China’s Unifying Plan: (5) Risk Assessment of Total Sina-US War

YE QIQUAN

March 29, 2023

Abstract:

If China launches military operations across the Taiwan Strait in 2026, it will be difficult for the United States to respond appropriately. Mainland China has the military advantage of choosing the battlefield and the political advantage of choosing the time to fight. Accordingly, it is difficult for the United States to take effective political action before China takes military action, and it is also difficult for the United States to take effective military action before China takes military action. At the same time, as long as the Chinese army completes its landing on the island of Taiwan, the US alliance will completely lose the possibility of landing on any piece of land in China. This military fact is enough to ensure that China will not suffer military defeat in a series of military conflicts. However, this basic fact does not guarantee 100% success for China. If the United States can take a series of actions outside the conventional framework, it will have a great chance of seriously weakening China’s military advantage and may even be able to permanently separate Taiwan from China. At the same time, if the United States escalates its military conflict with China, it will not only face the risk of South Korea and Japan withdrawing from the military process, but also the risk that the confrontation will lead to the deconstruction and realignment of European power with China. Although the US-led imperial order faces risks, it still has the resilience to continue to exist. At the same time, the United States will not suffer a national failure in the Sino-US conflict.

Table of Contents

Key Words:

Taiwan Strait, military operations, unification, effective range, Sino-US conflict, anti-ship weapons

I. Overall risk assessment of a full-scale military conflict

The greatest risk to China’s unified action comes from Europe’s attitude. Europe’s participation in a military response to China is the biggest variable facing China.

The biggest risk for the United States as a leader is that it cannot fail. But the fact is that once war breaks out, American defeat is inevitable. In essence, this will be a war whose outcome is decided before it begins.

1.1 Hypothetical background

First, the following background is established as a basis for the discussion in this section.

1) China needs to reunify Taiwan during Xi Jinping’s tenure.

2) China has a good opportunity to launch a unification movement in 2026[1].

3) Mainland China will complete its full military occupation of Taiwan within 7 days[2].

4) Taiwan will not submit a peace negotiation plan before the central government launches military action[1].

1.2 Forediction Tone

1) China is unlikely to suffer a military defeat.

2) China cannot rule out the possibility of military defeat.

3) The US has global advantages

4) America has real disadvantages locally

5) There is a high probability that the United States will not suffer national failure.

II. The basis for China not to suffer military defeat

2.1 China has the political advantage of choosing the timing of the war

Mainland China is very likely to launch an operation any day between April and September 2026. China’s central government has the political and military advantages to choose the best time to act. Although the US alliance can make various accusations against China, this is ultimately a civil war. The US alliance has not found sufficient reason in the existing imperial order to prevent such action in advance.

2.2 It will be difficult for the US alliance to prevent China’s central military from landing on the island of Taiwan.

2.2.1 Inability to prevent landing in advance

1) The United States cannot find sufficient political and legal reasons to use effective military force on the island of Taiwan in advance to prevent the Chinese central government forces from landing on Taiwan;

2) Faced with an adversary like China, the United States does not have the strength to dare to break through its own moral standards and legal framework and use effective military force against the island of Taiwan in advance.

2.2.2 Unable to mass troops in advance

Deploying large numbers of troops in advance in South Korea, Japan, Okinawa or the Philippines to deter Chinese military action is not the preferred military or economic option.

1) The Chinese military can drain the economic and military power of the US alliance through delaying tactics.

2) Stationing troops in Japan and Okinawa is extremely negative political behaviour and will provoke opposition from the Japanese people.

3) In the event of a conflict, the American alliance runs the great risk of losing all its military power in World War I.

2.2.3 Rapid military aid to Taiwan cannot prevent landing

Given the current military power gap, rapid military assistance from the United States cannot narrow the military power gap between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan; the timetable for completing military operations depends on the Chinese central government’s determination to act, force and political hesitation.

2.2.4 Difficulty in conducting effective military operations in the centre of the battlefield

Even if the United States were to station a large number of troops in the Philippines in advance, it would be difficult for the United States to project military power onto the island of Taiwan once war broke out. It is also difficult for the United States to project superior long-range firepower to the island of Taiwan.

2.3. The American alliance has no chance of landing China

Once the Chinese army has landed on the island of Taiwan, the US alliance will lose the opportunity to confront the Chinese army unless it engages in unconventional warfare.

At any level of conventional war, the US alliance has no chance of landing on any piece of Chinese land (including the island of Taiwan). This is the most fundamental underpinning of China’s invincibility.

2.4. China Has the Military Advantage of Choosing the Battlefield

2.4.1 China has the political advantage of choosing the military outcome

China has no pressure to maintain the current order, so it has the political advantage of choosing the military outcome. For China, as long as there is no defeat, it is a comprehensive military and political victory.

The basis of China’s victory is the military occupation of the entire island of Taiwan. In the subsequent war with the American alliance, unless there is a major comprehensive defeat, it will be a double political and military victory for China. There is even a high probability that it will bring secondary economic benefits.

2.4.2 China Has the Military Advantage of Choosing the Battlefield

China has the advantage of choosing the outcome of the war, which gives China the advantage of choosing the battlefield. The United States has a huge advantage in global military deployment. China’s objective is very clear: not to fight in the zone of military advantage of the US alliance. Fight the war only in the area covered by China’s medium-range missiles. This is China’s “defensively offensive” strategy.

China’s “defensively offensive” strategy blocks the global advantage of the United States.

2.5. China already has the advantage of “effective range” of weapons

2.5.1 Effective Range

There are three elements to the effective range of a weapon: economy, range and lethality.

The history of the progress of warfare is a history of the pursuit of greater effective weapons range. But the longest range is not the best effective range. The effective range of a weapon is essentially made up of three parts: range, lethality and economy.

It took more than 1,000 years for the most advanced bows and arrows to be used in war to replace the spear and become the dominant weapon of war. It took about 100 years for firecrackers to replace bows and arrows. The Napoleonic era briefly became the era of artillery victory, but it was not until the Second World War that mobile artillery replaced percussion guns (rifles and machine guns) and became the dominant weapon determining the outcome of European wars. These are all cases where economics limits the effective range of a weapon.

2.5.2 Effective Range drives military progress

The quest for greater effective range is the driving force behind military progress.

The lance replaced the club because of its greater range. Bows and arrows entered the battlefield because they could kill enemies from a distance. Firearms replace bows and arrows because their production, storage, training and use costs are lower than those of bows and arrows. The percussion cannon replaces the blunderbuss because of its greater range and damage. Artillery enters the battlefield because of its irreplaceable range and greater damage. The use of combat aircraft in warfare, the appearance of the V1 and V2, and the use of mobile airfields all follow this trend [3].

2.5.3 Economy (scale usage) lies first in Effective Range.

Pike replaced Pestle

Once bronze refining technology had matured, the Pike (long spear, long lance) quickly replaced the heavy wooden stick (Pestle, Pestle Club) as the dominant weapon in warfare. This was due to its economic affordability.

Bow and arrow

Bow and arrow had a very short time to dominate warfare.

The bow and arrow is the first revolutionary development in the history of weaponry. It brought progress not only in military effectiveness, but also in military theory. For the first time, mankind was able to take full advantage of geographical factors to temporarily encircle the enemy in a small space and win the war without contact. With the advent of the bow and arrow, the model of war based on the impact and collision of legions gradually disappeared from the stage of history.

However, in the more than 1,000 years since their arrival on the battlefield, bows and arrows have never achieved the status of a dominant weapon. Simply because it is not economically viable. During the Warring States period, Han-State had the highest war technology. Han-State has the highest technology for making bows and arrows and the largest production, and they even export it to other countries. But Han-State was the first of the six countries to be destroyed. So much so that later dynasties in ancient China were ashamed to be called Han (The Chinese spelling is 韩, not 汉. They have the same pronoun ).

Houchong (Hand Cannon)

After the advent of Hand Cannon, they quickly replaced bows and arrows when their range was not as good as bows and arrows and their use was also affected by the weather. This is because their manufacturing costs are no higher than those of bows and arrows, but their training, maintenance and use costs are far lower than those of bows and arrows. This is typical evidence that economics determines the importance of weapons.

Musket, Rifle, and Machine Gun

The basic reason for replacing the Hand Cannon with the Musket and Percussion Rifle is that the range is increased, the lethality is increased, the increase in cost is acceptable. And the total cost of use is greatly reduced for the same overall lethality.

During the First and Second World Wars, the heavy machine gun was a key weapon on the battlefield. However, the heavy machine gun did not eventually become the dominant weapon on the battlefield because it had no cost advantage in achieving the same damage effect.

Artillery, Rocket, and Missile

Nazi Germany’s huge heavy artillery, V1 and V2 rockets did not create a firepower advantage. Economic cost is the main reason.

During the Second World War, the Tiger Tank, which was the most advanced in Europe and ranked first in comprehensive firepower indicators, was ultimately defeated by the T34 Tank and Sherman Tank, which were far inferior in firepower and protection. Economy (scale usage) is the most fundamental reason.

Many countries have long-range missiles with a range of more than 10,000 kilometres, but such missiles cannot be used in conventional warfare, except in nuclear warfare. Or, if used in conventional warfare, it is impossible to have a significant war impact. The root cause is unsustainable economics.

Land-based Missile and Aircraft Carrier Fleet

It can be predicted that as soon as a weapon appears whose comprehensive economic performance exceeds that of an aircraft carrier battle group, the expensive aircraft carrier method of combat will quickly disappear from the historical stage that dominates the outcome of wars.

2.6 The importance of the effective range of weapons

Of the three elements that make up the effective range of a weapon, the above narrative tacitly assumes that China is ahead in two and on a par with the United States in one. In fact, it can be assumed that the effective range of Chinese weapons is already ahead. This advantage has the following implications.

If the United States attacks China with conventional weapons, its weapons systems are at great risk.
It is basically accepted that, after 400 years of backwardness, land power weapons have surpassed sea power weapons for the first time.
Even if the military progress of the United States once again leads China through space or ballistic missiles, it will basically not be able to change the historical reality that the range of sea power weapons is relatively shorter than that of land power weapons.
The scale effect of China’s secondary industry will ensure that the cost of China’s superior weapons will be further reduced, thereby further promoting the leading advantage of China’s weapons in effective range.
It is difficult for land-based weapons to resist the temptation to prove their own superiority, and this may become a major incentive to start a comprehensive war.

III. The possibility of China’s failure

Three. The possibility of Chinese failure

So far, China seems to have a certain advantage in operating under the cover of its medium-range ballistic missiles. But military operations are always the most random of events. Statistically speaking, there is no event with a probability of 1.

As mentioned above, when China launched its operations on the island of Taiwan, the Chinese government had no pressure to maintain the current power order. This reality gives China the following advantages.

lChina has the advantage of choosing the date of the military operations
lChina has the advantage of choosing the battlefield
lChina has the advantage of choosing the outcome of the war

Among China’s advantages, two basic points guarantee China’s victory. One is the complete occupation of the island of Taiwan. The other is not to suffer a major defeat in a conflict with the United States. It can be seen that the key to defeating China is for the United States and its alliance to prevent the Chinese central government from occupying the island of Taiwan.

There are three ways in which this objective can be achieved.

3.1 Stop before Run

Among the plans to prevent the Chinese central government from militarily occupying the island of Taiwan, the plan with the highest probability of military success is the pre-emptive plan. Its military feature is to anticipate the Chinese central government’s actions and launch military plans in advance to prevent China’s landing operations. There are the following implementation options to achieve this goal.

Station a large number of troops in Taiwan before China launches operations. Turn China’s actions against Taiwan into China’s military actions against the United States.
Seizing major ports in Taiwan as military ports for the US coalition forces will give the US the military strength to block the Taiwan Strait.
To use various political plans and political means to promote Taiwan’s independence quickly and forcefully and to lay a “political foundation” for the US coalition to station troops in Taiwan.

3.2 Tackle (Block) in Game

If the United States and China clash in East Asia, the United States has many Asian allies. South Korea and Japan are certain to join the conflict. Other US allies that may join in include Australia, India, the Philippines and Myanmar. But the combination of these forces cannot provide a military advantage over China. Joining the European powers is the basis for the US alliance to form a military advantage over China.

Europe joining the US coalition to jointly attack China is a political assumption that is very close to reality. Perhaps China does not fully understand this political assumption.

3.2.1 European hostility has not always been the focus of Chinese research.

1) Reviewing the research on Chinese politics in the past 20 years, Europe’s hostility towards China has not been the focus of research by Chinese political scientists. In fact, Europe has strong “endogenous” hostility towards China. The level of hostility is even higher than the level of public opinion in Japan and South Korea.

2) The decline of Europe’s economic and political power over the past 30 years basically coincides with the rise of China’s power.

3) European public opinion generally tends to believe that China has taken over Europe’s share of economic and political power.

4) The past history of winning the war against China makes it difficult for European voters to recognise and tolerate China’s practical advantages.

5) Europe has not only the pressure to “passively” attack China, but also the urge to “endogenously” comprehensively defeat China. Once the risk of major failure is basically eliminated, Europe’s blind moves and adventurous impulses towards China will be difficult to contain.

6) Europe’s “conceptual innovation” and “conceptual leadership” capabilities do not reflect the true philosophical logic of Europeans. European public opinion is not as “anti-nuclear war” as they claim. On the contrary, the philosophical logic of “uncertain prospects” and “incompatible tribes and groups”, rooted in the history of national and cultural development, has made European public opinion generally “blind”.

7) Once the logic of “using nuclear power” has been triggered in European public opinion, European politicians will be completely unable to stop it. The main responsibility for preventing the use of nuclear weapons in real wars will inevitably fall on the shoulders of the Chinese.

3.2.2 Europe has full colonial attributes

In the war of 2022, European countries, whether actively or passively, are participating fully and actively in a war to weaken themselves. This is in serious contradiction with the principles of political science and the trend of historical development.

To judge from this the low political capacity of all European politicians is not in accordance with the principles of statistics.

The only reason that can support this political reality is that “Europe has become a complete colony of the United States” [4].

Europe, as a US colony, will certainly become a burden for China in the Sino-US conflict and will not be able to play the role of a political power balancer – this is China’s expectation of Europe for more than 30 years before 2022.

3.2.3 China cannot bear the consequences of European collective action

If Europe coordinates with the US alliance in advance and sends troops together to disrupt China’s unified action, it will cause China great political difficulties. It may even have political, military and economic consequences that China cannot bear.

lExceeded plan.

There may be a risk that China will not include the European powers as military enemies. Research of Chinese politics has always focused on studying the hostility of the United States, Japan, South Korea and India towards China. In reviewing political research over the past 20 years, China has also studied to some extent the hostility to China in Vietnam, the Philippines, Australia, Russia and Indonesia. Chinese political researchers may have been confused by Europe’s superior “concept creation” ability and ignored a group with the strongest hostility to China in the world.

lPowerful capabilities for war of attrition.

The European powers have not only strong military production capabilities, but also strong primary and secondary industrial production capabilities. These are the assets Europe is using to support the American group in its long-term war of attrition.

lPowerful real-time warfare capabilities.

If the European powers concentrate heavy troops in the Philippines in advance, the US alliance will be able to project war power quickly onto the island of Taiwan. This puts China at risk of losing most of its navy in the first wave of fighting.

lExtremely serious political consequences.

Once the European powers mass heavy troops near the Philippines, China would face the following intolerable political consequences.

1) A complete political break with Europe;

2) The complete separation of China’s economic system from that of Europe and the United States;

3) The formal (at least quasi-formal) division of the world into two parallel parts;

4) greatly increasing the risk of nuclear war.

Once the European powers make a formal decision to join the US coalition against China, the shock to China will be of the highest order. It will take China at least half a year to make appropriate political decisions. This delay will lead to infinite changes and variables.

3.3 Nuclear war

Taking the war directly to the level of nuclear war is another plan of the US coalition to gain military advantage. The United States can immediately drop a small nuclear device on a small reef with no clear ownership in the South China Sea when China has just launched its military operation against Taiwan, using the strongest political posture to express its complete break with China. The United States can also use nuclear war plans to regain military superiority when preemptive and accidental deterrence plans fail.

Exceeds China’s political plan. China has always regarded the theory of nuclear counterattack as the basis of its national nuclear strategy. Chinese politicians have always opposed the use of nuclear weapons in war.
America’s war decisions have always been limited by public opinion. Quickly raising the war response level to the highest level deprives public opinion of the opportunity to oppose it.
It is not certain that China and the United States have an effective nuclear balance. At least the current public opinion in the United States and Europe does not believe that China and the United States have a nuclear balance. This puts China at a political disadvantage in the face of nuclear threats.

IV. America’s advantages

1) Globally distributed military bases and support facilities;

2) The stockpile of strong military power;

3) An unparalleled alliance system that can concentrate the most powerful military and economic capabilities to overwhelm the enemy;

4) Comprehensive military advantages in areas far from China’s land power;

5) Nuclear power superiority and determination to proactively raise the level of war;

V. America’s disadvantages

1) Unable to withstand military defeat; unable to win a long-term war of attrition;

2) It is difficult to concentrate military power from the periphery of the battlefield to the centre of the battlefield;

3) Military policy is susceptible to dramatic changes due to fluctuations in domestic public opinion;

4) It is impossible to fight two full-scale wars on the European battlefield and the Asian battlefield at the same time;

5) Difficulty in choosing both military and peaceful options in advance;

6) Unable to handle the risks of Japan and South Korea during the war;

7) Unable to control the risk of restructuring the European power system.

VI. The Greatest Risk to the United States

6.1 Japan and South Korea withdraw from the war process

1) Japan and South Korea are inevitable participants in the conflict between China and the United States;

2) Compared with Europe, Japan and South Korea have more typical and extensive colonial characteristics; Japan and South Korea cannot raise objections to US war actions;

3) Japan and South Korea are definitely active participants in low-level conflicts between China and the United States;

4) As soon as one of China, Russia or North Korea expresses the political will to prevent South Korea from further intervening in the war, South Korea can be expected to show political hesitation.

5) If the military conflict between China and the United States escalates to a medium war level, it is the inevitable gateway for South Korea to withdraw from the war process [5].

6) When the military conflict between China and the US escalates to a medium war level, it will be a historical crossroads for Japan to consider following A or C.

7) Once it is convinced (or seriously doubted) that the United States cannot win in a medium- and high-level war, it will be an inevitable threshold for Japan to withdraw from the war process.

8) If the war continues, Japan’s behaviour may not stop at withdrawal from the war process[6].

9) If Europe, Israel, East Asia and North America are regarded as the four main military pillars of the United States in maintaining the imperial order, the collapse of the East Asian military pillars of the United States will inevitably severely weaken the military pillars of the imperial system.

6.2 Deconstruction of the Existing Power System in Europe

The maintenance and deconstruction of the European power system depends mainly on the complex game between China, the United States and Europe. This is mainly reflected in the following:

Whether Europe as a whole is directly involved in the military conflict between China and the United States;

Whether the United States is determined to exclude China from the existing power system;

Whether China finally decides to break completely with the United States;

Among the above three aspects, European and American factors are external factors that contribute to China’s final European policy, while China is the most important factor in determining the direction of Europe. This assumption is based on the following reasons.

1) Europe’s general political weakness due to the war in 2022.

2) The history of border mobility in Europe has indeed begun. But it is still in a weak state of equilibrium.

3) Russia has considered the Dnieper River as a new border to ensure the security of the Russian nation. Any new imbalance will bring new opportunities for Russia.

4) The whole region of North Africa, the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula are existing geopolitical forces opposing the European power system.

5) Many countries in Europe have made psychological and political preparations and are ready to face a geopolitical chaos.

6) Europe’s economic power is an important basis for maintaining Europe’s political capabilities. But it is currently weakening and declining. Although China is an important competitor for European power, it is also an important force that determines the development direction of European economic and political power.

7) The Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula not only welcome but also expect Chinese power to intervene in the region.

8) The North African region looks to China more than to Europe for its prospects of economic progress and political expansion.

9) China is very likely to become the spark that ignites multi-dimensional anti-European forces, and China may even personally promote the process of border mobility and power reorganisation in Europe.

10) If China is determined to start the process of deconstructing and reorganising power in Europe, it will be difficult for the United States and Europe to stop it.

VII. The way for the United States to avoid total defeat

When discussing the failures of the United States, there are two levels of discussion. One level is the failure of the American imperial order. The other level is the failure of the United States at the level of national power.

7.1 The United States Will Not Suffer National Failure

1) At present, China does not have the total national strength to defeat the United States. This includes political power, military power and philosophical programmes.

2) Even if the United States is defeated in a major war in the Pacific or the Indian Ocean, China will not be able to seriously weaken the national power of the United States.

3) The prerequisite for China to defeat the United States militarily is to adopt a “defensive offensive” strategy. The opportunity for China to adopt an offensive strategy to defeat the United States is not ripe at this stage.

4) Even if the United States relinquishes its global responsibilities, the retreat to the Americas does not mean that the national prospects of the United States are bleak. Since TRUMP, the United States has been trying to find a new path for national development. Such attempts will involve more people and will take a very long time.

7.2 The US-led imperial order is both fragile and stable

1) China has the capacity to become the leader of an anti-US imperial order, but China does not have the political preparation to defeat the United States;

2) China is not philosophically prepared to overthrow the US imperial system. The lack of a philosophical programme leaves China without a political programme to assume world leadership. The G2, G3 and even G4 plans are all more ideal political plans for China to lead the world than G1.

3) Compared to the huge chaos caused by the G3 or G4 plans, China would rather choose the G2 plan. Given the choice, the G2 plan would definitely be far superior to other plans for the United States.

4) Compared with retreating to the Americas or mutual nuclear war, choosing the G2 option is easier and cheaper for the United States.

If the United States and China reach a consensus on choosing the G2 solution, these two superpowers will eventually reach cooperation.

Summary

Reference:

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