paper has strongly hinted that these policy preferences may not definitely exist after the armed reunification of Taiwan. However, it can be predicted that even if there is a risk of losing more political space, Taiwan will still not actively pursue “one country, two systems”. The reasons are at least the following:

It is impossible to reverse the Taiwanese people’s opposition to “one country, two systems”.
No matter which camp wins the 2024 election, peaceful negotiations with the mainland are unlikely to win the support of the Taiwanese public.
China will not hold talks with any group that does not have the mandate of public opinion and does not take the lead in showing more goodwill.
Mainland China will not discuss any plan other than “one country, two systems”. And it cannot break through the limits already set by the 2022 versions of the two systems.

II. Mainland abandons two systems

By default, China’s policy has always been inherited and long-term. The Chinese central government still holds high the banner of “one country, two systems”, but this does not mean that the mainland still adheres to the inertia of unilaterally liberalizing political preferences to Taiwan.

Since 2016, public opinion in mainland China against the preferential treatment of the two systems has continued to grow rapidly.

After the Taiwan authorities became deeply involved in the Hong Kong riots in 2019, public opinion on the mainland opposed peaceful reunification and called for reunification by force reached its peak.

On August 10, 2022, the mainland central government officially canceled major political preferences for Taiwan.

The white paper on August 10, 2022 officially announced the “abolition of one country, two systems” [1]. This is because all elements of the one country, two systems principle, including military command authority, diplomatic authority and the authority to appoint senior officials, have been returned to the central government.

The main reasons why mainland China abandoned the 40-year-old “one country, two systems” policy are as follows:

After 2016, mainland public opinion strongly opposed the peace talks.
After 2016, Taiwan seriously angered the central government of China.
Both systems will essentially harm China’s geopolitical interests.
Both systems will leave a window for external forces to interfere in China’s internal affairs.
The two systems will slow down the pace of Chinese history
Giving sub-identities to ethnic groups will hinder ethnic integration
The special zone structure will increase national governance costs
The structure of the SAR and the empowerment of ethnic sub-identities will create the danger of Taiwan’s next split.

2.1 Mainland public opinion strongly opposes Two-system

Since 2016, anti-mainland, anti-mainland people, and anti-central government behaviors in Taiwan have intensified. Mainland people’s perception of the Taiwanese regime and Taiwanese people is increasingly deteriorating. From the past “treasure island” and “the most beautiful scenery in Taiwan are the Taiwanese”, it has completely changed to hating, despising, scorning, and hating the Taiwanese.

With the advancement of media technology, some abnormal TV programs in Taiwan and programs in which Taiwanese insult mainlanders have become well-known to mainlanders. For example, “There are no toilets in the Mainland”, “Mainland people don’t close the door when going to the toilet”, “Mainland people can’t afford tea eggs”, “Mainland people can’t afford pickled mustard”, “Mainland people rely on catching voles to supplement protein”, “Mainland people are destroying Taiwan’s environment”, “Mainland people are very poor”, “Mainland people line up to watch others eat instant noodles”. There are countless examples like this, which make mainlanders think Taiwanese are really annoying. On the other hand, I think the IQ of Taiwanese people is indeed negative.

There are two terms on the mainland Internet specifically targeted at Taiwanese: “One country, two wisdoms” and “frog.” The first word reflects the extreme contempt that mainlanders have for Taiwanese. This sentence not only reflects the mainland people’s contempt for the Taiwanese people, but also intensifies the mainland people’s general dislike of the Taiwanese people.

Figure 3: The press conference video of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council is filled with barrages calling for Taiwan’s early reunification (screenshot by Ye Qiquan).

According to a 2018 opinion poll, 97% of mainland netizens support Tsai Ing-wen’s re-election[3]. The main reason is that Tsai Ing-wen’s re-election will promote or accelerate the process of military unification in mainland China. This shows that public opinion within the mainland is very strong against the peace talks.

Today, mainland people generally hate and oppose “one country, two systems.” “One country, two systems” has at least the following negative labels in the perception of mainland Chinese today:

The history of the concession and the memory of historical humiliation;
Unequal treatment of nationals;
Real feelings of humiliation;
Unequal economic distribution plan;
Support treason;

2.2 Mainland public opinion despises Taiwanese

The attitude of mainlanders towards Taiwanese has changed dramatically.

Before the three links between the two sides of the strait, mainlanders had a vague impression of Taiwanese. In primary school textbooks and Chinese middle school textbooks in mainland China, content about Taiwan has always been an indispensable part. This traditional education method makes mainland people have a vague and infinite concern for Taiwan.

Figure 4: Once upon a time, mainlanders were crazy about everything in Taiwan.

Cross-strait exchanges began in the days of Lee Teng-hui. During the Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou eras, cross-strait exchanges took place in almost all areas of the economy and people’s lives. As a large number of people from the mainland visit Taiwan, they can experience first-hand the actual living conditions of people in Taiwan. The mainlanders’ feelings towards the Taiwanese are at their best during this historical period. The famous Chinese phrase “Taiwan’s most beautiful scenery is its people” was coined during this period. This short phrase also fully reflects the mainland people’s warm embrace and praise for the Taiwanese.

However, since the late period of Ma Ying-jeou’s rule in Taiwan, Taiwan has begun to take hostile actions against the mainland. These anti-mainland actions have escalated since 2016. Ultimately, these actions against the mainland, the central government and mainlanders have caused mainlanders to lower their evaluation of Taiwanese. This process of negative evaluation escalates as Taiwan’s hostile behaviour escalates.

The two short words “one country, two wisdoms” and “green frog” were invented by mainland netizens to specifically describe Taiwanese. Their exact origins cannot be traced. But these two words began to appear on the Internet around 2007. At present, mainlanders almost exclusively use these two words to refer to Taiwanese. These two words fully reflect the extreme contempt, disdain and hatred of the mainlanders for the Taiwanese.

In this political environment that despises and scorns the Taiwanese people, if the mainland central government wants to give the Taiwanese people higher political and economic treatment than the mainland people, it must measure the resistance of the mainland people.

2.3 The Taiwan Government Has Angered the Mainland Central Government

After Tsai Ing-wen came to power in 2016, she repeatedly manipulated the issue of Taiwan independence. The “Taiwan National Theory” defines Taiwan as a “sovereign and independent country”, “Taiwan Consensus”, “Taiwan Values” and “Taiwan, the Republic of China”.

In 2019, the United States and Taiwan are deeply involved in the anti-Beijing turmoil in Hong Kong, seriously angering the mainland central government.

In August 2021, Tsai Ing-wen spoke of “neighbouring countries”.

Start of several batches of US lawmakers’ visits to Taiwan in 2022

The Speaker of the US House of Representatives will visit Taiwan in August 2022.

2.4 The Two System Hurts China’s Geopolitical Interests

From the perspective of international political relations, China’s reunification is the inevitable result of China’s growing political and economic power. At the same time, it should be noted that the state-to-state relations between China and the United States have not been properly handled. Before and for some time after China’s unified action, the state-to-state relationship between China and the United States will still be full of uncertainty. This uncertainty creates the potential for great risks. Under such circumstances, China and the United States will have different understandings of international relations and geopolitics. If both parties take actions to protect themselves and harm the other party based on different positions, it will be a reasonable expectation.

1) It is likely that the United States will exclude China from the current economic system, or that China will exclude the United States from the geopolitical sphere of East Asia.

2) It is also reasonable to expect that the United States will prevent China’s economic and political expansion around the world, or that China will try its best to form a huge anti-U.S. alliance on the world island.

Against the background of these expectations, maximising China’s geopolitical advantages in East Asia is not only China’s inevitable political pursuit, but also China’s reasonable action plan. But if China makes too many political concessions to Taiwan, it will seriously limit China’s geopolitical advantages in East Asia. This will also limit China’s ability to act in East Asia.

2.4.1 Shared economic progress requires China’s geo-security

The reunification of mainland China and Taiwan is the inevitable result of China’s comprehensive national strength rising to a certain level. It is unrealistic and irrational to stop or even try to reverse this trend. The trend has reached a point where there is no choice but to accept it.

As China’s national strength increases, it will be another inevitable trend to further expand the economic market and promote the improvement of other countries’ economic strength.

Just as the United States promoted economic progress in Europe through the Marshall Plan from the 1950s to the 1970s and led the Asian economy through the “flying geese model”, China will also become the leading force for economic growth in South America, Africa, Asia and even Europe in the next period. Europe in the next period.

The targets of China’s economic expansion will be first or mainly developing countries. With its strength and experience in developing the real economy, China has the ability to lead more countries into or near the industrialisation process. This trend is also expected by most developing countries.

If China wants to start a common industrialisation process in the world, it must have sufficient economic strength and economic jurisdiction. Without sufficient economic strength and economic jurisdiction, China cannot support this great dream. Economic jurisdiction is a power that is inevitably parasitic on the country’s military power.

Economic security is also parasitic on the country’s overall security capabilities. Geographical security in eastern and south-eastern China is an extremely important part of China’s national security. This factor will be closely linked to China’s ability to drive economic progress. The geopolitical power of the island of Taiwan occupies a very important position in this security structure.

In short, Taiwan’s geopolitical power is closely related to China’s national security strategy in the east and southeast. It is also closely related to China’s economic security and economic power. It is also closely linked to China’s ambition to drive global economic progress.

2.4.2 The two systems will weaken China’s geopolitical capabilities

The implementation of one country, two systems in Taiwan will weaken the centralisation and security capabilities of the Chinese central government in Taiwan, seriously weaken the geosecurity of eastern China, and seriously weaken China’s ability to lead other countries in jointly expanding industrialisation.

China’s geopolitical weakness on the island of Taiwan will have another, more serious consequence. The maritime power attributes of Japan and South Korea cannot be suppressed, leaving a major strategic gap in East China.

China’s geopolitical weakness on the island of Taiwan will not only weaken China’s overall geopolitical power in East Asia, but will also weaken China’s ability to engage in geopolitical cooperation with Russia.

China’s geographical disadvantage in Taiwan will seriously affect China’s international political influence in Europe.

2.5 The two systems will leave a window for external forces to interfere in China’s internal affairs.

2.5.1 Examples of unrest in Hong Kong

The handover of Hong Kong is a major event in China’s modern history. It is also a rare classic case in world history of resolving complex historical issues through peaceful negotiations. It is an outstanding achievement in the political construction of the People’s Republic of China.

However, the political situation in Hong Kong has not been stable since the handover. This instability peaked in 2019.

2.5.2 Small excuses lead to big confusion

The anti-extradition bill incident in 2019, like previous incidents, is a typical example of small excuses causing social unrest in Hong Kong.

A couple of young people from Hong Kong travelled to Taiwan. The young man killed the young woman in Taiwan and then fled back to Hong Kong. Taiwan was unable to arrest the suspect and try the case. Hong Kong’s territorial law applies and the case happened in Taiwan, so Hong Kong cannot arrest and try the murder suspects. Knowing that murder suspects are publicly visible in society without being able to bring them to justice is a huge challenge and contempt for the whole world order and legal system.

Hong Kong has no legal cooperation arrangements for the transfer of prisoners to Taiwan, and no legal cooperation arrangements for the transfer of prisoners to the mainland. The above-mentioned murder case exposed this loophole in Hong Kong law. Closing legal loopholes is a natural and logical process.

Such a legal, reasonable and gradual process has actually caused chaos in Hong Kong. Things that are completely unreasonable elsewhere are the norm in Hong Kong.

2.5.3 Foreign interference in China’s internal affairs

It is an indisputable fact that the United States and Taiwan were deeply involved in the anti-extradition bill incident in Hong Kong in 2019. This fact will not be discussed or argued in this section. Only the shortcomings of the two systems caused by the political structure of Hong Kong will be discussed.

Comparison between Hong Kong’s anti-extradition bill incident in 2019 and the attack on the U.S. Capitol in 2021
Country	Cause/ Instance	legal basis of the incident	degree of confusion	legal impact	Conclusion on USA opinion	legal consequences
China	questioned the negative effects of amending law	opposed amending an existing law	15-month chaos	extremely serious	“It is a beautiful landscape.”	The Hong Kong government withdrew the amendment; more than 500 people were arrested.
USA	questioned the integrity of the election results	freedom of expression	several hours chaos	Extremely minor	“criminal offense”, “domestic terrorism incident”, “insurrection”	Criminal prosecution on participants, many were requested up to 33 years in prison.
China	Attack all Hong Kong	Unauthorized rallies	Serious	extremely serious	democratic freedoms and to safeguard human rights	quelled by the central government’s amendment of laws; 589 people were arrested
USA	Storming of the U.S. Capitol	Unauthorized assembly	Minor	Very Minor	“Criminal offense,” “insurrection,” “terrorism”	National Guard and police; FBI intervened, 13 arrested, 1 dead, more than 500 searches; more than 400 criminal prosecutions.
China	broke into Legislative Council building; damaged property, attacked police,	displayed rebel flags, demanded establishment of a provisional government. Substantial violation of the law	extremely serious	extremely serious. close to rebellion or treason	Action on freedom of speech, action on safeguarding human rights.	589 arrested.
USA	broke into the Capitol; taking photos, taking away small souvenirs	Security personnel leading the way, no damage to property. No rebellion or treasonous remarks Insurrection	Minor	No rebellion or treasonous remarks Insurrection	Rebellion; treason; Criminal offense, insurrection, terrorism	970 arrested 500+ Research; 400+ prosecutions.
China	roadblocks, Molotov cocktails, helmets, shields, corrosive liquids, bricks and stones			more than 1 year	peaceful operations, peaceful demands,
USA	masks, mobile phones, cameras			Less than 24 hours	Riots, terrorism
China	snatched police guns, bit off police finger, surrounded police officers, tied up others, set fire to burn dissidents.				Peaceful demands, democratic actions, beautiful scenery.	Most exempted; 589 arrested.
USA	taking photos; taking away lamps, files, tables				riots, criminal offenses, domestic terrorism	use of the military and police, use of the FBI, criminal prosecution
Tabulation: Ye Qiquan ( 叶其泉 PPPNET www.pppnet.net)

There is no need to use words to discuss whether there are foreign forces interfering in China’s internal affairs. Look at this table and you can draw a conclusion. The United States and its allies will not apply the same standards to similar incidents in China and the United States. The American League has the power to formulate concepts and judge public opinion. They can take advantage of the shortcomings of Hong Kong’s two systems and apply double standards to China, thereby interfering in China’s internal affairs.

One country, two systems, whether in Hong Kong or Taiwan, gives foreign powers leverage and a platform to interfere in China’s internal affairs, posing grave risks to China’s national security. Even Macau, which is now in a secure state, faces the same risk.

2.6 Empowerment of “sub-national identity” hinders the process of national integration

2.6.1 Identity alienation in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus is the cultural medium for political alienation

One of the psychological reasons why Europeans reject Russians is that “every Russian has Mongolian blood”.

A review of the research literature from the 1960s and 1970s suggests that, at least in eastern and southern Ukraine during that period, no Ukrainian residents denied that they were Russian or part of the Russian people. Before the 2013 coup, Ukrainian residents also had no sense of a typically Ukrainian identity.

The separation of Ukraine and Belarus from the former Soviet Union is the premise and basis for the current political enmity between Ukraine and Russia. People who were almost completely mixed into the same ethnic group during the Soviet era gradually developed different ethnic markers due to the separation of the country. These secondary national markers have gradually become the soil and cultural medium for political alienation. The current predicament that Russia is facing in Ukraine is a product of the alienation of national identity.

It is easy to predict that within a certain historical period it will be difficult for Russia to avoid the Belarusian dilemma caused by the alienation of national identity. Although Belarus and Russia are now deeply intertwined strategic allies, different voices have begun to emerge. “Belarus has thousands of years of history”; “Don’t say we have relations with Russia”; “I am Belarusian”; “Chinese, please don’t call us Belarusians, we are Belarusians”.

2.6.2 Political Alienation through Identity Empowerment of “Hong Kong Citizens

China also demonstrates the consequences of political alienation through identity alienation. The “one country, two systems” policy of Hong Kong and Macao was once a roadshow model to induce Taiwan to participate in political negotiations. This model, especially the Hong Kong model, fully exposes the fatal flaws of two systems in one country. It leaves a window for external forces to interfere in China’s internal affairs.

1) For almost a hundred years since the British colonised Hong Kong, Hong Kong people have always considered themselves to be “Chinese” or “Cantonese”. During the Republic of China, a football league called the “Provincial and Hong Kong Cup” was held every year. It is not called the Guangdong-Hong Kong Cup, the Twin Cities Cup or the Brothers Cup. The name of this football league does not have a word with the same meaning in it. This word means that Guangdong is the province of Hong Kong people.

2) From the 1950s to the 1970s, Hong Kong had many events in which Hong Kong people expressed their Chinese identity. Whether they considered themselves to be part of the mainland government or the Taiwan government, they all pursued (declared) their Chinese political identity.

3) After Hong Kong implemented “one country, two systems” and became a Special Administrative Region in 1997, a new sub-identity of “Hong Kong people” emerged. The meaning of “Hong Kong people” is then different from the people living in Beijing, Guizhou, Guangdong and Guangxi that we often refer to. They belong to a special group of people with a “national sub-identity”. Slowly but surely, not only do Hong Kong people no longer recognise themselves as Cantonese, but a significant number do not even recognise themselves as Chinese. This is a typical case of political alienation caused by identity alienation.

Since 1997, anti-Hong Kong and anti-China sentiments have been gradually growing in Hong Kong. These are fermented and developed on the basis of a national sub-identity of “Hong Kong people”. This process of political alienation culminated in the 2019 anti-return riots. This process of political alienation did not stop with the promulgation of the HKSAR National Security Law in June 2020. Over the past three years, we can clearly see that this process of political alienation has gradually weakened. This is a typical positive case of “political assimilation” through “reduction of national sub-identity characteristics”.

2.6.3 “National sub-identity” without clear empowerment also hinders national integration

China’s history of ethnic integration is the most successful case of ethnic integration in the world

Looking at China’s more than 2,000-year history, which has clear written records, China is the most successful country in terms of ethnic integration. There are at least eight recorded ethnic minorities that have been fully integrated into the Han nationality group. Today, there is no great cultural isolation between the Miao, Tujia, Dong, Bai, Yi and other ethnic groups. Similarly, the Anglos have occupied Britain for more than a thousand years and still cannot resolve the identity differences between the English, Scots, Welsh and Irish. It has been almost a hundred years since the United States became a superpower, and it has not yet formed an ‘American nation’.

Ethnic minorities and even the Han people in Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan have a long history of chiefly rule. Since 1950, these three provinces have been successful examples of China’s ethnic policy. The Yi people in Sichuan, in particular, are very different from the local Han people in terms of their historical development, social system and cultural background. However, these huge differences did not prevent them from successfully integrating into the modern Chinese civilisation after 1950. The short integration process and the degree of success are unique not only in the history of Chinese civilisation, but also in the history of national integration in the world.

“National sub-identity” without clear empowerment also hinders national integration

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the process of ethnic integration was successful in the three provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan. These success stories do not mean that there are no failures in China.

The author’s personal experience is that Tibetans have been doing extensive business in the mainland since the 1960s and 1970s. Tibetan commercial activities in the mainland mainly involve the sale of traditional knives and other souvenirs with ethnic characteristics. At that time, there was no systematic market and social management mechanism in mainland China. In cities, a very small number of police and industrial and commercial administrators are relied upon to manage social order. In rural areas, the militia and industrial and commercial administrators of townships and brigades are relied upon to manage social order.

However, during this period of irregular administration, people in Tibetan areas (or people dressed in Tibetan clothing) behaved docilely and rarely caused trouble (or at least were not heard to do so).

Over time, the administration of the country gradually became more formalised. In both urban and rural areas, public security forces and police stations now function normally. The market management mechanism has also improved. The state already has the coercive power to maintain social and market order.

Then, for a while, the central government emphasised ethnic unity and respect for ethnic minorities. As a result, Tibetans doing business in the mainland caused trouble all over the mainland. Once civil disputes arise, the police dare not deal with Tibetans and can only deal with mainlanders unilaterally. In fact, this has led to tension and confrontation between Tibetans and Han people. Tibetans are causing more and more disputes on the mainland, and the level of conflict is getting higher and higher.

The negative consequences of inconsistent law enforcement do not stop here. Later, residents of Gansu and Ningxia also be reported that they were frequently causing trouble on the mainland.

The ’emphasis on national unity’ rule is only an internal rule in the implementation process. But this rule actually gives some people a special “national sub-identity”. It is this “ethnic sub-identity” that hinders the process of ethnic integration or causes alienation in ethnic relations.

“Taiwanese” is already a real “national sub-identity

In fact, the majority of Taiwanese are Han and speak mainly Hokkien and Mandarin. They worship the same Mazu as the people of Fujian. But in fact “Taiwanese” has become a de facto national sub-identity. The Taiwanese are now deliberately denying this fact. That is to say, their basic characteristics in life are the same as those of the Fujian people. They are trying to remove all biological markers, cultural markers and historical memories that have any connection with China.

Since Taiwan is not yet a fully independent political entity, nor a “special administrative region” empowered by the Chinese central government, the identity of “Taiwanese” has not yet been fully legally empowered. Whether to strengthen the political significance of “Taiwanese” as a sub-identity or to reduce its political significance will be a major fork for the Chinese central government.

2.7 The structure of SAR increases the cost of national governance

Many strange things have happened in the operation of the HKSAR government.

Michael Tien (Tian Beichen, 田北辰）wavers, sometimes supporting the establishment and sometimes opposing it;
The Pan-democrats Camp hasrepeatedly used procedures to block the agenda, even they have no voting advantage;
Parties with voting majority repeatedly made policy concessions and compromises to the minority;
Launching an opposition movement in the streets as soon as the minority is defeated in the parliamentary vote. Through street campaigns, the minority party effectively used illegal procedures to deprive the majority party of its legal rights.
While emphasising its independence, the HKSAR government has repeatedly asked for financial and political support from the central government;

In fact, there is a common logic behind these strange phenomena. It requires the central government to continuously pay political costs to the political forces in the HKSAR.

Special governing agencies always bring extra cost on central government

Looking back at China’s history, special administrative regions have always imposed additional economic costs on the central government.

1) The provincial governor system ( Prefecture Governor System) in the Han dynasty caused the central government to lose its financial capacity and political control.

2) The Jiedushi system (States Governor System) of the Tang dynasty initially saved the central government administrative costs, but eventually caused the central government to lose its financial capacity and political power.

3) Buddhist faith played a positive role in easing civil relations, reducing the opposition between local and central powers, and stabilising the dynastic ruling order. However, excessive devotion to Buddhism eventually caused the central government to lose its ability to collect large taxes and recruit soldiers.

The fundamental reason for these shortcomings is that these special agencies (mechanisms) once helped the central government. In the early days, they all had good reasons for being and good value. In fact, they made significant contributions to the central government’s achievement of specific policy objectives. But eventually they all became a burden on the central government and one of the main reasons for the fall of the dynasty.

Hong Kong is a special administrative region (SAR) adjacent to the mainland, and is fully covered by China’s land-based power. The central government is still unable to fully satisfy the constant demands of various political forces in Hong Kong. Taiwan is separated from the mainland by a sea, so it is normal to expect higher administrative costs than Hong Kong. Establishing the structure of the Taiwan Special Administrative Region will undoubtedly further increase the cost of governance in China.

Analysing the history of political development of Hong Kong and Taiwan, China’s special administrative region system has become an appeasement system. That is, the central government pays huge appeasement costs to local governments that resist the authority of the central government. Will this further encourage other provinces to rebel against central policies and authority? Provide long-term financial and political benefits to Hong Kong. Provide Taiwan with long-term political and financial benefits. Taking this as an example, how will the central government respond to Tibet’s and Xinjiang’s demands for preferential treatment? If Gansu and Ningxia apply for preferential treatment, what will the central government do? If Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan ask for preferential treatment, how will the central government respond? If the three northeastern provinces ask for tax rebates, what should the central government do?

Looking back at the Western Han, Eastern Han and Tang dynasties, the decline of the dynasty was not caused by foreign enemies. It was caused by the narrowing of the power gap between local governments and the central government. Even in the Ming Dynasty, the reason for the decline of the Ming Dynasty was not the attack of the Qing cavalry. The reason for the decline of the Ming dynasty was actually the loss of effective tax sources, as well as the loss of effective power and means to collect tax sources.

How to increase the mainland’s governance over Taiwan from a historical perspective and reduce the cost of governance is an important topic of scholarly research after China unified Taiwan.

2.8 The structure of Taiwan SAR will slow down pace of China’s history.

China has reached this historic window of opportunity to resolve the issue of Taiwan’s reunification. At the same time, China is also facing another watershed, the problem of how to move forward. The speed and pace of China’s further progress based on how China exploit the geopolitical benefits of Taiwan’s reunification.

The geopolitical security of eastern and southeastern China is related to the speed and scale of China’s progress. The Taiwan Special Administrative Region under the two systems will severely limit the ability of the Chinese central government to exercise geopolitical power over the island of Taiwan. Relatedly, China’s overall geopolitical power in East Asia will be weakened. Accordingly, China and Russia’s geopolitical cooperation capabilities in East and Central Asia will inevitably be weakened. Accordingly, China’s ability to implement and act in other political directions will inevitably be weakened.

China’s geopolitical goals and geopolitical paths after Taiwan’s reunification

If the United States not initiate pre-peace talks or post-peace talks plans, China and the United States will inevitably face a comprehensive soft confrontation once China completes the reunification of Taiwan. There may even be a hot conflict lasting 3 to 7 years. During this confrontation, if China does not separate Japan and South Korea from the US system, it will definitely face a long-term geopolitical disadvantage. If Taiwan implements “one country, two systems”, it will seriously limit China’s use of Taiwan’s geopolitical power. It will also severely limit China’s ability to achieve its geopolitical goals.

China’s geopolitical goals and geopolitical paths after Taiwan’s reunification are likely to include the following

1) Using the island of Taiwan as a base to build a solid land island or land bridge or land sword base. Extend China’s land-based forces into the Sea of Japan.

2) Suppress the sea-based forces of Japan and South Korea. China could achieve this goal by using the island of Taiwan as a base, alone or in cooperation with other third parties, in the sea north of Japan. In any case, the full development of the geopolitical power of the island of Taiwan is the basis of all possibilities.

3) Drive American power out of East Asia. By making independent use of Taiwan’s geographical advantages, China can achieve the goal of expelling US military power from East Asia. At the very least, China can independently suppress (compress) the geopolitical capabilities of the United States in East Asia.

4) Achieve regional cooperation in East Asia and Northeast Asia. This is another goal after driving the United States out of East Asia. But it is more difficult to achieve. China will have to use greater chaos, greater geopolitical pressure and a more complex international situation to achieve this goal.

5) If China is not willing to completely overthrow the existing international order, China’s enhanced geopolitical power in East and Northeast Asia will become the basis for China and the United States to negotiate power sharing.

6) If the United States wants to exclude China from the existing economic order, China’s enhanced geopolitical power in East and Northeast Asia is an important basis for China to integrate regional forces and establish a parallel economic order.

7) Fully utilising the geopolitical power of the island of Taiwan is the basis for China to achieve a series of subsequent political goals. Whether to establish a special administrative region structure for Taiwan will be an important decision for the Chinese central government.

2.9 The SAR Structure and the Strengthening of Ethnic Sub-identities Risking China’s Next Separation

2.9.1 Problems from the collapse of the Soviet Union

Russia’s current risks are not limited to Ukraine. In the 50 to 100 year cycle, Russia will certainly face political separation pressures from Belarus and Kazakhstan. Let’s not talk about Kazakhstan first. At least the Belarusian direction is a typical example of political landmines laid on the basis of identity differences (alienation of national identity).

If you go to lIf and look at the history of Ukraine, you will also find a brief history of what used to be called “Ukraine”. But for Belarus, it is difficult to find a clearly marked historical label of “Belarus”, no matter how hard you look for it. Even the historical label of the sub-country “Cossacks” is much clearer than the label “Belarus”. But now, on various formal and informal occasions, Belarusians emphasise that they have “thousands of years of history”: “Please don’t say that we have relations with Russia. “We are Belarusians”. Chinese people, please don’t call us “White Russians”, we are “Belarusians”.

lAt Back then, Yeltsin separated Belarus and Ukraine to get out of the dilemma of having no money and not being able to support the people. Not only are there political risks now, but there will be greater political risks in the next 50 to 100 years. Now the Ukrainians have gone from being brothers (or at least cousins) to being enemies of the Russians. There is more than a half chance that Belarusians will become enemies of Russians within 50 to 100 years (possibly shorter).

lIn the next 100-year cycle, Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians will inevitably face a complex process of intertwined national identities.

2.9.2 China’s crossroads

Whether the term ‘Taiwanese’ is willing to admit it or not, in political science it has become the political enemy of the ‘Chinese people’. The good news for the Chinese government is that the political label “Taiwanese” has not yet been formally “legally empowered”. Therefore, it is easy to weaken, dilute and then disappear. How to prevent the ‘legal empowerment’ of the ‘Taiwanese’ label is probably a major problem for the mainland central government.

If someone keeps emphasising that the people of Zengcheng are different from the people of Guangzhou, the people of Jinjiang are different from the people of Quanzhou. They will definitely think “we are just different”. Slowly, this mentality will be exploited by politicians. In the United States, politicians can exploit the differences between “red state people” and “blue state people” and their identities to pursue political interests. In Turkey, politicians can exploit differences between “secularists” and “anti-secular forces”. In India, politicians can exploit religious divisions. In Thailand, the rural-urban divide has created unrest in the country. In Ukraine, alienation and identity divisions are the basis for the start of the war. Now the Taiwan label is being used by politicians for the same reason. The Taiwanese have now created a new identity for themselves. This new identity is “Taiwanese”. This new Taiwanese identity will be the political basis for their next rebellion against the mainland.

Summary

Reference

Policy Document. The Taiwan Question and China’s “Reunification” in the New Era. Interpret: China. CSIS. Aug. 10, 2022. https://interpret.csis.org/translations/the-taiwan-question-and-chinas-reunification-in-the-new-era/
Ye QiQuan. China’s Unifying Plan:(8) Evolution of China’s Two-system Proposal. PPPNet. Mar. 29, 2023. https://en.pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan8-evolution-of-chinas-two-system-proposal/
王凡. 为何大陆网友纷纷支持蔡英文连任？Deutsche Welle. Jan. 16, 2018. https://p.dw.com/p/2qwJ3

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